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Abstract
This study analyses the reforms of monetary and exchange rate policies in Vietnam 
during the 1990s. It focuses on the reform of monetary instruments, particularly 
transition from direct to indirect monetary policy instruments, the effects of exchange 
rates and prices on trade flows, the possibilities and policy options of using devaluation 
as a tool to encourage exports, improve the trade balance and balance of payments 
(BOP).
Investigating the reform of monetary instruments and the transition from direct to 
indirect instruments shows that the State bank of Vietnam (SBV) relied more on direct 
instruments, which were used as effective tools to control inflation and maintain 
macroeconomic stability and have been liberalised step by step. However, the use of 
direct instruments led to inefficiency in financial intermediation and misallocation of 
financial resources. Indirect instruments have been increasingly introduced but their 
role in the financial sector is still limited due to the underdevelopment of the financial 
market. The results from empirical analysis indicate that the use of indirect instruments 
contributed to increase the degree of monetary control, but there is not enough evidence 
to conclude that it improved financial sector efficiency. Therefore, indirect instruments 
should be increasingly implemented and should start to replace the direct ones in the 
near future. In addition, the restructuring of the banking system and state-owned 
enterprise (SOE) reform are important for the success of transition to indirect 
instruments and to maintaining macroeconomic stability.
Exchange rate policy in Vietnam, as a part of monetary policy, has been implemented in 
a flexible and market oriented way. During the period 1992-1998, nominal effective
exchange rates depreciated around 20 per cent, but real ones appreciated around 20-30 
per cent. The results from Error Correction Models (ECMs) indicate that prices affect 
trade flows more than exchange rates do in the short run for export demand and in both 
short and long runs for import demand. In contrast, exchange rates have larger effects 
on trade flows in the long run for export demand and the Marshall-Lerner condition 
holds. Moreover, joining bilateral and multilateral trade agreements requires Vietnam to 
reduce tariffs and other trade restrictions. This suggests that devaluation may need to be 
used to encourage exports in the near future.
This possibility of using devaluation can be considered more carefully when the 
dynamic links between inflation, exchange rate and money supply are examined. The 
results from Vector Error Correction Models (VECMs) show that exchange rates and 
money supply indeed lead to higher inflation in the long run. In the short run, both 
money growth and exchange rate depreciation are major sources to increase inflation, 
but exchange rate depreciation alone increased inflation very little. So, the devaluation 
can be used to stimulate exports and reduce the appreciation of real exchange rates in 
the short run. However, the devaluation policy needs close coordination with monetary 
policy, in which money supply must be controlled effectively. With large capital 
inflows, indirect monetary policy instruments such as open market operations (OMO), 
foreign exchange forwards and variable deposit requirements, are considered as tools to 
sterilise capital inflows, and to avoid inflation and real exchange rate appreciation.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Monetary policy plays a vital role in shaping the destiny of a nation, for money and 
credit significantly influence the direction, nature and volume of economic activities 
(Desai and Ghonasgi 1969). The term monetary policy refers to actions taken by central 
banks to influence monetary and other financial conditions in pursuit of the ultimate 
targets of price stability, high level of employment, external equilibrium and sustainable 
economic growth. Through monetary transmission, central banks use monetary 
instruments to influence operational and intermediate targets in order to achieve the 
above ultimate targets.
Exchange rate policy is considered as a macroeconomic tool to achieve and maintain 
international competitiveness and so ensure a viable balance of payments (BOP), and to 
anchor domestic prices. Exchange rate policy also has been conducted by the central 
banks and is considered as an instrument of monetary policy.
However, in general, the role of monetary policy in developing countries is limited 
compared with developed countries because of some features of the developing 
economies such as, a low degree of monetisation, their underdeveloped banking 
systems and the narrow size of securities markets. These will hinder the effectiveness of 
monetary policy (see Addison and Demery 1993, Ghatak 1981). The implementation of 
exchange rate policy in developing countries also has some differences with developed 
countries since most developing countries still maintain fixed or crawling peg exchange
rate regimes after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. Their currencies are non- 
convertible, foreign exchange is controlled and capital markets are repressed (Edwards 
1989).
Since the late 1980s, most centrally planned economies (CPEs) have transited their 
economies into market oriented ones, and the reform of monetary and exchange rate 
policies in these countries are essential, because of their historical legacy. Most CPEs 
had typical features such as state ownership of means of production, government set up 
physical input and output plans, as well as fixed prices. Foreign trade mainly relied on 
the countries within the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA1 2), this was in 
the form of barter trade among these countries. A passive financial system and mono­
banking system included state bank and state specialised financial institutions". State 
banks had significant monopoly power over banking and credit, specialised financial 
institutions usually provided banking services to particular sectors (for example State- 
Owned Enterprises (SOEs)) that were specified by the state bank authorities 
(Sundararajan 1992). Banking system activities and monetary policy (monetary 
management) in these countries played a passive role that provided the financial assets 
required to finance the real sector transactions prescribed by the central plan (Wagner 
1998: 6). Exchange rates were considered as an accounting device to convert the 
domestic and foreign prices during the barter trade between CMEA countries, since 
physical input and output plans also contained foreign exchange, external borrowing 
and import plans (Sundararajan 1992).
The transition from centrally planned economies into market oriented ones has changed
1 CMEA countries included Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Former Czechoslovakia, Former Soviet 
Union, Former German Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Cuba and Vietnam (see 1WE 1985).
2 They included specialised banks and saving funds.
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the nature of those economies. Therefore, their financial systems must be reformed and 
the fundamental reforms of monetary and exchange rate policies in both their 
institutions and functions are crucial for the success of financial sector and economic 
reforms.
1.1-Vietnam economic reform since the unification in 1975
Vietnam’s economy before the 1980s followed the Soviet economic model as well as 
traditional CPEs. The major characteristics of the Vietnamese economy in that period 
can be described as follows: means of production belonged to the state, the government 
determined all economic activities through physical input and output plans, and 
controlled prices. SOEs in industries (with emphasis on heavy industry) and 
cooperatives in agriculture were the foundation of the economy. These sectors received 
subsidies from the government in investment, credit loans, etc. Foreign trade was 
underdeveloped, was mainly with CMEA countries and monopolised by the 
government. The service sector was peripheral. The financial system was passive and 
there was a mono banking system. The financial and banking system only 
accommodated the production plans set by the central government.
This economic model was appropriate to the government to develop certain sectors 
(state sector) or pursue the purpose of industrialisation. Besides that, it also provided 
social benefits for people such as education and health. However, this did not create 
incentives for economic units and individuals. In addition, the military involvement of 
Vietnam in Cambodia, the US embargo and a cut in foreign aid from the former Soviet 
Union and Eastern European Countries in 1979-1980, worsened the economic situation 
and put the Vietnamese economy in serious recession. This revealed more clearly the
failure of a central planned system and created the critical demand for economic reform 
(see Vu 1994, Vo 1997).
In the early 1980s, some partial reforms in the economy were undertaken. The first 
reform was initiated in agriculture in 1980 with the “output contract” movement, which 
brought incentives and flexible, effective possibilities for households in the collective 
farms. The following reform was the reform of SOEs in the industrial areas in 1981, 
with the “three point plan” under Decision 25/CP of the State Council. This reform in 
the industrial area also increased the autonomy and improved the incentives of SOEs in 
production. However, the reforms in both agriculture and industry still performed in the 
frameworks of the CPEs and these did not make a fundamental change (Vo 1997).
In 1985, the first financial reform, named “price-wage-money”, was launched. In this 
reform, the one price system was introduced and state subsidies on consumption goods 
prices were abolished. A higher wage system was set up to compensate the reduction in 
the real wage due to abandoning of subsidies and high rates of inflation. Money reform 
was also implemented, the old Dong was converted into the new one at a rate of ten to 
one. However, this reform failed and caused a severe crisis for the economy. In the 
period 1986-88, “Annual inflation accelerated to several hundred per cent, output 
growth slowed, and external arrears rose to high levels” (Leung and Vo 1996: 188, and 
see Table 1.1). Total investment declined to very low rates (around 8 per cent of GDP) 
and the “current account deficit is estimated to be larger than total investment, implying 
that the saving rate was negative. For those three years, external finance was used not
’ Plan A consisted of the output plan for the state, using state-supplied inputs; Plan B was the plan for 
state above plan A, which resulted from inputs procured by the enterprises themselves; and Plan C was 
the “minor” output plan, under which enterprises could sell these outputs in the “free” market.
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only to fund all investment, but also to cover some consumption and/ or government 
current expenditure” (World Bank 1990:17).
The failure of this reform was due to the absence of appropriate fiscal and real sector 
reforms (Ngo 1997). Moreover, the sequencing of reform was poor: “restructuring of 
the state sector was not in phase with the financial reform, which was still of a mono­
bank type” (Roman 1995: 117). Therefore, a comprehensive reform package was 
needed.
Table 1.1. Economic Growth and Inflation Rates, 1981-88 (per cent pa)
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88
R eal n a tional incom e 
g ro w th  1/ 2.3 8.8 7.2 8.3 5.7 6.5 3.4 4 .6
R eal G D P  g ro w th  1/ 5.7 3.4 2.5 5.9
In v estm en t (% of GDP) 12.9 8.6 8.0 8.5
N a tio n a l sav in g  (% of GDP) 5.6 -1.7 -1.1 -2 .0
In fla tio n  ra te  21 69.6 95.1 49.5 64 .9 9 1 .6 4 87 .2 301 .3 308 .2
Note: 1/ 1982 Prices
2/ General Price Index (weighted to the official and free market indices).
Source: GSO(1991: 15). McCarty et a! (1992: 87). World Bank (1990:16,118). Author’s
In March 1989, a comprehensive economic reform in Vietnam was implemented. The 
purposes of this reform were to stabilise the economy, to create a basic change in 
economic management and set up prerequisites for the transition to a market oriented 
economy. The reform included a stabilisation program that used measures of restraining 
government expenditures and the growth of credit, eliminating most domestic price 
controls, raising interest rates and devaluing the exchange rate (Riedel 1993) and was 
combined with the abolition of bureaucratic management based on state subsidies, 
decentralisation of SOEs, decollectivisation in rural areas, allowing the development of
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the private sector, reforms of the financial sector and changes in external economic 
relations (foreign trade, FDI).
As a result, from 1989 to 1997, macroeconomic stability was achieved and maintained. 
Inflation was brought down from 308.2 per cent pa in 1988 to 34.7 per cent pa in 1989, 
and although it rose to more than 60 per cent pa during 1990-1991, it was brought down 
again and maintained at around 10 per cent pa or single digit level during the period 
1992-1997 (Tables 1.1 and 1.2). During that time, the economy achieved a high growth 
rate. Real GDP grew at an average rate of 7.9 per cent pa, of which 10 per cent pa was 
for industry, 4.3 per cent pa for agriculture, and 9.9 per cent pa for services.
Average annual growth rates of exports and imports were around 27 per cent to 28 per 
cent pa. FDI had been increased substantially from US$100 million in 1989 to around 
US$2 billion in 1997. Balance of payments (BOP) improved and budget deficit also was 
restrained from 7.7 per cent to 8.8 per cent of GDP in 1989-1990 to just above 1 per 
cent of GDP in 1997. Total investment and domestic saving increased from around 11 
per cent and 5 per cent of GDP in 1989 to around 27 per cent and 20 per cent of GDP in 
1997, respectively (Table 1.2). Moreover, the reform was effective in galvanising the 
development of the private sector4 and contributing to poverty reduction (World Bank 
1999). The achievements of the comprehensive economic reform were praised by 
international communities.
The financial crisis in the region occurred in mid-1997 and most countries in the region 
were affected by it. In contrast, “Vietnam has avoided the serious balance of payments,
4 Share of private sector in the total GDP of economy increased from around 27 per cent in 1991 to 
around 39 per cent in 1995, and it declined to around 37 per cent and 36 per cent in 1997 and 1999 due to 
the development of state and foreign investment sectors (see Appendix: 8.9).
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fiscal or banking crises that have been common in the region” (World Bank 1999: 5). In 
the two years 1998-1999, inflation was still controlled at 9.2 per cent pa in 1998 and 
only 0.1 per cent in 1999. BOP and budget deficits were maintained at the pre-financial 
crisis level (Table 1.2).
However, Vietnam has been facing many challenges and difficulties after the financial 
crisis and severe floods in the central area of Vietnam in 1999. The real GDP growth 
rate declined to 5.8 per cent and 4.8 per cent pa (the lowest rate since 1989). FDI also 
reduced to US$800 million in 1998 and US$700 million in 1999 (private foreign 
investment returned to Korea, Thailand, and Malaysia, but not as yet to Vietnam). 
Urban unemployment rose to 7.4 per cent from 6 per cent in 1997 (World Bank 1999). 
The total amount of foreign debt (both convertible and non-convertible areas) accounted 
for 76.8 per cent and 74.0 per cent of GDP in 1998 and 1999? (IMF 2000: 3) and may 
cause problems for the current account and BOP.
This data was estimated by the IMF (2000) until August 2000, and the amount of foreign debt in the 
convertible area was US$10,577 million (of which 94.7 per cent was medium and long term debt) and for 
the Nonconvertible area it was TR 10,515 million (TR is transferable roubles). However, according to 
Nguyen (2001), the total amount of Vietnam’s foreign debt (government and business debt) was 
estimated at US$1 1,800 million by December 31, 1999. Government debt was US$7,600 million, 
accounting for 64.5 per cent of total foreign debt. The government’s debt before 1993 is called the old 
debt; it was equivalent to only US$3,700 million since this debt was written off from 50 per cent to 85 per 
cent. The government’s debt after 1993 is called the new debt, which was estimated at US$3,900 million. 
All the government’s old debt after restructuring and new debt have times for maturity from 10 to 40 
years with concessionary interest rates (low interest rates). Data of business foreign debt are not 
available.
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During the period of comprehensive reform, SOEs have been reformed to improve their 
autonomy and efficiency, but until late 1997, more than half of them (total SOEs are 
5800) have lost money, their total debt was VND63 trillions (US$4.4 billions)6. The 
equitisation process has been slowed. After the financial crisis, their situation has 
worsened due to fall in domestic demand and greater import competition (World Bank 
1999).
The banking system has also been reformed from a mono to a two-tier system and it has 
been in the process of restructuring and improving in soundness and effectiveness. 
However, there are still problems in the banking system such as the degree of 
monetisation being low, a high level of non-performing loans (NPLs), poor 
management, and ineffective intermediation.
The reform of foreign trade has seen significant achievements in liberalising the entry to 
foreign trade, supporting exports and diversifying the direction of trade. However, the 
level of protection in Vietnam is still higher than its neighbours, import tariffs are high 
and dispersed, export taxes are still imposed on some goods, the degree of transparency 
is low.
Understanding these challenges and difficulties, the Vietnamese government has 
continued to reform and a number of important measures have been taken such as 
creating a sound banking system, reforming SOEs, opening up international trade, and 
creating a more supportive environment for the private sector. The aims of further 
reform are to stimulate the growth of the economy, but “the implementation of these
6 (see World Bank 1999: 22)
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measures is only now beginning, and it is not yet clear whether action will be firm or 
rapid enough to help turn around the economy” (World Bank 1999: 5). At present, 
while neighbouring countries in the region have recovered rapidly, Vietnam may 
become one of the slower performers in the region.
1.2-Objectives, approaches and structure o f this thesis
The objectives of this thesis are to examine the reforms of monetary and exchange rate 
policies. These focus on the reform, particularly the transition from direct to indirect 
monetary instruments and also concentrate on the effects of exchange rate and prices on 
the trade flow and whether devaluation can be used as a effective tool to encourage 
exports and improve trade balance and BOP. Moreover, the links between inflation, 
exchange rate and money supply needs to be examined in order to provide the scientific 
evidence for policy makers to coordinate monetary and exchange rate policies in the 
case of devaluation that stimulates exports and economic growth while macroeconomic 
stability is still maintained.
These issues are important in transitional economies such as Vietnam, where financial 
sector reform was undertaken and the reform of monetary policy, particularly the 
transition from direct to indirect monetary instruments is in progress. This transition is 
indispensable and the evolution of indirect monetary instruments is a key factor to 
evaluate the success of financial sector reform. In addition, the tendency of VND/USS 
real exchange rate appreciation since March 1992 (Dodsworth et al. 1996a) and the 
heavy devaluations from neighbouring countries after financial crisis in the region in 
mid 1997, may erode the competitiveness of Vietnam’s exported goods, discouraging 
exports, stimulating imports and increasing the pressure to devaluate the Dong. These 
issues have attracted more attention.
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However, these issues have not been analysed comprehensively. Monetary instruments 
were looked at by Vo (1997) to analyse the stabilisation program in the 1980s-1990s, 
and exchange rate policy was mentioned in the aspects of dollarisation in Ngo (1997). 
The debate of whether or not to use devaluation to improve exports and trade balance 
has been substantial among Vietnamese economists and policy makers, but their 
analyses were mainly based on institutional and policy change and used very simple 
econometric models (see Le and Tran 1995, Le 1996, Vu 1997 etc).
This thesis tries to answer the questions: How have monetary instruments, particularly 
transition from direct to indirect monetary instruments been implemented in Vietnam 
during the 1990s? Has the transition from direct to indirect monetary instruments 
improved financial sector efficiency and monetary control? How has exchange rate 
policy been reformed during that period? Do exchange rates and prices affect the trade 
flow? Can devaluation be used to improve exports and trade balance? What are the links 
between inflation, exchange rates, and money supply? Did exchange rate depreciation 
and money supply growth lead to a higher rate of inflation during the 1990s? This thesis 
has used economic theories and econometric models such as the Error Correction 
Models (ECMs), and Vector Error Correction Models (VECMs) in order to solve these 
questions.
The structure of the thesis is as follows:
Chapter 2 reviews the theoretical issues, which relate to the uses, advantages and 
disadvantages of direct and indirect monetary instruments. The experiences in the 
transition from direct to indirect monetary instruments in developing and transitional
1 1
economies, which include the pace of implementation and the use of indirect monetary 
instruments are summarised in this chapter. Chapter 2 will provide the theoretical 
framework for analyses in subsequent chapters.
Chapter 3 summarises the characteristics of the banking system, its monetary and 
exchange rate managements prior to 1988 and reviews the reform of the banking system 
from early 1989 up to present. In this chapter, institutional reform of the banking system 
since 1989 and some important issues which may affect monetary and exchange rate 
policies during the 1990s are discussed.
Chapter 4 analyses the reform of monetary policy, particularly the transition from direct 
to indirect instruments in Vietnam during the 1990s. The impact of using indirect 
monetary instruments on financial sector efficiency and monetary control is examined. 
After that, policy implications for further reform of monetary instruments are also 
suggested.
Chapter 5 reviews the exchange rate policy in developing countries since the mid 1970s 
and discusses the effect of devaluation on the trade flows and the alternative of using 
import tariffs cum export subsidy policies. The Error Correction Model (ECMs) that 
can be used to analyse the short and long run relationship between variables in the 
following chapters are briefly introduced.
Chapter 6 analyses the reform of exchange rate in Vietnam during that time, including 
examination of nominal and real exchange rate movements. The reform of foreign trade 
policy is not a focus of this thesis, but this is also reviewed to set a stage for analysing 
the effects of prices and exchange rates on trade flows in the next chapter.
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Chapter 7 uses ECMs to examine both the short and long run effects of prices and 
exchange rates on exports and imports, in order to answer the question of whether or not 
devaluation can be used as a good tool to encourage exports and improve trade balance. 
Based on the empirical studies in this chapter, policy implications for the exchange rate 
policy, particular devaluation policy, are also discussed.
Chapter 8 reviews the theoretical issues that relate to the links between inflation, 
exchange rates and money supply. After that, Vector Error Correction Models 
(VECMs) are used to examine the dynamic links between these variables in both short 
and long runs. The main purposes of this chapter are to find the effects of exchange rate 
depreciation and money supply growth on inflation. This provides the basic information 
to closely coordinate monetary and exchange rate policies in the case of devaluing the 
domestic currency.
Chapter 9 summarises the main contents and findings of the thesis.
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Chapter 2
REFORMING MONETARY INSTRUMENTS: THE 
TRANSITION FROM DIRECT TO INDIRECT 
INSTRUMENTS IN TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES AND 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
2.1. Introduction
Monetary instruments play an important role in implementing monetary policy and their 
changes have a crucial influence on the economy in most countries. Through the 
monetary transmission mechanism, the central banks use monetary instruments to 
influence the operational or proximate targets and the intermediate targets as well as to 
achieve the ultimate targets. The general framework for the implementation of monetary 
policy as outlined in the diagram below, has been widely accepted (Freedman 1990):
Ultimate
targets
Intermediate
targets
Instruments
Operational 
or proximate 
targets
The instruments of monetary policy include interest rate controls, credit ceilings, 
reserve requirements, discount, rediscount and refinancing facilities, and open market 
operations. The operational or proximate targets may be short-term interest rates, bank 
reserves, and the monetary base. The intermediate targets include money aggregates
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(Ml, M2, and M3), market interest rates, and exchange rates. The ultimate targets 
include price stability, a high level of employment, external equilibrium and adequate 
economic growth (Bockeimann 1990)7.
There are two kinds of monetary instruments: direct instruments such as interest rate 
controls and credit controls, and indirect instruments such as reserve requirements, 
discount, rediscount and refinancing facilities, and open market operations. The use of 
each instrument depends on the central bank which implements monetary policy based 
on its macroeconomic conditions and the level of financial development (Alexander et 
al. 1995). In recent years, developed, developing and transitional economies have 
increasingly adopted indirect monetary instruments. This is because when a country’s 
market expands, direct instruments tend to become less effective, resulting in 
inefficiencies and dis-intermediation. Also, advantages of the use of indirect 
instruments are: “The greater use of indirect monetary instruments can be seen as the 
counterpart in the monetary area to the widespread movement toward enhancing the 
role of price signals in the economy more generally. Both have the same objective of 
improving market efficiency” (Alexander et al. 1995: 1).
The transition from direct to indirect instruments of monetary policy in developed 
countries has been stimulated by innovation and deregulation in the financial sector, 
while transition in developing countries has occurred since financial liberalization 
removed rigid controls and encouraged competition. However, for CPEs, now 
transitional economies, this transition has occurred since the nature of the financial 
sector has changed, so its instruments must also be changed (Hilbers 1993).
7 “Although all countries have instruments and ultimate goals, they may not use proximate or 
intermediate targets depending on whether the authorities find them helpful in carrying out policy”. See 
Bockelmann (1990: 27) for more details.
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Therefore, the transition for transitional economies is a vital process in financial sector 
reform and the transition from CPEs into market oriented economies. In that sense, 
analysing the transition to the indirect instruments of monetary policy is important in 
order to evaluate the achievements of banking and financial sector reform, particularly 
the process of moving to a market economy in the transitional economies.
The issue of monetary instruments and transition to indirect instruments of monetary 
policy has been analysed by some economists such as Lindgren (1991), Caprio and 
Honohan (1991), Sundararajan (1992), Hilbers (1993), Alexander et al (1995), 
Menkhoff (1997), Axilrod (1997). Their studies focussed on advantages and 
disadvantages of direct and indirect monetary instruments, the transition to indirect 
instruments in transitional economies and developing countries, which includes the 
institutional and initial conditions, the implementation and use of indirect instruments. 
At present, many developing countries and transitional economies including Vietnam 
are still in transition to indirect monetary instruments. Therefore, analysis of the 
theoretical aspect and experiences in reforming monetary instruments, in particular the 
transition to indirect monetary instruments from the previous studies is necessary.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the necessary theoretical framework and the 
lessons learned from experience, in order to set the stage for the analysis of the reform 
of monetary instruments, particularly transition to indirect instruments in Vietnam in the 
next chapters. The structure of this chapter is as follows: Part 2 reviews research on 
monetary policy instruments. Part 3 discusses experiences in the reform of monetary 
instruments and the transition from direct to indirect monetary instruments in 
transitional economies and developing countries.
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2.2. Monetary policy instruments
As many economists have pointed out, a central bank can implement monetary policy in 
two ways: “directly through its regulatory powers, or indirectly through its influence on 
money market conditions as the issuer of central bank money” (Alexander et al. 1995: 
2) .
The differences between direct and indirect monetary instruments in their operation 
have been distinguished as follows: 1-direct instruments set or limit either prices 
(interest rates) or quantities (credit) through regulations, while indirect instruments 
operate through the market by influencing demand and supply conditions; 2-direct 
instruments are mainly aimed at the balance sheets of commercial banks, while most 
indirect instruments are aimed at the balance sheet of the central bank (see Hilbers 1993 
and Alexander et al. 1995).
These differences are relative and not very clear. Since a central bank uses indirect 
monetary instruments to influence market conditions, it can target certain key interest 
rates or quantities of credit through the market mechanism. On the other hand, even 
though indirect instruments are market-based, they still need regulation through the 
government or central bank to set up the framework for their operations (Alexander et 
a l 1995).
2.2.1. Direct monetary instruments
Three main direct monetary instruments have been used in transitional economies and 
developing countries. They are interest rate controls, bank-by-bank credit ceilings, and
o
directed credits .
8 “The typical direct instruments are credit ceilings and administratively determined deposit or lending 
rates”(Hilbers 1993: 309). These three instruments have been the main direct instruments used in
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Interest rate controls
Interest rate controls are a popular direct instrument for developing countries and CPEs. 
Industrial countries still used such controls until the late 1980s. Usually, interest rate 
controls are in the form of fixed interest rates or fixed spreads between lending and 
deposit rates.
An advantage of interest rate controls is that it is easier for monetary authorities to set 
fixed interest rates or spreads than to use using indirect instruments of monetary policy 
to influence money demand or supply conditions to reach a certain level of interest 
rates. If long-term interest rates are considered as an objective of monetary policy, or 
when monetary authorities cannot achieve a target interest rate through market means, 
then interest rate controls are resorted to (Alexander et al. 1995).
Interest rate ceilings are also regarded as a second best response to financial collapse, 
although “preventing the concentration of loans to one borrower, limiting foreign 
exchange risk, requiring adequate reserve against default, and so on are the first line of 
defense against financial break down” (McKinnon 1991: 91). Interest rate ceilings have 
the advantage of limiting the adverse selection problem. Since high-risk borrowers 
normally want to bid higher lending rates to get bank loans, they may not want to pay 
back these loans or cannot do so because of their defaults from high-risk projects 
(Mishkin 1996). With regulated interest rates, risky borrowers will find it difficult to get 
bank loans through bidding higher lending rates, particularly when the banks have not 
enough information on borrowers or bank supervision is weak (Alexander et al 1995).
developing countries and transitional economies before and during the transition to indirect instruments. 
See case studies in seven countries: Chile, Egypt, Ghana, Indonesia, Mexico, New Zealand, and Poland
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However, interest rates controls inhibit financial development mainly by depressing real 
interest rates. Low or negative real interest rates can impede economic growth by 
reducing volume of investment and the productivity of capital (see McKinnon 1973, 
Shaw 1973, Mathieson 1980, and World Bank 1989). Fixing interest rates or the spreads 
in terms of the ceiling on lending rates and the floor on deposit rates may lead to 
misallocation of resources and bank dis-intermediation. Ceilings are usually lower than 
market rates, so borrowers can get cheap credit, which encourages them to overuse 
capital (a scarce good in developing countries and transitional economies). This also 
leads to administrative rationing of credit. Ceilings or floors discourage intermediation 
between banks and banks easily circumvent them, because this rigid regulation may 
reduce bank profits in the case of low ceilings and high floors. To ensure profits, the 
banks may impose additional fees for the borrowers or shift bank’s deposits into assets 
yielding market rates (such as foreign exchange or into goods) (Alexander et al. 1995). 
Interest rate controls also hinder price competition and development of a money market 
(Lindgren 1991). So interest rate liberalisation is a prerequisite for banking system 
reform and the transition to indirect instruments as well.
Bank-by-bank credit ceilings (or credit ceilings)
Credit ceilings were used in Western Europe until the 1980s and are still used in some 
developing and transitional economies. Credit ceilings set by the central bank determine 
the maximum credit growth rates over a given period. They are in the form of quotas 
that depend on capital, existing credit and deposits.
Credit ceilings are an effective way of controlling bank credit expansion. Particularly 
when the monetary transmission mechanism is uncertain, the central bank can use credit 
ceilings to minimise the loss of monetary control during transition to indirect
(Alexander et al. 1995). 19
instruments (Alexander et al. 1995). Credit ceilings also help to control inflation and the 
balance of payments more quickly and precisely than other conventional methods of 
monetary policy. They are more advantageous and to be preferred in small open 
economies when external deficits can become very large in relation to GDP, and 
financing problems may arise in a very short time (Cottarelli el al. 1986). In urgent 
occasions such as a financial crisis, or when no other instruments are adequate, credit 
ceilings may be used effectively for relatively short periods.
However, credit ceilings discourage competition between banks since all the banks in 
the banking sector have the same credit growth rates as determined by the central bank. 
The more effective banks cannot expand their credit at a higher rate than the less 
effective banks. This leads to ineffectiveness and dis-intermediation in the banking 
sector. Moreover, credit growth rates are not market-determined, so credit ceilings 
distort the allocation of bank resources and they also distort freely determined interest 
rates (Lindgren 1991). In addition, the implementing of credit ceilings is difficult if 
there are many banks and if there are capital inflows (Alexander et al. 1995). If credit 
ceilings do not cover all credit institutions there may be a discriminatory element which 
could lead to an uneven playing field between them.
Directed credits
Directed credit has been used in transitional economies for a long time. Usually, central 
banks make credit plans to fit in with the production plans of the government, and 
credits flow directly to particular sectors or enterprises such as SOEs and cooperatives 
in the transitional economies before economic reform. Usually, such credits do not 
require collateral.
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Directed credits have advantages in concentrating financial resources to finance specific 
sectors or priority programs such as heavy industries and export promotion. They are 
often allocated in areas, with low rates of return (as in the case of former socialist 
countries). However, directed credits result in the misallocation of financial resources, 
since these credits are a discretionary provision of the central banks and misallocation is 
magnified where discretionary behaviour and corruption are endemic.
In summary, direct instruments have some advantages such as being relatively easy to 
perceive, to use (than indirect instruments) and to explain to politicians and the public. 
The governments or central banks can easily finance specific objectives9.
Direct instruments are effective in controlling interest rates and credits in the case of a 
rudimentary and noncompetitive financial system. In particular, direct instruments are 
still used in the transition to indirect monetary instruments in the case of undeveloped 
financial systems:
During the transitional period to indirect monetary control, financial markets 
may be too thin, resulting in strong interest rate effects and volatility, which 
many governments fear will discourage investment. Central banks may therefore 
maintain some direct instruments for an interim period until financial markets 
are sufficiently developed (Alexander et al. 1995: 9).
In addition, direct instruments can be considered as a second best or supplementary 
solution in the case of market failure (for example, a financial crisis).
Direct instruments also have some disadvantages. These disadvantages may increase 
over time, especially when the financial sector becomes more developed. First, direct 
instruments are not market-based instruments, leading to misallocation of financial 
resources and inefficiencies, since credit is often provided to projects that are inefficient
9 See details in Lindgren (1991) and Alexander et al (1995).
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or given for non-monetary objectives. Second, direct instruments may hamper 
competition and lead to disintermediation between banks. With banks being constrained 
to the same growth rate of credit due to the credit ceiling, inefficient banks can be 
protected from competition by limiting the growth of efficient banks. This is 
particularly so in the transitional economies where state-owned banks dominate the 
banking sector, which tends to limit the entrance of the private actors to the banking 
sector.
Third, direct control may lead to monetary overhang of liquidity and financial 
repression.
Excess liquidity tends to build up because of limits on bank lending, while 
deposit growth is fuelled by an expansion of reserve money caused, for instance, 
by monetary financing of the deficit. The excess liquidity, in turn, entails an 
inflationary potential, for the time when the credit limits are eased (Alexander el 
a/. 1995: 9).
In particular, if interest rates are kept below the equilibrium level by regulation, that 
may lead to financial repression. This discourages saving and leads to unproductive 
uses of saving; and financial resources may shift from bank saving to other forms such 
as securities or real assets. If the structures of interest rate and credit controls are 
complicated, it may distort bank management and cause inefficiencies.
Fourth, direct instruments require more micro-management of the banking system by 
central banks and the monitoring of bank performance is increasingly difficult 
(Lindgren 1991). When direct controls are in place for long periods, evasion and 
circumvention tend to increase (Hilbers 1993), since these controls force credit 
institutions into portfolio positions that they would not voluntarily accept. If the 
compliance is not uniform, financial intermediaries that comply with the controls may
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be placed at a disadvantage, further compromising the position of the formal financial 
sector and encouraging the growth of the informal financial sector (Alexander et 
a l 1995).
The next section examines indirect instruments and compares them with direct 
instruments.
2.2.2. Indirect monetary instruments
There are various types of indirect instruments. However, here the focussing on three 
instruments those have been popular in developing and transitional economies. They are 
reserve requirements; discount, rediscount and refinancing facilities; and open market 
operations.
Reserve requirements (RRs)
RRs refer to the proportion of deposit liabilities at a financial institutions held in the 
form of deposits with the central bank or in the form of other eligible assets, such as 
cash in vault. RRs are classified as an indirect instrument since although “they are 
applied through regulation ... their monetary effect is realised through the impact on a 
bank’s demand for reserve money, and reserve money creation is most directly 
monitored and controlled via the central bank’s balance sheet” (Alexander et al. 1995: 
2).
RRs were first introduced through statute law in the United States in 1913 (Menkhoff 
1997). They were considered originally as an instrument for countering crises of 
confidence arising when liquidity shortages occurred. Banks may face extreme demands 
for liquidity; if this demand is not satisfied, it could trigger additional demand. This can
23
happen when depositors fear that they will lose their deposited money and try to convert 
their money deposits into cash before other depositors can do so and before a general 
confidence crisis arises. Such a crisis could threaten the banking system. Minimum RRs 
can be used to meet unexpected demand and avoid shortages of liquidity. However, the 
counter crises of confidence role of RRs has declined because of the development of 
other methods such as bank supervision, credible deposit protection, and the central 
bank function as the lender of last resort to prevent solvency problems (Menkhoff 
1997).
Besides the advantage of RRs in countering the liquidity shortages, the main advantage 
of RRs is to allow the central bank to control the money supply. Central bank control of 
the money supply through changing required reserve ratios (or reserve ratios), can be 
briefly explained as follows:
From the conventional money multiplier equation:
M C + D 1 + cdmm
H C + R rd + cd
(2 .1)
Where:
M is money stock; mm is money multiplier; H is base money or high-powered money; 
C is currency held by the public; D is money deposits; R is bank reserves; cd is the 
currency-deposit ratio; rd is reserve-deposit ratio (it is a ratio of bank reserves to 
deposits; bank reserves consist of notes and coin held by banks and banks’ deposits at 
the central bank).
(mm is larger the smaller the rd\ mm is also larger the smaller the cd).
And the reserve-deposit ratio function:
rd = r (i, io, rrR, X); (2.2)
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where, rd is a function of the market interest rate i, the discount rate /£>, the required 
reserve ratio rrR, the variability of deposit flows A. An increase in i will reduce excess 
reserves: rd will be reduced. In contrast, increases in ip, rrR, and A will increase rd.
The money supply function (2.3) is a function of the market interest rate i, the discount 
rate ip, the required reserve ratio rrR, the currency-deposit ratio cd, and the variability of 
deposit flows A.
M = mmW = mm(i, ip, rrR, cd, A)H (2.3)
At given H, money supply M is increased when money multiplier mm rises. The money 
multiplier mm increases with the level of the market interest rate i, and it decreases with 
the discount rate io, the required reserve ratio rrR, and the currency-deposit ratio cd. If 
the central bank raises the required reserve ratio, bank deposits at the central bank will 
increase and bank lending will fall, the money supply will decline (excess liquidity will 
be sterilised if this occurred10), the market interest rates will rise, and the level of 
economic activity will decrease (Livingston 1990). If the central bank reduces the 
required reserve ratio, the reverse will happen.
There are some disadvantages of RRs that have been pointed out by Hilbers (1993) and 
Alexander et al (1995). First, unremunerated RRs are like a tax on the banking system. 
If RRs are at high levels, it may result in a widening of the spread between bank lending 
and deposit rates, and this can lead to disintermediation. However, if remunerated RRs 
are imposed, it may cost the central banks. Second, RRs are not convenient for 
managing short-term liquidity, since if RRs are adjusted frequently, this may lead to 
fluctuating interest rates and disruption to bank portfolio management. Third, RRs may
10 RRs also can be used to sterilize excessive liquidity by increased RR ratios; particularly when the open 
market operation policy does not absorb excessive liquidity at the desired level, then RRs are considered 
to be a useful supplementary tool. However, this advantage is meaningless when “the volume and 
flexibility of open market operation policy is sufficient” (Menkhoff 1997: 49).
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lead to a movement of funds to financial centres, which have lower RRs (Menkhoff 
1997).
RRs have been used in many countries for a long time and they are still an effective tool 
for controlling money supply in countries in the early stage of undertaking the transition 
from direct to indirect monetary instruments. However, their role is reduced when open 
market operations are sufficiently developed. The use of RRs has been dropped in 
industrial countries in recent years.
Discount, rediscount and refinance facilities.
Discount, rediscount and refinance facilities are an important tool of central banks for 
relieving liquidity shortages of banks (lender of last resort function), for controlling 
money and credit conditions, and for allocating credit selectively (Alexander et 
a l 1995).
In the last resort function of a central bank, these facilities allow individual banks or the 
banking system as a whole to borrow funds from the central bank at times when there is 
a shortage of funds and when other sources of funds are closed off. This function is very 
important in securing individual banks and the banking system as a whole from a 
financial crisis, since a relatively small liquidity problem in one bank (if it is not 
resolved) might become a large problem for the whole banking and financial system. 
An advantage of these facilities is in providing liquidity more quickly to banks, when it 
is needed, than open market operations. In particular, they also may be useful in the 
case where open market operations are limited due to lack of paper (Alexander el 
al. 1995). Moreover, these facilities do not require collateral; usually they are involved 
with eligible papers and access criteria.
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Discount, rediscount and refinance facilities can be used as an effective means of 
controlling money and credit conditions. In Equation 2.3, at a given money base H, 
when the central bank increases the discount rate iß, the money multiplier mm will be 
reduced, since with a higher discount rate, banks will hold a higher reserve rather than 
borrowing more expensive funds from the central bank to cover any reserve shortage 
that may occur. Therefore, an increase in discount rates (it is similar to an increase of 
rediscount and refinance rates) will induce the market interest rate to rise, demand for 
money to fall, money supply to contract, and economic activities may fall. Changes in 
the discount rates are also used as a signal from the central bank to inform the market 
that it will discourage or encourage borrowing from central banks. In supporting the 
discount, rediscount and refinance facilities, some economists agree that the initial 
impact of these facilities on financial markets is wider than is the case with open market 
operations, which are limited to one or a few financial centres (Alexander et al. 1995).
These facilities are also used to allocate credits selectively to banks or credit institutions 
which provide funds to support particular sectors such as SOEs, agriculture, or the poor 
in the remote areas as is the case in some transitional economies. The aim of this policy 
is to increase the social return from these sectors, but there are inefficiencies in some 
cases.
Discount, rediscount and refinance facilities have been shown to have some 
disadvantages. First, the efficiency of these facilities in terms of flexible quantitative 
implementation is substantially poorer than in the case of open market operations 
(Menkhoff 1997). Second, the rediscount window is “not very convenient for precise 
base money targeting, since access to the window is usually at the initiative of banks.
27
Criteria for rediscount paper and for access to the window have often been utilised to 
implement selective credit policy” (Alexander et al. 1995: 4). Third, if these facility 
rates are set up below market rates (as in the USA, Japan and Germany), it would most 
likely lead to non-price rationing of credit. So in the financial sectors where open 
market operations are developed these facilities are contractionary.
Open market operations (OMO)
Open market operations involve the purchase or sale of bonds, bills and other financial 
instruments from central banks in the open market. By purchasing or selling these 
securities, a central bank can affect the money supply and related financial measures 
through their impact on the monetary base11. Through purchasing securities, central 
banks can inject money into the financial system, and through selling them, they can 
absorb money from the system (Axilrod 1997).
The mechanism whereby OMO purchases increase the monetary base, and thus increase 
the money supply can be briefly explained as follows: assume the state bank of Vietnam 
(SBV- central bank) purchases VND1 billion of government bonds from a private 
individual, government securities on the assets side in the balance sheet will rise by 
VND1 billion (Table 2.1). The seller of this bond receives a cheque (its value is 
VND1 billion) from the SBV, and deposits it in a bank account. The bank will deposit it 
with the SBV and its bank deposits at the SBV will rise by VND1 billion on the 
liabilities side in the balance sheet. Therefore, the monetary base rises by VND1 billion 
as do bank reserves.
11 The monetary base includes currencies held by the public and bank reserves. For the purpose of 
controlling the money stock in the long run, it makes little difference if the central bank controls the 
monetary base or bank reserves, but in the short run, tighter control of money stock can be exerted 
through the monetary base than through bank reserves. See details in Rasche and Johannes (1987).
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This story is continuous with the subsequent behaviour of the seller and the seller’s 
bank. The seller may want to hold more currency, in which case a part of his or her 
deposit is converted into currency. The currency deposit ratio cd will rise (both bank 
reserves R and deposits D fall).
T ab le  2.1: A n O pen M arket P urchase and the C en tra l B an k  B a lan ce  Sheet
(V N D  bill)
A ssets L iab ilities
Government securities + 1 Currency 0
All other assets 0 Bank deposits at central bank + 1
Monetary base (source) + 1 Monetary base (uses) + 1
The bank which has a cheque for VND1 billion deposited in the SBV now has a reserve 
deposit ratio rd which is too high (since both R and D in this bank increase by the same 
amount, rd must be increased), which will reduce the bank’s profitability. So the bank 
has to reduce rd through lending activities. When the bank makes a loan, the borrower 
will have a new bank deposit (in this way, the money supply is raised more than the 
amount of OMO). By making loans from deposits of loan customers in the banking 
system, this process will create a multiplied expansion of the money stock.
Therefore, open market purchases from the central bank will increase the monetary 
base, which generates a multiple expansion of the money stock, and ceteris paribus, the 
interest rate will be reduced (Livingston 1990). It is inversely the case for open market 
sales.
A central bank can conduct OMO in one of two ways: aiming for a given quantity of 
reserves and allowing the interest rate to fluctuate freely (the active way) or by aiming
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at a particular interest rate and allowing the amount of reserves to fluctuate (the passive 
way). The passive way is usually employed by industrial countries, where the market is 
sensitive and well developed. The active way is more advantageous in developing 
countries; the reason for that perhaps being the absence of effective secondary and 
inter-bank markets in these countries (Axilrod 1997).
Open market operations have advantages in that they allow “central banks great 
flexibility in the timing and volume of monetary operations at their own initiative, 
encourage an impersonal, businesslike relationship with participants in the market 
place, and provide a means of avoiding the inefficiencies of direct controls” (Axilrod 
1997: 2). They also provide a transparent and efficient means of controlling money that 
enhances market development.
However, to conduct OMO, interest rates must be fully liberalised, a deep liquid and 
secondary market is required, and the central bank must have an adequate stock of 
marketable assets. Moreover, advanced monetary programming skills and reliable 
economic information are necessary (Hilbers 1993 and Alexander et al. 1995).
There is another kind of open market operations which has similar effects, called open 
market type operations (Lindgren 1991). This activity concerns the selling of bills in the 
primary market. These bills may be issued by the central bank or the government and, 
usually, they are short-term bills. Open market type operations have been used in 
economies where there is no financial depth and the secondary market is insufficiently 
developed to conduct open market operations.
This type of open market operation has an advantage as a:
Flexible instrument for short-term liquidity management because issuance is at
the discretion of the central bank, and various auction/tender formats
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can be used to steer the interest rate. If treasury is not willing to accept sufficient 
interest rate flexibility, central bank papers preserve the operational autonomy of 
the central bank (Alexander et at. 1995: 5).
Moreover, the issuance of government bills is a convenient way to finance excess 
government expenditure. It also increases financial discipline when central bank 
finances directly to the government are stopped.
However, the open market type operations exhibit some difficulties in their use as 
Alexander et al (1995) and other economists have pointed out: “the central bank may 
incur losses if large primary issuance is need to sterilise liquidity. If central bank bills 
are used in parallel with treasury bills, a problem may occur in the absence of strong 
coordination between the issuing agents” (Alexander et a/. 1995: 5). In addition, debt 
management may conflict with money management, since the treasury in most cases 
makes final decisions on debt management and the central bank serves as its agent. The 
central bank may be pressured to facilitate primary market issues at a predetermined 
rate (Axilrod 1997).
Recently, OMO have been the main instrument of monetary control in industrial 
countries and are becoming important for developing countries and transitional 
economies. Open market type operations are a rudimentary type of open market 
operations that is preferred in economies where liquidity and secondary markets are thin 
and particularly in countries making the transition from direct to indirect monetary 
instruments.
In short, we can sum up the advantages of indirect instruments of monetary policy as 
follows:
3 1
First, indirect instruments are more effective than direct ones, since they do not 
encourage disintermediation and growth of an informal financial sector like direct 
instruments, while direct instruments become increasingly ineffective over time 
(Alexander et al. 1995). Second, indirect instruments allow monetary authorities greater 
flexibility in implementing monetary policy. Through small, frequent changes in 
indirect instruments, monetary authorities are able to respond quickly to shocks and to 
correct errors of policy in a short time. In contrast, it is difficult to adjust direct 
instruments rapidly without disturbing bank portfolios. Indirect instruments also ensure 
consistency between monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies (Lindgren 1991). 
Third, indirect instruments are market-based instruments, which means greater 
efficiency in the allocation of financial resources, and reduction of non-money 
objectives of financial resources. The use of indirect instruments also increases 
economic signals to central banks in conducting and implementing monetary policy. 
These contribute to the development of the financial market. Fourth, by using indirect 
instruments, central banks can encourage intermediation, competition, transparency and 
financial deepening, and reduce evasion and circumvention from banks and financial 
institutions.
However, the implementation of indirect instruments is more complicated than use of 
direct instruments and requires a deep financial market, financial instruments and 
infrastructure. The effects of indirect instruments on the ultimate targets cannot be 
observed immediately; they can only be observed indirectly through intermediate 
targets or indicators. This is due to the lag in the transmission process. In addition, 
conducting monetary policy is complicated when the central banks introduce indirect 
instruments in the process of financial liberalisation. Moreover, interest rates and 
exchange rates may become more interdependent; opening the capital account does not
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always accompany the transition to indirect instruments .
In general, we can say that direct instruments become less effective than indirect 
instruments when the financial sector is developed. Therefore, the transition to indirect 
monetary instruments is indispensable for most countries including Vietnam, and the 
important question to economists and policy-makers is: how can the shift from direct to 
indirect instruments be accomplished smoothly and effectively in the conditions of 
developing countries and transitional economies? The next section answers this 
question.
2.3. Experiences in reforming monetary instruments: the transition from  
direct to indirect monetary instruments in transitional economies and 
developing countries
Transitional economies and developing countries have embarked on reform of monetary 
instruments and transition to indirect instruments since the late 1980s. Some of the 
countries have been successful, but a few have failed in this reform process, and have 
had to reintroduce direct instruments. So, drawing lessons from the experience of these 
countries is necessary.
The experience from the transitional economies and developing countries in the 
transition to indirect instruments has shown that they have faced more problems than 
industrial countries, mainly because they lacked the necessary institutional and 
economic conditions (Alexander et al. 1995). These necessary conditions are discussed 
below.
12 A more detailed discussion, see Alexander et al. (1995: 15).
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2.3.1. The initial institutional and macroeconomic conditions
The characteristics of centrally planned economies (CPEs) and the features of their 
banking and financial systems in the period before the reform of monetary instruments 
and the transition to indirect instruments in the transitional economies have been 
investigated by Sundararajan (1992) and Hilbers (1993). These authors described the 
characteristics that were typical of CPEs such as controlled wages and prices, large 
inter-enterprise arrears (which strongly influenced the effectiveness of monetary 
policy), soft budget constraints, excess liquidity and macroeconomic instability. There 
was a single tier banking system in the CPEs with the central bank’s role to execute the 
financial plan (a cash and a credit plan) to meet the production plan set by the 
government. There was little autonomy in conducting monetary policy. Credit and 
interest rates were controlled strictly by the central bank; interest rates were set 
administratively, with loans to priority sectors often provided at preferred rates. Besides 
the central bank (or state bank), there were specialised banks, which served in particular 
areas (industry, agriculture, and foreign trade), but they were segmented, lacked 
competition and commercial banks skills, and had weak or nonexistent prudential 
regulations and supervision.
The initial institutional and macroeconomic conditions in non-industrialized countries 
(developing countries mainly) that adopted indirect instruments of monetary policy 
were analysed by Alexander and other economists from the IMF . They found initial 
conditions were common to most of these countries. First, the introduction of indirect
L> A sample included 19 countries (17 developing and 2 transitional economies) which were well- 
advanced in transition from direct to indirect instruments in each region was chosen for the analysis. The 
initial point of transition to indirect instruments started when the central banks began to auction treasury 
bills or central bank bills. The transition ended at the point where the market was reliant fully on indirect 
instruments (at that time, interest controls had been eliminated, and the share of direct credits from central 
banks amounted to no more than 25 per cent of total credits), see Alexander et al (1995).
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instruments was part of a broader set of reforms, which included liberalisation of the 
financial sector, macroeconomic stabilization and liberalization of the economy in 
general. Second, most of them had an IMF-supported program at that time. Third, they 
all had policies to allow new banks to enter the financial sector and give them more 
freedom. Fourth, the banking sector was mainly owned by the public sector (60 per cent 
of the sample), and the common features were weak and segmented money and inter­
bank markets, lack of effective supervision, a low level of competition between banks, 
and autonomy of central banks. Fifth, half of the countries in the sample had large 
economic imbalances at the beginning of the reform process that were indicated by 
some factors such as high inflation rates (above 20 per cent pa), negative real interest 
rates, and high fiscal deficits (exceeding 5 per cent of GDP). Sixth, at the beginning of 
the reform process, about 80 per cent of the sample countries had excess liquidity in the 
financial system.
So, the main conditions of transitional economies and developing countries before 
transition to indirect instruments were excess liquidity and macroeconomic imbalance; 
the banking system being segmented and inefficient, lacking competition and 
supervision; a low level of central bank autonomy; and credits and interest rates 
controlled. These conditions suggest that it is difficult to transit to indirect instruments 
without a stabilisation plan and comprehensive reform of the economy, a reorganised 
banking system and liberalised interest rates. The introduction of indirect instruments 
may not be completed in a short period, depending, among other things, on the 
development of liquidity and secondary markets.
These conditions may affect the pace and the use of indirect monetary instruments, and 
the sequencing of the transition to indirect instruments as well. Moreover, the transition
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to indirect instruments may need the concomitant reforms.
2.3.2. Implementation and the use of indirect instruments
Alexander et al (1995)14 also pointed out that the implementation of indirect instruments 
in non-industrialised countries has some similar features. Firstly, as mentioned in the 
previous section, reform of monetary instruments was part of a broader financial reform 
package. This included reorganizing the banking system, improving bank supervision, 
and revising the legal framework. Moreover, two-thirds of countries in the sample spent 
considerable effort in coping with excessive fiscal imbalances. Secondly, central banks 
improved control of credit expansion and in many cases absorbed the excess reserves. 
Most countries had to abolish or limit access to facilities that allowed banks to borrow 
automatically from the central banks, and central bank financing to governments was 
also reduced. Thirdly, interest rates were liberalised early in the transition in most or all 
countries, but bank-by-bank credit ceilings were abolished only in 35 per cent of the 
sample countries, and the rest abandoned them later in the transition process.
In addition, the implementation of indirect instruments often required other measures 
and reforms to support the transition process, depending on each country’s 
circumstances13. In some cases, the reform of monetary instruments often included 
temporary reversals or the reintroduction of direct instruments. Experiences from 
Argentina, Burundi, Chile, Jamaica, the Philippines, and Venezuela were examples16.
14 Sample from Alexander et al (1995) included 19 countries, but there were only two CPEs (Poland and 
Hungary).
15 For instance, Poland had to take into account modernisation of the payment system during the 
transition to indirect monetary instruments. Egypt, Ghana, Israel, Mexico, and Thailand began to 
restructure their commercial banks. Most sample countries had to strengthen bank supervision and 
regulation and increase banking competition in the transition process. See Alexander et al (1995).
16 “All countries except Burundi and Jamaica faced a serious financial crisis, which prompted the 
temporary reintroduction of controls on interest rates to alleviate the burden of high real interest rates on 
borrowers and banks. Reversals in Burundi and Jamaica were a direct response to excessively high fiscal 
imbalances, which the authorities were reluctant to finance at market interest rates. Thus, inadequate
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These experiences from sample countries also indicate that a successful transition to 
indirect instruments does not depend on the choice of exchange rate regime, but it could
. . 1 7be influenced by this choice . In this transition, it is also not require to remove capital 
controls, which will be phased out gradually when the monetary authorities had 
necessary instruments to manage capital flows. A capital account liberalisation can 
stimulate large capital inflows, making it difficult for the monetary authorities to 
manage the funds. However, this does not deny that the inflows also contribute to the 
development of money and capital markets, which may facilitate the transition to 
indirect instruments.
The survey by Alexander et al (1995) shows that all countries in this sample at the end 
of the transition started open market type operations mainly in the primary market, due 
to the absence of well-developed secondary markets for treasury and central bank bills. 
Only 20 per cent of the sample countries relied fully on open market operations through 
secondary markets. In these open market operations, treasury bills were preferred to 
central bank bills and maturities of no more than three months were used more than 
longer-term ones. Weekly auctions were adopted by most countries. Reserve 
requirements were commonly used in all countries, except Mexico, and half of them 
imposed RR rates above 15 per cent. However, only one-third of the central banks 
remunerated reserve requirements. Rediscount facilities were used as well as open 
market type operations, but most countries restricted access to these facilities.
banking supervision and failure to sustain adequate macroeconomic policy were key factors in the 
reversal of financial reform” (Alexander et al. 1995: 21).
17 The choice of exchange rate regime could influence the desirable speed of transition to indirect 
instruments, because fixed exchange rate regimes typically require greater interest rate flexibility. See 
Alexander et al (1995).
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Besides analysing the implementation experiences and the use of indirect instruments, 
the authors also examined the financial efficiency and monetary controls in these 
countries when the transition was complete. Their results indicate that the efficiency of 
financial sector intermediation improved and the volatility of the money multiplier and 
key monetary aggregates declined to a manageable level in most countries.
The analysis of the adoption of indirect instruments in non-industrialised countries from 
Alexander et al (1995) shows that the pace of transition from direct to indirect 
instruments has varied across sample countries. Some countries such as Argentina, 
Chile and Israel adopted indirect instruments within one year; 58 per cent of the sample 
countries took a more gradual approach; 47 per cent of the selected sample countries 
reversed monetary reforms. In the latter cases, they continued to use direct instruments; 
Mexico, for example, even reversed its policy on the debt crisis during the transition to 
indirect instrument.
The sequencing in the reform of monetary instruments and the transition to indirect 
instruments in transitional economies and developing countries is not identical. 
However, the typical sequencing can be divided into three stages. In the first stage, the 
main characteristics of transitional economies and developing countries before the 
transition to indirect instruments were excess liquidity and macroeconomic instability; 
the banking system was underdeveloped and inefficient, with a lack of competition and 
supervision. As well, there was a low level of central bank autonomy. Therefore, reform 
of monetary instruments and transition to indirect instruments was carried out in the
18 See Sundararajan (1992), Hilbers (1993), and Alexander et al (1995). Sundararajan and Alexander el aI 
divided the sequencing into three stages. Hilber identified four stages in the transition from a command 
economy to a market economy with the choice of monetary instruments appropriate to each stage. 
However, the second and third states of Hilber’s division are similar to the second stage of both 
Sundararajan and Alexander et al. So we will summarise the attitudes of these authors about the 
sequencing into three stages.
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context of a comprehensive economic reform, which includes a macroeconomic 
stability program and financial sector liberalisation. In the financial sector, besides 
improving bank supervision and reforming the legal framework, reorganising the 
banking system was a very important task in these countries. In particular, the 
transformation from a mono-banking system to a two-tier banking system was essential 
in transitional economies, since the two-tier banking system created an appropriate 
framework for the use of indirect instruments (Hilbers 1993). At this stage, although a 
two-tier banking system had been established, it was very segmented and the central 
bank had limited independence, and financial transactions were still based on the 
financial plan. Therefore, direct instruments dominated, and indirect instruments such 
as RRs could be used but played only a supporting role in transitional economies 
(Sundararajan 1992). RRs were used to absorb excess liquidity in many countries at the 
first step of this stage, and they could also be used to inject funds into the market 
through reduction in RRs.
When the money market is underdeveloped, the central bank can use some instruments 
such as overdrafts, Lombard facility, credit auctions and refinancing (in the transitional 
economies) to perform the lender of the last resort function and provide funds to the 
market (Alexander et al. 1995). During this stage, some countries maintain interest rate 
controls (not only transitional economies), but depending on the degree of 
macroeconomic stability and development of financial sector, they can begin to 
liberalise interest rates to foster the money market, increase competition between banks 
and create room for operation of indirect instruments in the next stage.
The second stage has been reached by most transitional economies. During this stage, 
macroeconomic imbalance may persist and excess liquidity is possible. The two-tier
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banking system is more developed but it is still segmented and competition between 
banks is low. A secondary market is not established yet in some countries, and central 
bank independence is being confirmed. Therefore, direct instruments begin to be phased 
out and indirect instruments begin to be used (Sundararajan 1992). Interest rates are 
largely liberalised, but not fully; credit ceilings are allowed to trade unused margins in 
some countries; and direct credits have been reduced in transitional economies. RRs are 
beginning to be reduced at this stage since the development of other instruments 
(discount windows and auctions of government and central bank bills) and 
macroeconomic stability may be improved. Discount windows are the main financial 
sources from the central bank to banks and credit institutions. However, it is impossible 
to introduce open market operations with the absence of a secondary market, so most 
countries adopting indirect instruments in this stage have used open market type 
operations in the form of auctions of short-term government or central bank securities. 
These auctions need to be combined with credit auctions or discount windows to 
facilitate monetary control and development of the money market (Alexander et al. 
1995).
In the third stage, when the macroeconomic imbalance has been sufficiently reduced, 
the banking system is developed, a secondary market is established, the central bank 
becomes independent and interest rates are fully liberalised. Then the central bank can 
rely entirely on indirect instruments and direct instruments can be eliminated, but they 
should be kept at hand for emergencies (Hilbers 1993). If the elimination of direct 
instruments lacks the above conditions and direct instruments are still effective, then 
full reliance on indirect instruments could be premature and the central bank may have 
to reintroduce direct instruments (Alexander et al. 1995).
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In general, experience in the reform of monetary instruments and the transition to 
indirect instruments from developing and transitional economies has proceeded along 
similar lines, except in the first stage of the transition. In Stage 1, due to some 
differences in initial and macroeconomic conditions in the transitional economies and 
developing countries, the process was a bit different: the CPEs had to establish a two- 
tier banking system and the central bank first conducted monetary policy toward a 
market economy. With an undeveloped financial market, there was lack of prudential 
regulation and supervision, macroeconomic imbalance, and the banking staff still lacked 
experience in the new environment. Therefore, the level of maintaining direct 
instruments in Stage 1 and early in Stage 2 in the transitional economies may be higher 
than that in the developing countries, in order to perform smoothly and efficiently the 
transition to indirect instruments. From late Stage 2 and Stage 3, the pace, 
implementation and the use of indirect instruments should be similar to developing 
countries, since the conditions between the two kinds of countries are similar.
2.4- Conclusion
In the expansion in both domestic and international financial markets, indirect 
instruments of monetary policy have been revealed to be more advantageous than direct 
ones in encouraging efficient financial intermediation, reallocating financial resources 
efficiently, and minimizing the circumvention from banks and credit institutions. 
Indirect instruments also allow the money authorities more flexibility in implementing 
monetary policy. Therefore, the transition from direct instruments to indirect ones is 
indispensable for most countries; particularly for transitional economies where the 
nature of the financial system has changed and its instruments must be changed.
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The experience in the reform of monetary instruments and transition to indirect 
instruments of the transitional economies and developing countries can be summarised 
as follows:
• First, initial and macroeconomic conditions in these countries have influenced the 
pace of implementation, the use of indirect instruments and sequencing as well.
• Second, reform and transition have been performed in the context of broader 
financial sector reform. However, to minimise the difficulties and smooth the 
transition, concomitant reforms that relate to the restructure of the banking and 
financial systems, insulation of fiscal deficits and improving bank supervision, legal 
and payment systems are necessary.
• Third, a gradual pace in the transition to indirect instruments is preferred in these 
countries. The typical sequencing of the transition can be divided into three stages. 
In the first stage, besides other reforms in the financial sector (particularly, the 
establishment of a two-tier banking system in transitional economies) and the 
liberalisation of interest rates, RRs and credit facilities should begin to be 
introduced. However, direct instruments still dominate compared with indirect ones. 
In the second stage, direct instruments are being phased out and indirect ones begin 
to be implemented widely. Open market type operations in the form of auction of 
short-term government and central bank securities, and other indirect instruments 
such as rediscount and refinancing facilities and credit auctions, should be used to 
develop monetary control and foster money market development. In the third stage, 
the monetary authorities should stimulate the development of institutions and 
infrastructure of the financial market and begin to rely entirely on open market 
operations. At this stage, direct instruments should be abolished gradually. 
However, the monetary authorities should be able to access direct instruments in 
case of emergency.
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These experiences from transitional economies and developing countries are useful and 
valuable to countries in transition, particularly to Vietnam. These will be considered in 
the examination of the reform of monetary instruments and transition to indirect 
instruments in Vietnam in the next chapter.
43
Chapter 3
THE BANKING SYSTEM IN VIETNAM
3.1- Introduction
The exploration of the banking system and the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV), which has 
conducted monetary and exchange rate policies, is necessary before analysing the 
reforms of monetary and exchange rate policies. This chapter summarises the 
characteristics of the banking system and the management of money, credit and foreign 
exchange prior to 1988. The reform of the banking system that focuses on the 
institutional reform since 1988 is reviewed (policy reforms that include monetary' and 
exchange rate policy reforms are the task of subsequent chapters). Moreover, some 
issues such as the degree of monetisation, soundness of the banking system, the money 
and securities markets, and reform of SOEs that may affect the reform of monetary and 
exchange rate policies are also mentioned.
3.2- The banking system before 1988
Similar to a typical CPE, Vietnam had a passive financial system and a mono-banking 
system in the period prior to 1988. The financial sector consisted mainly of the banking 
sector, and non-bank financial intermediaries were not significant. The structural and 
operational features of the banking system in this period are considered in order to 
understand this system more clearly.
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3.2.1- Structure of the banking system
The banking system prior to 1988 included the SBV, two specialised banks and a 
system of saving funds (see Chart 3.1).
Chart 3.1. Structure of the Vietnamese banking system before 1988
BIDV, BFTV Branches in provinces and districts
SAVING FUNDS 
(Credit Cooperatives, 
Socialist Saving Funds)
Branches in 
provinces, districts, 
and communes 1 /
Branches in 
provinces and 
districts
Note: 1/ Socialist saving funds operated in the urban areas, Credit Cooperatives which had branches 
to communes operated in the rural areas.
The National Bank of Vietnam was established on May 6th, 1951 according to Order 
15/SL and was renamed the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) in 1960. It was a mono-bank 
and was also a state-owned organisation, which had a complete structure from central to 
local level with the headquarters in Hanoi and their branches in most cities, provinces 
and districts. The main functions of the SBV included monetary management and 
financial intermediation. So, it functioned as both a central bank and a commercial 
bank. The main tasks of the SBV were to manage the state funds, serve the state sector 
and finance the state budget.
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There were two other specialised banks belonging to the SBV. The Construction and 
Investment Bank of Vietnam, established in 1957 (now the bank for Investment and 
Development of Vietnam-BIDV), was in charge of supplying funds for long-term public 
projects. The Bank for Foreign Trade of Vietnam (BFTV) was established in 1959, and 
had the duty of financing all international economic activities, and managing foreign 
exchange.
The Credit Cooperatives (saving funds) were established in 1957. They operated mainly 
in rural areas. In the 1960s, the Socialist Saving Fund was founded in urban areas. Both 
saving funds mobilised funds from the public under the supervision and regulation of 
the SBV. During this period, the non-state sector was very small and not allowed to 
establish banks, and the SBV and its specialised banks monopolised the whole banking 
system.
3.2.2 - Operation of the banking system
As was typical of CPEs, the operation of the banking system in Vietnam prior to 1988 
was mainly to provide money (cash) and credit to meet the money (cash) and credit 
plans that were required from the planned output targets, which were determined from 
the central government. The operation focussed on financing the state sector and state 
budgets and managing state funds. In this chapter, the operation that relates to our 
purposes, such as managing money and credit, and regulating foreign exchange, are 
mentioned.
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Management of money and credit
Deposits mobilised from the saving funds and banks were under the control of the SBV, 
and the mobilised funds were distributed by the SBV to its branches and specialised 
banks in order to finance the SOEs, cooperatives and the private sector according to the 
plan targets from the State Planning Commission (on behalf of the government). 
Normally SOEs had priority and received huge credit at low interest rates. Cooperatives 
received a small portion of total credit at interest rates higher than SOEs. The private 
sector received very little credit from the state owned banks (SOBs)19. Table 3.1 shows 
the bank credit structure during the 1980-85 period. The figures reflect the fact that 
credit policy from SOBs was very much in favour of SOEs, but not for the cooperatives 
and the private sector.
Table 3.1. Bank credit structure, period 1980-85
(% of loans, end of period)
Short term loans Tons term loans
SOEs 94.6 86.3
Cooperatives 4.6 11.1
Private Sector 0 . 8 2.6
Source: SB V  (1996a: 224-25).
The SOEs were required to open accounts at (SOBs) and all their financial activities 
were controlled strictly by the SOBs. However, under the soft budget constraints (easy 
access to cheap credits and financial bailouts), the SOEs usually drew cheap credits 
from the SOBs to fulfill the production plans, which were a very important task 
(sometimes more than economic efficiency) in the command economy. They tried to 
accumulate raw materials or store those to ensure fulfillment of the production plans, 
and then credits often-exceeded credit quotas (Ngo 1997). The negative interest rate
19 These included SBV branches and specialised banks
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policy and ineffective ways to enforce the allocated quota of credits from the SBV 
encouraged such activities by the SOEs. To finance the excess credits over planned 
quotas to SOEs, the SBV normally had to print money, and therefore, according to Tu 
(1991), money supply was always higher than the planned level (up to 2.5 times), and 
M2 in 1985 was about 35 times higher than in 1980 (SBV 1996a).
Table 3.2. Sources of financing for State Budget Deficits, 1976-92 (VND billion)
76- 
80 a/
81- 
85 a/
86 87 88 89 90 91 92
Total Deficits 15 2 1 8 3 6 1 2 8 1 ,0 4 4 2 , 7 2 7 2 , 8 1 8 1 ,4 6 8 3 , 8 4 5
D o m e s t i c 0 3 0 3 17 0 0 131 1 ,0 0 0
b o r r o w i n g s
F o r e i g n 13 1 0 9 13 3 9 3 3 1 1 ,0 2 6 1 ,641 0 . 5 b / 2 , 8 4 5 c /
b o r r o w i n g s
Issuing Money 2 10 6 2 3 8 6 6 9 6 1 ,701 1 ,1 7 7 2 6 2 0
( %  o f  t o t a l 13 .3 4 8 . 6 6 3 . 9 6 7 . 2 6 6 . 7 6 2 . 4 4 1 . 8 1 7 .9 0
deficits)
Note: a/ average figure for the period, b/ mobilised from imported goods remained prior to 1990, c/ 
contained VND600 bill of imported goods remaining from previous years + VND720 bill of foreign 
aid for development + VND1, 525 bill of Foreign Borrowings.
Source: Cao(1995: 63). Author estimates
According to its task, the SBV also financed the state budget, which was always 
deficient during that time. Besides domestic and foreign borrowings20, the proportion of 
money printed to finance the state budget deficits in total deficits increased and reached 
its highest level of 64 per cent to 67 per cent of total deficits in the period 1986-1988 
(Table 3.2). This event was most likely related to the highest level of inflation in the 
1980s-90s, including 487.2 per cent, 301.3 per cent and 308.2 per cent pa in 1986, 1987,
20 See World Bank (1990:10): “Vietnam’s external economic relations during the 1980s have primarily 
been with Comecon economies, especially the Soviet Union. Western nations and several neighbouring 
countries have maintained an economic boycott that has limited Vietnam’s transactions with convertible 
currency area. The trade with Comecon economies is carried out through barter arrangements negotiated 
government-to-government. As part of these arrangements, Vietnam has received large amounts of credit 
at low interest rates as well as grant financing. Hence, external borrowing and aid from the Comecon has 
financed some part of the government’s budget deficit; nevertheless, too large a share has been financed 
domestically by printing money”. (Note: Comecon is Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)).
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and 1988, respectively (see Table 1.1, Chapterl). After that, the SBV slowed down with 
respect to printing money and stopped during the period 1989 to 1992. Inflation also was 
brought down to 67.5 per cent pa in 1991 and 17.5 per cent pa in 1992 (Table 1.2). 
Therefore, printing money to finance the SOEs and state budget deficits is considered as 
a major cause for inflation during the 1980s.
Table 3.3. Nominal and Real Interest Rates, 1986-88 (per cent pa)
Interest rates 1986
re a l
1987
n o m i n a l re a l
1988
n o m i n a l rea l
Lending rates on 
working capital
S O E s  (u n d e r  p lan) -79 1 4 .4 -  18.72 -69 2 1 . 6 - 2 4 . 8 4 -69
P riva te  sec to r -62 100.80 - 122.4 -45 100.80 - 122.4 -45
Lending rates for capital 
construction
S O E s -80 1 2 .9 6 -  15.84 -69 1 8 . 0 0 - 2 4 .1 2 -70
Deposit rates
S O E s -81 8.88 -72 10.8 -73
S av ing  depos i ts -71 72 -58 72 -58
T im e  depos i ts -67 96 -51 96 -52
Credit cooperatives 
L e n d in g  rates -64 112.91 -46 122.71 -46
D epos i t  rates -64 112.91 -44 115.32 -47
Source: World Bank 1990, Table 4.2, p i33
At this time, the SBV imposed low nominal interest rates for both deposits and loans. 
However, with a high inflation rate, the real interest rates were negative. In addition, 
interest rates were varied, depending on economic sectors. The state sector, with heavy 
industry, received the lowest lending rates. Cooperatives and the private sector paid 
higher interest rates (Table 3.3). Negative real interest rates had discouraged saving 
(Table 1.1, Chapter 1), which had the potential to restrict available funds for investment, 
but these stimulated SOEs to borrow and overuse the cheap credits from the SBV.
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Management of foreign exchange
Before 1988, foreign exchange transactions in Vietnam were controlled strictly by the
government through three state organs: the State Planning Commission (now called the 
Ministry of Planning and Investment-MPI), the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the
SBV. They have coordinated closely in formulating policies concerning the nation’s
foreign exchange reserves, credit and controls over foreign exchange transactions. 
SOEs, cooperatives, private firms and individuals did not have rights to deal in foreign 
exchange. All activities that involved foreign exchange (buying or selling foreign
currencies, gold, precious metals or stones) were under the sole control of the SBV and 
Vietcombank (BFTV) managements.
Table 3.4. Official and Parallel Exchange Rates, 1981 -  89.
Year Vietcombank Rate 
VND/US$
Parallel Rate 
VND/USS
Premium 
( per cent)
Feb 1981 2.445 36.0 1,372.4
Apr 1982 9.358 75.0 701.5
Jan 1983 9.806 105.0 970.8
1984
Dec 1985 14.250 167.0 1,071.9
Oct 1986 15.00 465.0 3,000.0
Apr 1987 80.50 700.0 769.6
Dec 1987 368.20 1150.0 212.3
Dec 1988 3,000.0 4,350.0 45.0
Mar 1989 3,800.0 4,850.0 27.6
Apr 1989 4,900.0 4,950.0 1.0
Note: Exchange rates were at selling prices. Premium = (Parallel-Official Rates)* 100/Official Rate. 
Author estimates.
Source: Phan (1992: 100).
During this period, a fixed exchange rate regime with a multiple exchange rate system 
was in place and exchange rates were set daily by the SBV. Between 1985 and 1988, 
there were three kinds of official exchange rates for the VND and US$: the official 
exchange rate for external trade (which ranged from VND18: US$1 to VND900: US$1);
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the inward remittances rates for Vietnamese living abroad (ranging from VND18: US$1 
to VND3000: US$1); and the non-commercial transaction rate (eg. tourism, services of 
foreign experts, and remittances for foreigners - ranging from VND15: US$1 to 
VND3000: US$1)21. Besides these rates, two Rouble exchange rates also existed. The 
transfer Rouble rate was used for trade with the CMEA countries, and the clearing 
Rouble rate was used for non-commercial transactions22.
Vietnam’s foreign trade was largely undeveloped during the period 1976 to 1988. The 
majority of foreign trade was with countries in the CMEA23, among which exchange 
rates were used as a converting tool to clear barter trade. So, the role of exchange rates 
was neglected. On the other hand, due to the fixed exchange rate regime, the official 
exchange rates were kept below the parallel market rates, and the premium was very 
high. The highest level of premium was 3,000 per cent in October 1986 (Table 3.4). 
This caused difficulties for the SBV in managing and reserving foreign exchange, 
stimulated rent seeking, smuggling activities, and encouraging people to store their 
wealth in the form of US$ and gold outside the formal banking system.
In general, management of money and credits in the period before 1988 from the SBV 
was accommodated to the production plans set by the central government. The financing 
SOEs and state budget deficits, and inefficient controls of money supply by the SBV 
were major sources for high level of inflation and macroeconomic instability. The role 
of exchange rate was neglected and considered as a conversion tool between VND and 
other currencies.
21 See Brahm (1992).
22 See Vu (1994).
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Moreover, credit policy was favouring the state sector and neglected the private one that 
made investment inefficiently. The negative interest rate policy and lack of public 
confidence in the banking sector made saving discouraged. Therefore, these necessitated 
major changes in the banking and financial sectors and as well as the whole economy.
3.3-Banking system reform since 1988
As mentioned in Chapter 1, Vietnam adopted a comprehensive reform package in 
March 1989 and this package included financial sector reform, besides the reform of 
state economic management, SOE reform and reform of external economic relations.
The banking system is an essential part of the financial sector and it was reformed a 
little earlier than the comprehensive economic reform. From March 1988, the 
Vietnamese banking system started to reorganise and change under Decision No 
53/HDBT, which determined the main orientation of the new structural organisation and 
operation o f the banking system. In May 1990, under two decrees of law from the State 
Council, a two-tiered banking system was established. The institutional reform of the 
banking system and some related issues in the banking system and the economy, which 
may have affected the monetary and exchange rate policies during that time, are 
discussed below.
3.3.1. Institutional reform
The two-tier banking system was established in 1990 and it has consisted of the SB V in 
the first tier and state owned commercial banks (SOCBs), other commercial banks,
23 More than 60 per cent of foreign trade volume was traded with CMEA countries (non-convertible Area) 
(Tran 1992: 184-85).
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finance and insurance companies, credit cooperatives and people’s credit funds in the
second tier (Chart 3.2).
On the first tier of the banking system, the SBV became the central bank of Vietnam 
(commercial banks were separated from the SBV), the “bank of banks”. The main 
functions of the SBV since 1990 have been in macro-management and they can be 
described as follows (Brahm 1992: 30):
Chart 3.2. Vietnamese Banking System, 1990-99.
Finance
and
Insurance
Companies
Other CBs: 
Joint-Stock 
Banks,
Foreign Bank 
Branches, 
Joint-venture 
Banks
SOCBs: 
BFTV, BIDV, 
ICBV, VBA, 
and
(Bank for the 
poor and 
HDBMRD)
Credit
Cooperatives,
Credit Funds
Note: HDBMRD is Housing Development Bank of Mekong River Delta
• economic planning and monetary policy:
• settlements;
foreign exchange controls;
supervision of commercial banks and credit institutions;
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• issuing regulations and directives concerning foreign exchange, settlements, credit 
and banking activities;
• supervising the implementation of these regulations and directives;
• functioning as banker for credit institutions;
• printing and issuing currency;
• maintaining and monitoring reserves;
• a managing money circulation;
• managing gold and foreign currency;
• and establishing a national balance of payments.
So, the SBV has been in charge of conducting monetary policy that includes printing 
and issuing money, managing money circulation and foreign exchange, and 
implementing exchange rate policy. It has also been responsible for formulating the 
operations of commercial banks, finance companies, and credit cooperatives, and 
supervising and regulating all their activities.
The second tier of the banking system has comprised of four different groups of credit 
institutions. The first group contained four state owned commercial banks (SOCBs): 
The Bank for Foreign Trade of Vietnam (BFTV-Vietcombank) and the bank for 
Investment and Development of Vietnam (BIDV-Vietindebank) existed before 1988. 
The BFTV has dominated trading in foreign exchange and offering services in 
international trade such as processing international payments, letters of credit 
operations, and also making loans and accepting deposits. The BIDV is responsible for 
mobilising and providing funds for development projects in both local and foreign 
currencies. It provides medium and long term lending.
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The Industrial and Commercial Bank of Vietnam (ICBV-Vietincombank) and Vietnam 
Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (VBA-Agribank) were established in 1990 
based on the separation of two departments from the SBV. The ICBV has operated in 
mobilising funds and making local and foreign loans, trading foreign exchange, gold 
and silver, processing local and international payments, consulting, etc. The VBA- 
Agribank’s operations include mobilising funds and making loans mainly in the 
agriculture sector. The VBA also operates the Bank for the Poor, which was established 
in 1995. This is a government funded low-income credit scheme (see IMF 1998).
Table 3.5. Structure of Banking System, 1990-98
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98
The SBV
A s se ts  ( V N D  tr i l l ) 12.7 24 .8 2 32 4 8 .7 7 7 .4
Total bank Assets
( T B A ) ,  ( V N D  tr il l) 14.9 28.0 34.5 3 8 .8 4 8 .4 74.3 86 .2 119 .2e 137.4e
T B A  R a t io  to  G D P  (% ) 35.5 36.5 31.2 2 8 .4 2 8 .4 32 .5 3 1 .7 38 38
T o ta l  L o an s  to  G D P  (% ) 14.1 13.2 13.8 17.5 19.6 18.5 18.7 19.8 2 2 .0
T o ta l  D e p o s i ts  to  G D P  (% ) 17.4 17.7 14.8 13.2 13.3 14.4 15.3 18.0 2 0 .0
SOCBs
A s s e t s  ( V N D  tr i l l ) 14.7 26.6 31 .6 3 5 .2 43.3 58 .0 6 6 .0 9 7 .7e 112.7e
%  o f  T B A 9 9 .0 94.8 91.8 9 0 .5 89.5 78.1 7 6 .6 82 82
%  o f  to ta l  c re d i t  e x te n d e d 82 .8 7 9 .6 75.5 7 7 .2 81.4
Other CBs
A s s e ts  ( V N D  tr il l) 0.15 1.46 2 .84 3 .67 5.1 16.3 2 0 .2 2 1 . 5e 2 4 . 7e
%  o f  T B A 1.0 5.2 8.2 9.5 10.5 2 1 .9 2 3 .4 18 18
o f  w h ich :  JS B  (% ) 10 10
F B B + J V B  (% ) 8 8
%  o f  to ta l  c re d i t  ex te n d e d 17.2 2 0 .4 24 .5 22 .8 18.6
Note: e is estimated figure, JSB is Joint Stock Bank, FBB is Foreign bank branch, JVB is Joint Venture Bank. 
TBA is total bank Assets (excluding assets of the SBV).
Source: World Bank (1995: 9,15), IMF (1997b), IMF (1999a: 27), IMF (2000:23), Saito (1997: 3).
In 1997, the Housing Development Bank of the Mekong River Delta was established to 
provide low interest rate loans for housing development of inhabitants in the Mekong 
River Delta. This is a development bank and also has other functions as a commercial
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bank, but its capital is small (VND500 billion from the government)24 compared with 
the four big SOCBs (average capital of each bank was around VND1.3 trillion in 
199725) and as it has just operated for a few years, its role in the banking sector is 
limited.
Since 1990, the four SOCBs have always played a dominant role in the banking system. 
The 3000 branches of SOCBs are in most provinces, districts and economic centers in 
Vietnam, and their total assets accounted for 82 per cent of total bank assets in 1997-98. 
Credit extended to the economy by SOCBs accounted for three/fourths to four/fifths of 
total credit, while non-SOCBs have from one/fourth to one/fifth of total credit (Table 
3.5).
The second group contains joint stock banks, foreign bank branches and joint-venture 
banks. Most joint-stock banks were established during 1991-93 and their shareholders 
are SOCBs, SOEs and private entities. Foreign bank branches operate mainly in the area 
of trade finance and deal with foreign currencies. They are allowed to accept a limited 
amount of domestic currency deposits (which equal 25 per cent of their branch capital). 
Joint-venture banks are partnerships between an SOCB and a foreign bank, and they 
also are subject to the same restrictions as foreign banks in taking domestic currency 
deposits.There were 51 joint stock banks, 23 foreign bank branches and 4 joint venture 
banks in 1998 and their total assets increased quickly from 1 per cent in 1990 to 18 per 
cent of total bank assets in 1998 (Table 3.5 and World Bank 1999).
24 See VIR (1997)
25 The figure estimated from Table 3.5 and 3.7 (in 1997, capital/Total asset is 5.5 per cent for SOCBs).
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The third group includes finance companies, which may be established as either 
shareholding or state-owned companies. The main operation of a finance company is to 
provide funds for the purchase of goods and services. Finance companies may also 
engage in many of the same activities as a commercial bank provided that approval has 
first been obtained from the SBV (Brahm 1992: 34). There were 4 finance companies, 
one insurance company and 8 leasing companies operating in 1998 and 1999, but their 
assets are small compared to other commercial banks (in 1996, 2 financial companies 
had capital and reserves equal to VND20 billion (Saito 1998)).
The fourth group contains credit cooperatives, which are collectively owned institutions. 
The funds of credit cooperatives have been collected from their members and only 
contributors are eligible to borrow funds. Credit cooperatives’ operations have been 
supervised and regulated by the SBV. In the period 1988-1990, the number of credit 
cooperatives grew rapidly. In late 1990, there were 7,660 credit cooperatives in rural and 
urban areas. However, due to lack of adequate rules related to licensing, limits to 
volume of credit and interest rates, collateral and inspections, the credit system was in 
severe crisis, and until June 1993, 6,000 unqualified cooperatives were closed and only 
62 credit cooperatives remained (VIR 1993). In 1994, savings and loan institutions such 
as people’s credit funds were permitted and there were around 1000 credit cooperatives 
and people’s credit funds, operating in 1998 and 1999.
After 10 years of reform since the mono-banking system was transformed into two tiers, 
the banking system has been developed in the numbers of commercial banks, credit 
institutions and assets. There are many domestic and foreign bank branches in Hanoi, 
HoChiMinh City and other big cities. Residents and foreigners can easily open accounts 
in term of VND and foreign currencies, and easily deposit and withdraw their money.
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Some big banks such as Vietcombank and ANZ have also provided ATMs (Automatic 
Teller Machines) in some places. The use of bankcards, and credit cards is not unusual 
in Vietnam at present. Total bank assets increased from 28.4 per cent of GDP in 1994 to 
38 per cent of GDP in 1997-98 (Table 3.5). This reflects an increase in the degree of 
monetisation in the banking system (even though this degree is still lower than some 
countries in ASEAN - see in the next section). Currency deposits in VND and in foreign 
currencies also grew in the range from 28.5 per cent to 51.3 per cent pa and from 16.1 
per cent to 42 per cent pa, respectively in the period 1994-98 (Table 3.8); this indicates 
the increase in public confidence in the banking system.
The establishment of the two tier banking system in 1990 was crucial for banking 
reform in Vietnam, since it created an appropriate framework for monetary policy 
reform, particularly the use of indirect monetary instruments (see Hilbers 1993). The 
development of banking and financial systems facilitates the transition to indirect 
monetary instruments and implementation of exchange rate policy. However, the 
following issues are important when analysing the reform of monetary and exchange 
rate policies.
3.3.2. Important issues in the banking system and the economy
The degree of monetisation
The degree of monetisation is conventionally measured as a ratio of the broad money 
stock to GDP. There was a very low degree of monetisation in the Vietnamese banking 
system compared to other countries in the ASEAN from the period 1995-98. The ratio 
of M2/GDP was 26 per cent in 1997 and 28.4 per cent in 1998 for Vietnam, while it was 
from 55.6 per cent to 113.8 per cent for some countries in ASEAN in 1997-98 (Table
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3.6). Moreover, the ratio of total commercial bank assets in Vietnam to GDP was 38 per
cent, loan and deposit ratios to GDP were from 22 per cent to 20 per cent in 1998. These
also reflect the low degree of monetisation in Vietnam (Table 3.5).
Table 3.6. Indicator of Financial Deepening in International Comparison 
___________________________ (per cent), 1994-98____________________
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
1-Broad Money (M2)/GDP
Vietnam 25.3 23.0 23.8 26.0 28.4
Indonesia 44.9 48.0 52.2 55.6 57.5
M alaysia 82.0 86.2 93.9 99.9
Ph ilipp ines 45.7 50.4 54.5 61.6 60.8
S ingapore 86.8 84.5 85.6 86.7 113.8
Tha iland 77.8 78.9 79.3 89.9
2- Currency/Deposit Ratio
Vietnam 76.4 57.2 53.9 44 5 35.7
Indonesia 14.3 12.1 9.9 10.2 8.6
M alaysia 15.9 14.0 11.9 11.1 8.5
Philipp ines 15.6 14.5 13.0 11.7 11.0
S ingapore 13.3 12.9 12.1 11.2 7.6
Tha iland 9.7 9.7 9.2 8.5 7.4
3-Currency/Broad Money (M2)
Vietnam 43.3 36.4 34.9 30.8 26.4
Indonesia 10.8 9.5 8.1 8.2 7.3
M alaysia 10.2 9.2 8.1 7.8 6.7
Ph ilipp ines 12.4 11.6 10.4 9.6 9.0
S ingapore 10.0 9.7 9.2 8.7 6.3
Tha iland 8.5 8.6 8.2 7.7 6.7
Source: IMF (1999b), IMF (1999c), IMF (2000). Author estimates.
Currency/deposits and currency/M2 ratios in Vietnam have declined from 76.4 per cent 
and 43.3 per cent in 1994 to 35.7 per cent and 26.4 per cent in 1998, respectively. 
However, they were still higher than those (from 6.3 per cent to 11 per cent) in some 
countries in ASEAN (Table 3.6). This reflects a deficient payments system and low 
levels of confidence by the public in the SOCBs. A commonly felt shortage of currency 
induces the public to hold currency for a long period (World Bank 1995). However, 
even if public confidence existed, the inadequate financial instruments limit banking 
financial intermediation in the banking sector.
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Money and securities markets
The money market in Vietnam has been underdeveloped during the 1990s. The inter­
bank market for domestic currency was opened in July 1993, and the inter-bank market 
for foreign exchange also was established in 1994. These markets have provided a 
mechanism for transferring funds between banks, before the use of the last resort 
function from the SBV. However, they have been still underdeveloped and have not 
functioned well. The volume of transactions in the market for domestic currency was 
small, it was from more than VND80 trillion in 1994 to VND 26 trillion in 1996, and 
there were no transactions in this market in VND in 1997 (IMF 1997a).
The inter-bank market for foreign exchange in the period between 1994 and 1996 was 
also very poor, total volume of US$ transactions went from just over US$3million to 
US$24 million a year. This market has become more active from 1997 due to demand 
for US$ being high - total volume of US$ transactions increased from US$720 million 
to US$7200 million in 1998 (SBV 1997-98).
After some years of preparation, the securities market in Vietnam was first officially 
opened on July 26, 2000 in the securities trading centre in HoChiMinh City. However, 
the operations of this market have been very limited26. Since the scope of our thesis 
covers the period of the 1990s, so it will not be mentioned in this thesis.
26 On the opening day, VND300 billion of T-Bills was auctioned. Also this centre had its first day of 
trading securities on July 28, 2000. However, the performance of the centre have not been active due to 
lack of securities and controlled prices of securities. There were only 6 kinds of securities in the market in 
August 2000: T-bills, shares of four companies which were listed in the securities market and shares of 
BIDV, while the number of broker companies is seven. Ceiling prices for securities were set, the prices 
for the next business day must not exceed the closing price of the last trading day by more than 5 per cent. 
As a result, there were only a few thousand shares traded in the first few weeks and some economists are
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Bank Soundness
Non performing loans (NPL) in the Vietnamese banking system are indicated by the 
amount of overdue loans. Overdue loans, as a percentage of total loans were 12.5 per 
cent for deposit money banks in September 1998 compared to 8.9 per cent in 1994. The 
SOEs and joint stock companies contributed 35.5 per cent and 46.1 per cent of the total 
amount of overdue loans in 1998 (see Appendix 3.1). The large amount of overdue 
loans underlies the risk of loan losses and reduce the profitability of banking system. 
The profits/ total asset ratios for deposit money banks were only 0.77 per cent in 1997 
and 1.12 per cent in September 1998 (Table 3.7).
Table 3.7. Vietnam: Bank Soundness Indicators (per cent), 1994-98 1/
94 95 96 97 9 8 /S 94 95 96 97 9 8 /S
C a p ita l/T o ta l A sse ts C a p ita l/T o ta l L o a n s  2 /
D e p o s i t  m o n e y 6.0 7.7 7.2 7.9 7.6 9.4 12.5 12.3 13.2 12.9
b anks
S O C B s 5.5 4.8 5.0 5.5 5.0 9.2 8.4 8.6 9.3 8.6
N o n - S O C B s 7.7 25.1 14.6 16.5 18.0 10.1 28 .5 2 3 .8 26.3 29.1
P r o fits /T o ta l A sse ts P ro fits /'L o a n s
D e p o s i t  m o n e y 0 .10 0 .30 0.73 0 .77 1.12 0 .17 0 .48 1.24 1.28 1.90
b anks
S O C B s 0 .20 0 .39 0.85 0 .75 1.05 0.33 0 .68 1.47 1.26 1.78
N o n - S O C B s -0 .27 -0 .25 0 .32 0.83 1.43 -0 .36 -0 .2 9 0 .52 1.32 2 .30
Note: all figures are in percent
1/ Based on the monetary survey of four SOCBs and 24 non-SOCBs.
2/ Reflects recapitalization of SOCBs in October 1998 through conversion of frozen loans from the SBV 
3/ Excluding loans to government. 4/ Excluding government deposits.
S/ Average figure from March, June and September figures.
Source: IMF (1999a: 31)
The capital base of Vietnamese banks was very weak. Before October 1998. the highest 
capitalised SOCB had a ratio of capital to total assets of 5.5 per cent, non-SOCBs had a
discussing about the possibility of crisis in the securities market in Vietnam (see Hoang 2000, Quang 
2000).
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stronger capital/asset ratio of 18 per cent and capital/loans of about 30 per cent (Table 
3.7). By October 1998, the SBV recapitalised the four SOCBs by converting into capital 
VND2.4 trillion of SBV loans to banks, which were for the most part in the split of the 
mono-bank in 1990. As a result, the capital/asset ratio of SOCBs rose to 7.2 per cent 
(IMF 1999a), still a low ratio, containing a potential risk for banking operations.
Table 3.8. Vietnam: Monetary Survey, 1989-98
8 9 9 0 91 9 2 9 3 9 4 9 5 9 6 9 7 9 8
(V N D  t r i l l io n ,  e n d  o f  p e r io d )
N e t  f o r e ig n  a s s e t s 0.5 1.7 6.7 10.6 6.6 6.9 10.9 14.3 21.0 31.2
N e t  d o m e s t ic  a s s e t s 7.0 9.7 13.6 16.6 26.6 36.1 41.9 50.4 60.6 71.2
* Domestic credit 7.3 9.9 14.3 17.1 27.8 38.0 47.1 55.3 66.8 81.0
- Net claims on Gov 3.1 4.0 4.1 1.9 3.9 4.6 4.7 4.4 4.4 8.4
-Credit to the economy 4.1 5.9 10.2 15.2 23.9 33.4 42.4 50.9 62.4 72.7
+ to SOEs 3.6 5.3 9.1 12.4 15.9 20.5 24.1 26.8 31.0 38.1
+ to non-SOEs 0.5 0.6 1.0 2.8 8.0 13.0 18.3 24.1 31.4 34.6
*Other iterms, net -0.3 -0.2 -0.7 -0.6 -1.2 -1.9 -5.2 -4.9 -6.2 -9.8
B r o a d  m o n e y  (M 2 ) 7.4 11.4 20.3 27.1 33.1 43.0 52.7 64.7 81.6 104.2
of which: total deposits 5.1 7.5 13.9 16.6 18.9 24.4 33.5 42.0 56.5 75.5
* Dong liquidity 5.3 7.7 12.0 18.9 25.1 33.5 41.6 51.5 62.9 78.3
- Currency out banks 2.4 3.7 6.4 10.6 14.2 18.6 19.2 22.6 25.1 27.0
- Deposits (dd+other 3.0 3.9 5.5 8.4 10.9 14.9 22.5 28.9 37.8 51.4
* Foreign Cu Deposits 2.1 3.6 8.4 8.2 8.0 9.5 11.1 13.2 18.7 24.1
- in US$ millions 862 1004 1180 1520 1733
(A n n u a l  %  c h a n g e )
Credit to the Economy 43.9 71.3 49.8 57.0 39.8 26.9 20.1 22.6 16.4
Broad money (M2) 53.1 78.7 33.7 22.0 29.9 22.6 22.7 26.1 25.6
Dong deposits 32.2 40.4 51.0 30.2 36.6 51.3 28.5 30.8 36.0
Foreign cu deposits 766 75.6 127 -1.7 -2.1 18.5 16.1 19.0 42.0 28.8
Note: Gov is government, dd is demand deposit, Cu is currency 
Source: IMF (1995b), IMF(1999b), IMF (2000).
Besides these issues, the legal system has not yet caught up with banking and financial 
reform, there is a lack of skills and knowledge in the banking staff, a backward payment 
system, and supervision and prudential regulations are weak. These influence the 
effectiveness of the banking system, but they are beyond the scope of this paper.
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SOEs R eform
During the reform process, the number of SOEs fell from 12,296 in 1989 to around 
5,800 at the end of 1997 since some of those were merged and closed. The SOEs have 
played an important role in the economy. The SOEs share in total output increased from 
24.8 per cent in 1989 to 29.6 per cent in 1994, while employment fell from 11.9 per cent 
of total employment in 1989 to 8 per cent in 1994 (IMF 1995a: 18). In the period 1997- 
98, the SOE sector accounted for about 37 per cent of GDP and 8.8 per cent of total 
employment and it has dominating shares in production of oil, cement, chemicals and 
steel (IMF 2000: 5,13). SOEs have also used about 50 per cent of outstanding domestic 
bank credit. The 200 largest SOEs accounted for 60 per cent of state capital and 40 per 
cent of total debt (IMF 1999a: 42). There are three outstanding issues of SOEs, which 
need to be considered:
First, SOEs’ performance has been very weak. The classification of SOEs from 5,429 
enterprises in 1997 showed that only 40 per cent of SOEs were profit makers, 44 per 
cent were temporary loss-makers and 16 per cent were permanent loss-makers27 (IMF 
1999a: 43). If this situation were to be maintained for long time, it would undermine the 
health of the economy and banking system since SOEs are the main customers of the 
banking system and credit is allocated to this inefficient sector.
Second, SOEs’ debt has been a big problem. In 1997, SOEs’ total debt was VND63 
trillion (US$4.4 billion), of which 20VND trillion and VND43 trillion for worst 
performing and “poor” performing SOEs respectively (classified on the basis of
27 The large SOEs which are managed by central government seemed to perform slightly better than local 
ones (that may result from monopolistic position, preferential treatment in business operation including 
financing and import protection -see IMF 1999a).
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profitability and debt ratios) (World Bank 1999). The statistics of 1,044 large SOEs 
indicated their average debt-asset ratio28 equal to 0.61 and for two/thirds of the sample 
(5,429 SOEs), it was higher than 0.5 in 1997 also. These figures reflect the fact that on 
average, SOEs have larger debt than equity (IMF 1999a). The large debt affects 
profitability of SOEs since they have to pay more interest and also increase NPLs in the 
banking system, weakening both SOEs’ performance and the banking system.
Third, the process of equitisation of SOEs has been slow. This process was launched in 
mid-1992, but only 186 SOEs were equitised by August 199929. The reasons for the 
slow equitisation have been related to “workers and managers about their jobs, 
concerned to local governments on losing revenue sources and the lack of a well 
articulated framework for equitisation and valuation” (IMF 1999a: 45). The slow 
equitisation reduces the pace of SOE reform and development of money and securities 
markets.
3.4. Conclusion
The banking system in Vietnam before 1988 was a mono one and its role was passive 
and accommodating to production plans set by the central government. This system had 
to be reformed in the transition to a market oriented economy. After 1988, and 
especially since reform of the banking system in 1990, the two tier banking system has 
been established. The SBV became the state bank, its main functions being to conduct 
monetary and exchange rate policies, supervising and regulating the operation of the 
banking system as a whole.
28 Debt-asset ratio =(debt/(debt+equity)
29 See ‘Electronic Nhandan’s Newspaper’ on August 14, 1999. Http://www.nhandan.org.vn
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After 10 years of reform, the two-tier banking system has been developed in both 
number of financial institutions and their assets, these created a framework and 
facilitated the reforms of monetary and exchange rate policies. However, there are still 
issues of low degree of monetisation, the underdeveloped money market, bank 
soundness, and outstanding issues of SOEs, which limit the scope and effectiveness of 
monetary and the safety of the banking system. These issues have to be taken into 
account when analysing monetary and exchange rate policies in Vietnam.
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Chapter 4
REFORM OF MONETARY INSTRUMENTS: THE 
TRANSITION FROM DIRECT TO INDIRECT 
INSTRUMENTS IN VIETNAM
4.1. Introduction
As in many transitional economies, reform of monetary instruments, particularly the 
transition from direct to indirect instruments of monetary policy, is indispensable in 
Vietnam (see Chapter 2). After the establishment of the two-tier banking system in 1990 
which created the appropriate framework for the implementation and use of indirect 
instruments (see Chapter 3), the indirect instruments such as RRs and refining facilities 
were introduced in the early 1990s, and the T-Bill auctions in the primary market 
officially opened in June 1995.
There were not many studies related to the reform of monetary instruments in Vietnam, 
except for the few reports from the IMF Mission in 1995-96 and World Bank studies on 
Vietnam’s financial sector in 1995. Their studies are also reviewed in this chapter.
This chapter analyses the reform of monetary instruments, particularly the transition 
from direct to indirect instruments in Vietnam during the 1990s. The impact of the use 
of indirect monetary instruments on the financial sector efficiency and on the degree of 
monetary control are also examined. The chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 
examines the reform of monetary instruments and the transition from direct to indirect
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instruments. Section 3 evaluates the impact of the use of indirect monetary instruments 
on the financial sector efficiency and on the degree of monetary control. Section 4 
includes the conclusion and policy implications.
4.2. Reform of Monetary Instruments: the transition from direct to 
indirect instruments
In 1990, the two-tier banking system was established and for the first time, monetary 
policy was implemented by the SBV in the environment of a market-oriented economy. 
The ultimate targets of monetary policy as exercised by the SBV are to stabilise the 
value of the VND, restrain inflation and contribute to economic growth. The 
intermediate targets of monetary policy are the growth rate of money supply (M2), 
credit growth, and foreign currency reserves. Based on the macroeconomic conditions 
and the development of banking and financial sectors, the SBV has to use both direct 
and indirect instruments of monetary policy to achieve these targets, but it has relied 
more on direct instruments than indirect ones. During the 1990s, direct instruments have 
been liberalised and indirect ones have been increasingly introduced.
4.2.1. Direct instruments
The direct instruments of monetary policy which have been used by the SBV include 
interest rate controls, credit ceilings and directed credit. The main features of those 
instruments are discussed in the section below.
Interest rate controls
From the beginning of financial sector reform in 1989 up to the present, interest rates 
have been controlled by the SBV. However, reform of interest rate policy has made
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some progress: first, real interest rates have become positive. Second, interest rate 
setting has been liberalised step by step.
In the period before March 1992, the SBV set the interest rates for each type of official 
lending and deposit. The nominal deposit interest rates (DRs) in this period were set at 
very low levels, about 0.25 per cent per month (pm) or 3 per cent per annum (pa), but 
they were pushed up suddenly to a very high level in March and April 1989 (12 per cent 
pm or 144 per cent pa) and after that they were reduced step by step to 3.5 per cent pm 
(42 per cent pa) in March 1992 (Figure 4.1). Increasing the nominal DR was a method
used the SBV to absorb the cash in circulation; it helped to bring down inflation from 
about 300 per cent pa in the late 1980s to more than 10 per cent in 1992. Real DRs 
before March 1989 were highly negative, from more than -5 per cent to -10 per cent pm 
(Figure 4.1), due to the high inflation rate at that time. With success in curbing inflation, 
the real DRs became a positive first in March 1989, they maintained in a positive range 
for more than one year, then went down below zero until February 1992. The real DRs 
in 1989, 1990, and 1991 were 47.8 per cent, -13.1 per cent, and -22.5 per cent pa,
respectively (Table 4.1).
Figure 4.1: Monthly Deposit Interest Rates (01/1989-08/1998)
Source: Mori (1997), SBV (1995-98), Bach and Nguyen (1999). Author estimates the real deposit rate.
The situation with the DRs was similar to the short-term lending rates (SLRs), and
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medium and long-term lending rates (MLRs) in that period (Table 4.1, Appendix 4.1 
and 4.2). Before March 1992, the nominal SLRs and MLRs were around 40-48 per cent 
pa. The real SLRs and MLRs were strongly negative (from about -20 per cent pa). Due 
to anti-inflation policies, the nominal DR was higher than both nominal SLR and MLR 
from around 5 per cent to 40 per cent pa in the 3-year period from 1989 to 1991, except 
for nominal SLR in 1991. The interest spreads were highly negative from -34.5 per cent 
and -6  per cent pa in 1989 and 1990 (Table 4.1).
Table 4.1: Interest Rates in Vietnam, 1989-99 (per cent pa)
Year Deposit rates Short-term M & L term CPI Spreads
Lending rates Lending rates
N R N R N R
1989 82.5 47.8 48.00 13.3 42.00 7.3 34.70 -34.50
1990 54.0 -13.10 48.00 -19.10 42.00 -25.50 67.10 -6.00
1991 45.0 -22.50 46.00 -21.50 40.60 -26.90 67.50 1.00
1992 34.1 16.60 41.80 24.30 31.20 13.70 17.50 7.70
1993 20.4 15.20 28.20 23.00 18.00 12.80 5.20 7.80
1994 16.8 2.40 25.20 10.80 16.90 2.50 14.40 8.40
1995 16.8 4.10 25.20 12.50 20.40 7.70 12.70 8.40
1996 9.6 5.10 18.85 14.35 19.00 14.50 4.50 9.25
1997 8.0 4.40 13.50 9.90 14.70 11.10 3.60 5.50
1998 9.7 0.50 14.40 5.20 15.00 5.80 9.20 4.70
1999 6.9 6.80 13.0 12.9 13.28 13.18 0.1 6.10
Note: N is nominal rates, R is real rates, CPI is Consumer Price Index. Nominal annual rates are a 
sum of 12 monthly rates. The real rates equal nominal rates minus CPI rates. Spreads equal 
nominal short-term lending rates minus deposit rates. Deposit Rates (DRs) are interest rates for 
saving deposits (three-months, household), Short-term Lending Rates (SLRs) are interest rates for 
loans with maturity less than 1 year, Medium and Long-term lending Rates (MLRs) are interest 
rates for loans with maturity more than 1 year.
Source: Mori (1997), Bach and Nguyen (1999). SBV (1995-99), IMF (2000).
Author estimates the real DR, SLR, and MLR.
This policy used interest rates as an instrument of monetary policy to curb inflation, but 
with lending rates set below deposit rates, banks could not make profits and,
“Consequently, the state commmercial banks require the subsidies from the SBV, and 
they have no incentive to mobilise dong deposits or, alternatively, have incentives to
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introduce non-interest rate barriers to discourage new deposits, such as minimum 
balance requirements” (McCarty 1997: 61).
From March 1992 to December 1995, positive interest rates were maintained and the 
SBV moved from setting particular lending and deposit rates to imposing maximum 
lending rates and minimum deposit rates for each period. All subsidies on interest rate 
have been abolished from the beginning of this period. In particular, there were no 
special lending interest rates for SOEs. However, there were special (bargained) interest 
rates for borrowers in the remote areas or for specific objectives. Nominal DRs were 
reduced slowly from 34.1 per cent to 16.8 per cent pa through three time adjustments 
during more than 3 years. The real DRs were high, but they declined over the 1992-94 
period from 16.6 per cent to 2.4 per cent pa (Table 4.1).
Nominal SLRs were also adjusted from 41.8 per cent to 25.2 per cent pa through five 
discrete changes. With low inflation in that period, the real SLRs were very high and 
also declined from 24.3 per cent to 10.8 per cent pa (Table 4.1). Then the commercial 
banks achieved the high rates of return at that time.
Nominal MLRs were lower than Nominal SLRs until 1995 and they were also lower 
than nominal DRs until 1993 (Table 4.1). This implies that there was still a form of 
subsidy through interest rates to medium and long-term borrowers (most of them were 
SOEs). The real MLR fell in a range from 13.7 per cent to 2.5 per cent pa over the 
1992-94 period. So, real interest rates at that time were maintained at positive levels.
From January 1996 to December 1997, based on the development of the money market, 
demand and supply of credit and low inflation, the SBV abolished the floor on deposit 
rates (free to be determined by the banks and credit organisations). However, the SBV
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still set the ceiling on lending rates and the spread between the lending rates and deposit 
rates was set at 0.35 per cent pm (4.2 per cent pa). The special interest rates were 
replaced by different ceilings for lending rates for urban and rural areas. According to 
Decision 381/QDNH1 on December 28, 1995, the lending rate for urban areas was 1.75 
per cent pm, and for the rural areas 2 per cent. It is argued that this differential is 
justified since the demand for credit in the rural areas is greater than supply, the loan 
value is small, and risks and transaction costs are higher in rural areas than in urban 
areas. The maximum lending rates to mountainous, coastal or Khmer-minority regions 
were significantly lower than the market rate, from 15 to 30 per cent (Nguyen, 1997).
The nominal DRs (determined by the commercial banks) in the 1996-97 period declined 
from 9.6 per cent to 8.0 per cent pa. The real DRs also moved to a very low level from 
5.1 per cent to 4.4 per cent pa (there were few negative real DRs in several months 
during this period).
Through five periods of adjustments, the nominal SLRs and nominal MLRs decreased 
from 18.85 per cent and 19.0 per cent pa to 13.5 per cent and 14.7 per cent pa, 
respectively. These interest rates were lowest over the last 10 years. However, with very 
low inflation (from 4.5 per cent to 3.6 per cent pa), commercial banks and credit 
institutions still had real SLRs and MLRs that were around 10-14 per cent pa. The 
important point in this period is for the first time since 1989. the nominal MLRs were 
set higher than SLRs in 1996, and SLRs were higher than DRs from 1991 (Table 4.1). 
This is a move in the right direction, which can lead to reduction in the borrowing of 
medium and long-term loans (most borrowers of these loans were SOEs) and direct 
borrowers to efficiently use bank funds. Interest rate policy in this period was 
liberalised step by step and interest rates were gradually reduced. The lower interest
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rates should have created a more favourable climate for investment and economic
growth.
During 1998, the SBV abolished the interest rate differential between urban and rural 
areas, and the fixed spread of 0.35 per cent pm or 4.2 per cent pa as well, in order to 
promote competition between the areas. The ceiling of lending rates now applied to all 
areas, except mountainous, coastal and Khmer-minority regions that still received 
concessionary interest rates as in previous periods. Nominal DRs were at 9.7 per cent pa 
in this year, but the real DRs were 0.5 per cent pa due to higher inflation, 9.2 per cent pa 
in this year compared to 3.6 per cent in the previous year. Nominal SLRs and MLRs 
have been set to 14.4 per cent and 15 per cent pa, respectively. Their real rates were still 
positive (5.2 per cent and 5.8 per cent pa), despite higher inflation. The nominal DRs, 
SLRs and MLRs were slightly higher than in 1997 because the SBV had to maintain the 
real positive interest rates and they also wanted to absorb the cash in circulation and 
undertake a tighter monetary policy to reduce the impact of the financial crisis in the 
region.
In 1999, the ceiling on nominal SLRs and MLRs were reduced to around 13 per cent pa, 
nominal DRs were 6.9 per cent pa, (Table 4.1). These nominal rates were a bit lower 
than 1998, but the inflation rate was only 0.1 per cent pa, then the real interest rates 
were still higher than the previous year. The lower lending rates may stimulate the 
growth of economy, GDP grew at only 4.8 per cent in 1999 due to falling in both 
domestic and foreign demand as well as FDI (Table 1.2), after the financial crisis in the 
region in mid-1997.
In short, throughout the banking and financial sector reforms, interest rates have been
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controlled by the SBV. This control is appropriate in conditions of Vietnam where 
supervision and prudential regulation in the banking system is weak, the legal system is 
not developed yet and the degree of monetisation is low. The interest rate controls have 
the advantage in limiting adverse selection problems (see Chapter 2). As a high cost 
lesson from the past, losing interest rate controls from the SBV was one reason for the 
collapse of the credit cooperative system in Vietnam in the early 1990s (see Chapter 3). 
So, full interest rate liberalisation in Vietnam in that period would not be appropriate or 
too soon. The contribution of interest rate policy in curbing inflation and its gradual 
liberalisation toward market rates are successes of the SBV in the transition to a market 
economy and reform of monetary instruments.
However, interest rate controls normally impose deadweight losses on the economy, 
limit competition and provide incentives for arbitrage and evasion of controls from 
credit institutions, and hamper the effectiveness of indirect instruments (IMF 1997b). 
This has been the case in Vietnam and is detailed in sub-sections below.
The spread between the deposit rate and the lending rate
A spread of 4.2 per cent pa between deposit rates and lending rates30 was applied from 
January 1996 to January 20th, 199831. Through this regulation, the SBV intended to 
protect depositors and encourage banks to pay more attention to management and 
supervision of their business so that they could make profits by reducing costs. In 
practice, this fixed spread has had harmful effects on the SBV and the banks. First, the 
spread is harmful to competition (when the spread is regulated, deposit rates are 
managed too). Banks differ in terms of assets, kinds of business and areas, facilities and 
management skills. So banks with favourable conditions and low running costs will be
,0 Deposit rates for foreign currency deposits are determined individually by each bank (IMF 1997b).
11 According to decision 39/1998/QD NHNN1 and the SBV Annual Report 1998.
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able take advantage of others. Second, it is highly complicated to calculate the spread 
and cost for the SBV to ensure compliance by banks, because there are many kinds of 
deposits and loans with different terms (Nguyen and Nguyen, 1997). In Table 4.1, the 
spread between short-term lending rates and deposit rates in 1996 and 1997 was 9.25 
per cent and 5.50 per cent pa, not 0.35 per cent pm or 4.2 per cent pa; this reflects the 
fact that banks did not obey this regulation even though non-compliance incurred 
penalties from the SBV. This outcome also indicates the SBV’s enforcement was weak. 
However, non-compliance means that the market is operating, although the transaction 
costs are higher than if there were no such regulation. Third, the spread can be 
circumvented by banks through increasing other fees, or requiring borrowers to hold 
compensating deposit balances, leading to inefficiencies. Fourth, the spread of 4.2 per 
cent pa may not ensure the profitability of banks or cover operating costs, since the 
average bank spreads in countries that have similar per capita income and levels of 
financial sector development have been around 6-7 per cent pa (IMF 1997b). The fixed 
spread had been removed since January 1998.
The difference between lending rates of VND and foreign currencies 
In Table 4.1 and 4.2, the lending rates for domestic currency (VND) in nominal and real 
terms are always higher than those for US$, except the real MLRs in 1994 and 1995, 
and real SLRs and MLRs in 1998 were lower than those for US$, since inflation rates in 
these years were higher than other years during 1993-1999.
Lower interest rates in terms of other foreign currencies (particularly US$) could 
encourage domestic borrowers to borrow in foreign exchanges and neglect the foreign 
exchange risks. During the 1990s, many domestic companies have borrowed US$ from
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both domestic banks and foreign bank branches, or opened deferred letters of credit" 
(LC) with guarantees or non-guarantees from the banks to import goods. When 
imported goods arrive in Vietnam, they are sold (at prices even lower than imported 
prices) for VND which is deposited to receive interest or used for other businesses. On 
the due date, these companies would buy back US$ to repay the loans.
Table 4.2: Lending Interest Rates in US$, 1993-99 (per cent pa)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
7.5 9.0 9.5 9.5 8.5 7.5 6.5
Note: Data for December each year.
Source: IMF (1997b), SBV (1998), IMF (2000).
Under conditions of lower interest rates for US$ borrowings compared with those for 
VND, and stable exchange rates, these companies can obtain high rates of return. 
However, when there is a depreciation of the VND/US$ exchange rate, borrowers who 
borrow in USS will lose when they are still holding VND. This was the case of some 
companies that have faced difficulties due to exchange rate depreciation from the 
financial crisis in the region. The banks that have guaranteed those companies have also 
suffered.
Interest rate controls and the effectiveness of indirect monetary instruments
The IMF (1997b) has argued that the interest rate regime imposed by the SBV hampers 
the effectiveness of indirect monetary instruments. The experience from developing and 
transitional economies shows that the use of indirect monetary instruments depends on 
the development of money markets, while interest rate controls could affect the 
fluctuation in the inter-bank market rates, so that these rates do not reflect the true
32 This is also one way of circumventing credit ceilings. This will be detailed in the next section.
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marginal costs of bank funds or other interest rates, including lending rates (IMF 
1997b). Therefore, these controls hamper the development of the money market and 
limit the effectiveness of indirect monetary instruments. These problems are major 
limitations to the development of the financial sector and economic growth.
Credit ceilings
Credit ceilings are understood as the maximum volume of credit that is allowed to 
commercial banks by the central bank over a given period. In financial and banking 
sectors that are undeveloped and where indirect instruments are not fully introduced, 
credit ceilings remain the principal instruments of money control in credit expansion.
In Vietnam, a system of credit ceilings has been implemented by the SBV since April 
15, 1994. This direct instrument has been used to control credit expansion and constrain 
inflation, but this control was circumvented by banks until it was monitored.
The SBV decided the total increase in credit for each quarter, and then allotted credit 
ceilings for each commercial bank, also on a quarterly basis. Theoretically, the 
allotment of the banks’ credit ceilings has been calculated according to criteria such as 
their equity capital, the amount of credit outstanding, and deposit mobilisations of the 
previous quarter (MAE 1995). In practice, from 1993 to 1995, the allotment to each 
commercial bank was just like a share of the total amount of credit increase. The 
justification for this statement can be found in Appendix 4.3 which denotes the credit 
shares of the big six commercial banks (four SOCBs plus EXIM and Maritime banks). 
The credit share of Agribank increased, presumably due to the high priority given to the 
agriculture sector and rural development. In contrast, IDBV’s credit share was reduced; 
other banks’ credit shares were relatively fixed. So, the SBV seems to have direct
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control over the credit ceilings of each bank, rather than using the above criteria 
(Amano 1997).
The penalties for banks that increase their credit more than their allotments have been 
applied in several ways; for example, the SBV can recall the excess amount of their 
allotments from the banks, or they may increase the minimum reserves to absorb this 
credit excess. In 1995, the SBV considered a charge of 0.1 per cent per day of violation. 
In 1996, the charge for exceeding the ceilings was 0.3 per cent per month over the 
maximum lending rates (MAE 1996).
According to Decision 43/QD-NH41, the SBV also allowed banks to sell or trade their 
excess credit ceilings for specific maturities in February 1996 (SBV 1996). In fact, most 
banks had not reached their ceilings, so the prospects for trading were limited. Also, the 
SBV has the right to reallocate unused credit ceilings to banks that have used their 
allocation (MAE 1996).
The number of banks covered by the credit ceilings in 1996 was 24, and 26 in 1997. 
Joint venture banks and foreign bank branches are not subject to credit ceilings yet 
(SBV 1997). The credit of banks that were not subject to ceilings grew at a faster rate 
(7.1 per cent for the quarter) than credit of banks covered (5.0 per cent for the quarter) 
in the third quarter 1996. Therefore, the credit ceilings should cover all banks, to level 
the playing field and to make the credit ceilings more consistent with the financial 
program targets (MAE 1996).
As with other direct controls, credit ceilings create incentives to banks to avoid or 
circumvent them (IMF 1997b). This was the case of many Vietnamese banks that used
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deferred letters of credit (LC) to circumvent credit ceilings until these were included in 
the credit ceilings from 1995 to 1997. In early 1997, the total LC amounted to around 
US$2 billion, of which around US$1.2 billion was guaranteed by the SOCBs (60 per 
cent of total LC was guaranteed) (Ngoc 1997). However, the SBV’s data on bank 
guarantee activities was poor. In 1996, only five banks reported their LC guarantees to 
the SBV and only US$350 million in guarantees was reported (MAE 1996). Several 
joint stock commercial banks did not fulfil their LC payment obligations to foreign 
parties in late 1996-early 1997. This eroded international confidence in the Vietnamese 
banking system and also reflected the weakness of bank supervision by the SBV. In 
1997-98, the SBV implemented a number of measures such as requiring banks to 
strictly perform their LC commitments, strengthening regulations on LC transactions 
(Bach and Nguyen 1999). As a result, the backlog of LC payments was reduced to 
US$200 million at the end of 1998 (IMF 1999a).
Nevertheless, credit ceilings have been a useful tool for controlling credit expansion and 
constraining inflation in the period before 1998, particularly when the financial market 
is not deep and other indirect instruments have not been introduced widely. Since the 
second quarter of 1998, the use of this instrument began to be phased out, because the 
credit expansion was necessary to promote the economy that was showing the signs of 
slowdown at this time (SBV 1998). However, the SBV still keeps credit ceilings on 
hand in case they are needed.
Directed credits
Direct credits were the main instrument of credit policy from the mono-banking system 
before banking reform in 1990. Credits were provided directly to SOEs or to priority 
projects in accordance to production plans set by the government (see Chapter 3). In
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principle, after banking and financial sector reforms in 1990, direct credit was phased 
out and SOEs have had to compete with private enterprises to get bank loans; in the 
second half of 1992, all implicit interest rate subsidies for SOEs were removed (IMF 
1995a). As a result, credit to non-SOEs has increased from more than 12 per cent in 
1989 to nearly 48 per cent of total credit in 1998, while credit to SOEs gradually 
declined from around 88 per cent in 1989 to around 52 per cent in 1998 (Table 4.3).
Table 4.3: Share of Credits by Economic Sectors, 1989-98 (per cent)
89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98
Credit to SOEs 87.6 89.5 89.9 81.8 66.5 61.3 56.8 52.7 49.7 52.4
Credit to non-SOEs 12.4 10.5 10.1 18.2 33.5 38.7 43.2 47.3 50.3 47.6
Source- IMF (1995b), IMF (1999b), IMF (2000).
However, the SOEs still have found it easier than non-SOEs to access bank credits and 
receive credit privileges. In 1995, the national investment fund was created by the 
government to provide preferential credits for selected sectors and disadvantaged 
regions. Both SOEs and non-SOEs are eligible to access this fund, but 90 per cent of 
total loans has gone to SOEs. Since 1997, SOEs have been able to borrow from the 
SOCBs without collateral. SOCBs have been permitted to lend to loss-making SOEs if a 
sound business plan is presented. Some SOEs, which are facing difficulties in 
payments, have been allowed the rollover of outstanding credit (IMF 1998). These 
policies discourage the efficient allocation of financial resources, still favour SOEs, and 
do not create a level playing field between SOEs and non-SOEs. These could also 
impair banking system soundness.
33The SOEs are typically allowed to rollover loans for half the length of the original maturity. IMF 
(1999a).
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In general, during the 1990s direct controls were used effectively as tools to curb 
inflation and control the credit expansion, so that they have contributed to the 
maintenance of macroeconomic stability. However, their use has induced inefficiencies 
and circumvention, and hampered competition between financial institutions. These 
direct instruments need to be replaced gradually by indirect instruments when the 
conditions are sufficient.
4.2.2- Indirect instruments
Indirect instruments have been used by the SBV since the establishment of the two-tier 
banking system. The instruments used include reserve requirements, rediscount and 
refinancing facilities, and T-bill auctions in the primary market.
Reserve Requirements (RRs)
RRs have been used as an instrument of monetary policy by the SBV since 1991, after 
the two-tier banking system was established. This was similar to other transitional 
economies in transition to the use of indirect instruments. The use of RRs during the 
1990s mainly performed the function of countering crises of confidence in meeting 
unexpected demand and avoiding shortages of liquidity. However, they were not used in 
an active fashion to influence liquidity (IMF 1997b).
According to the Decree of Banking Law (1990), the RRs ratio could vary from 10 per 
cent to 35 per cent of total deposits in the commercial banksj4. But in practice, due to 
the fact that the assets of commercial banks were small and the inflation rate was low, 
the SBV imposed an RR ratio of 10 per cent of total deposits (in terms of both dong and
34The ratio of RRs from 0 per cent to 20 per cent of total deposits in the commercial banks, according to 
the Banking Law (1997), that was passed by the National Assembly on 12/12/97, was effective from 
1/10/98.
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foreign currencies, excluding maturities of over 12 months) in the period before March 
1, 1994 (Table 4.4). These RRs were in the form of deposits with the SBV. The deposit 
base of each bank was estimated by the SBV as the average of deposits outstanding at 
the beginning and the end of the previous month. However, most banks did not maintain 
RRs of 10 per cent of total deposits. Actual RRs held in the banking system were 0.7 
per cent, 5.6 per cent, and 6.9 per cent in 1991, 1992, and 1993, respectively (World 
Bank 1995: 102). Penalties for a bank’s non-compliance with RRs were rarely enforced, 
so the RR policy at that time was generally ineffective. 0
In March 1994, the policy of a uniform RR of 10 per cent of total deposits was changed 
to the use of differentiated rates by the SBV. The RRs for demand and saving deposits 
were increased to 13 per cent. In contrast, RRs for time saving deposits (including 3 and 
6 month saving deposits) were lowered to 7 per cent (this was raised to 8 per cent from 
late 1994 to the third quarter 1995). These RRs were applied to all deposits equal to or 
less than one year of maturity, including foreign currency deposits (deposits over one 
year of maturity were exempted). The SBV also allowed banks more latitude in 
choosing the deposit base. Depending on the availability of reported information, banks 
could calculate the deposit based on a daily average of outstanding deposits during the 
month or the average outstanding deposit as on the 5th, 10th, 15th, 20th, 25th, and the last 
day of the month (World Bank 1995).
The components of RRs were also modified. In the previous period, RRs had to be 
deposited totally with the SBV; the reserve rule was 55 per cent of RRs had to be 
deposited at the SBV, with no more than 15 per cent of RRs to be T-bills, and 30 per
°  Besides RRs, the SBV also imposed other ratios (non-statutory) on large cash holdings of banks that 
vary depending upon the liquidity situation in the financial system. For instance, the SBV can raise the 
ceiling on cash holdings by banks and ask them to hold any excess with it in a separate transaction
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cent to be vault cash (in both domestic and foreign currencies). The coverage of RRs 
was also extended to finance companies (before, it covered only banks, mainly SOCBs). 
The change in RR policy gave greater latitude to banks in calculating the deposit base, 
and partially relieved the burden of banks in maintaining non-interest deposits at the 
SBV.
However, the new policy had an adverse impact on the financial system. First, the
difference in RRs for demand and time deposits left scope for banks to evade their
impact. Banks can collude with customers to camouflage demand deposits as time and
saving deposits if RRs for demand deposits are higher than time and saving deposits
(World Bank 1995). Several countries have abandoned separate RR ratios because of
this problem. As the World Bank (1995:31) commented:
Where the procedures in respect of banking transactions are not well understood 
or well defined, where staff expertise is limited, observance of the new policy is 
likely to cause problems, and monitoring and enforcement of the policy by the 
SBV are likely to be troublesome. From this point of view, the new system is a 
regressive step.
Second, the inclusion of T-bills in the RRs weakened the monetary policy impact, since 
the holding of T-bills only changes the composition of RRs and not the volume of 
credit. Moreover, the RR ratio was considered to be very high compared with 
neighbouring countries where RRs of about 7-8 per cent are considered as the break­
even level. As mentioned above, the SBV has still used excess cash reserves in the 
transaction account as monetary instruments, even if they are remunerated, but 
obviously these two ratios imposed a heavy burden on financial intermediaries (World 
Bank 1995).
account that earns interest at 0.15 per month to prevent excess liquidity. These ratios have been used
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In October 1995, RR regulations were changed again. Separate RR ratios were again 
unified at 10 per cent. This RR ratio was applied to all domestic currency deposits of 
less than one year and foreign currency deposits of any maturities; all credit institutions 
were subjected to the RRs (in 1997, a uniform RR of 10 per cent was imposed on all 
deposits with maturity of 12 months or less and to all credit institutions, except rural 
joint stock banks, people’s credit funds and credit cooperatives). The deposit base of 
RRs was calculated on a monthly basis as average deposits per month.
Table 4.4. The SBV’s Reserve Requirements, 1991-99 (per cent pa)
Demand Saving 3 and 6-month Securities (a)
deposit deposit savins deposits
1991 10 10 10 10
1 March 1994 13 13 7 7
1 November 1994 13 13 8 8
1 October 1995 10 10 10 10
1 January 1998 10 10 10 10
1 March 1999(b) 7 7 7 7
1 June 1999 (c) 6 6 6 6
1 July 1999(d) 5 5 5 5
Note: RRs are calculated on total outstanding deposits on dong and foreign currency with maturities 
less than 12 months of the credit institutions (the state-run, urban joint-stock banks, foreign banks, 
joint venture-banks and finance companies).
(a ) Securities issued by the banks.
(b) 5 per cent RRs imposed on rural joint-stock banks, central and regional people credit funds and 
cooperative banks).
(c) 4 per cent RRs imposed on rural joint-stock banks, central and regional people credit funds and 
cooperative banks). 0 per cent RRs for credit institutions that mobilize and lend funds in gold.
(d) 1 per cent RRs imposed on rural joint-stock banks, central and regional people’s credit funds and 
cooperative banks.
Source: SBV (1995-99).
more as a monetary instrument than RRs (World Bank 1995: 102).
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T-bills were removed as a component of RRs, and vault cash was raised to 30 per cent 
of RRs. Reserve and settlement accounts were merged into single accounts for demand 
deposits at the SBV. The excess reserve was remunerated at an interest rate of 0.1 per 
cent pm, and shortfalls in RRs were penalised at the maximum lending rates by the SBV 
(1995-97).
The new regulation on RRs was extended by the SBV under Decision No 396/QD 
NHNN1 (signed on December 1st, 1997), effective from January 1, 1998. This new 
regulation still imposed 10 per cent RRs on all deposits with maturity of 12 months or 
less and on all credit institutions, except people’s credit funds and rural joint stock 
banks. Under this decision, the structure of RRs is as follows: a minimum of 70 per cent 
of RRs is to be placed on demand deposit accounts at the SBV, a maximum of 30 per 
cent of RRs are to be vault cash and valid payment notes that are placed in the credit 
institutions. The excess RRs are remunerated at an interest rate of 0.2 per cent pm for 
deposits in terms of VND and 4.86 per cent pa for deposits in terms of foreign currency. 
Any RR non-compliance is to be penalised (equal to 200 per cent of refinancing interest 
rates for deposits in terms of VND and 200 per cent of ceiling lending rates for deposits 
in terms ofUS$) (SBV 1998).
In the new banking law that was effective from October 1st, 1998, people’s credit funds 
and credit cooperatives are subject to RRs. However, the capital mobilised in these 
institutions is small (Appendix 4.4), the SBV still considered applying RRs on them 
until March 1999.
So during the period of three and half years from October 1995 to February 1999, the 
RRs were maintained at 10 per cent of deposits with maturity of 12 months or less. It is
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difficult to argue that RRs were used as an anti-inflation monetary instrument during the 
period since the annual inflation rate in 1995 rose to 12.7 per cent, declined to 4.5 per 
cent in 1996, and to 3.6 per cent in 1997. During this time RRs were fixed at 10 per cent 
pa. In addition, these RRs were very high, which imposed a heavy burden on credit 
institutions. From 1995 to 1998, the nominal SLR fell from around 25 per cent to 14 per 
cent pa, and the nominal MLR declined from 20 per cent to 15 per cent pa, while the 
RRs remained at 10 per cent pa. Thus the RR policy was rigid and financial 
intermediation in the banking and financial sector may be discouraged.
Since March 1, 1999, the RRs have been reduced to 7 per cent for all deposits of less 
than 12 months maturity. The regulation applied to state-run, urban joint-stock banks, 
foreign banks, joint venture-banks and finance companies. RRs of 5 per cent are 
imposed on rural joint-stock banks; regional people’s credit funds and cooperative 
banks. By June 1, and July 1, 1999 the RRs were reduced continuously to 6 per cent and 
5 per cent for all deposits of less than 12 month maturities, for all credit institutions 
except rural joint-stock banks, regional people’s credit funds and cooperative banks 
which have RRs imposed of only 4 per cent and 1 per cent in June 1 and July 1, 1999, 
respectively (Table 4.4). The reduction of RRs in 1999 may create favourable 
conditions for credit institutions to extend credits and improve their profitability.
Rediscount and Refinance Facilities.
Refinancing and refinance rates are also indirect instruments used by the SBV to 
regulate the volume of credit since the early 1990s. The refinance facilities have been 
introduced in simple form, due to lack of securities and other payment instruments in 
Vietnam.
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There are two types of refinance facilities that have been used. The first type relates to 
short term lending to banks when there is any shortfall in payments clearing and 
settlement arrangements. All banks can access this facility. The refinancing interest rate 
rises with the length of the period of refinancing; 0.06 per cent per day for credit for one 
to five days, 0.09 per cent per day for six to ten days and 0.12 per cent per day for more 
than ten days. The rates for less than ten days were lower than the maximum lending 
rates (SLR and MLR) in 1990-92. So, this facility provided little incentive for banks to 
manage their own short-term liquidity, and encouraged them to access the SBV’s 
credits (World Bank 1995).
Table 4.5: Refinancing Interest Rates, 1993-99
Agribank Incombank IDBV Vietcombank
April 1993 60 70 75 85 ( % of their loan
October 1993 60 80 80 80 contract rates)
April 1994 85 95 95 95 ....................
October 1994 95 100 100 100 ....................
April 1995 100 100 100 100 ....................
March 1997 1.10 % per month - for all credit institutions
August 1997 0.90 % per month - .........................................
January 1998 1.10% per month - ........................................
January 1999 1.10% per month - ........................................
December 1999 0.50 % per month - ..........................................
Note: Agribank is the Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development, Incombank is the Industrial 
and Commercial Bank, IDBV is the Investment and Development Bank, and Vietcombank is the 
Bank for Foreign Trade of Vietnam 
Source: SBV (1995-991.
The second type has been concerned with the longer-term facility and deals with 
refinancing of specific loan contracts involving documents. At the beginning, only 
SOCBs could use this type of refinancing; later on it was made available to all
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commercial banks. Before 1995, specific loans were financed for periods of 45 to 180 
days, and the financing interest rates were set individually for particular banks (World 
Bank 1995). The penalty rate for failure to repay on time was 150 per cent of the 
original refinancing rate.
According to Table 4.5, the Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development was charged 
the lowest discount rates (from 60-85 per cent of their loan contract rates) in the 1993- 
94 period, which reflected the priority given to the agricultural sector by the 
government. Other banks were offered higher rates, from 70-100 per cent of their loan 
contract rates.
From April 1995 to February 1997, all banks were charged the same refinancing rate, 
which was equal to 100 per cent of corresponding lending interest rates of commercial 
banks. This policy limited the borrowings from the central bank. From March 1997 to 
January 1999, the refinancing rates were set in a range from 1.1 to 0.9 per cent per 
month (or 13.2-10.8 per cent pa) for all other credit institutions. These rates were lower 
than the nominal short, medium and long-term lending rates in the period 1997-98 
(Table 4.1).
During 1999, the new financing rates were reduced four times from 1.1 per cent pm to 
0.5 per cent pm (13.2 per cent to 6 per cent pa). These are also lower than the nominal 
SLR and MLR in 1999. This policy may extend more credit to the economy in order to 
stimulate investment and economic growth.
In general, the refinance facilities in place during the 1990s have been used as indirect 
monetary instruments to control the volume of credit in the financial sector. The SBV
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has adjusted refinancing interest rates to encourage or discourage credit institutions 
from borrowing from the central bank in response to inflation trends. In 1994-95, 
inflation increased to over 10 per cent pa, the highest rate in the period 1992-99. The 
refinancing rate also reached its highest point (100 per cent of their loan contract rates) 
during this period. It was lowered when inflation fell to single digit levels in the period 
1996-99.
However, there are some shortcomings of this policy as follows:
First, the rediscount and discount windows of the SBV are still limited in their 
effectiveness since discount window activities of the commercial banks and credit 
institutions are very limited. The commercial banks mainly repurchase T-bills and T- 
bonds in the market. This is due to the lack of other securities such as bills of exchange 
and promissory notes that were mentioned in the commercial law (effectively from 
1/1/1998), and warrants as well. Moreover, company shares are very rare, because 
SOEs equitisation is still in its infancy. As of August 1999, only 186 SOEs had been 
equitised (see Chapter 3). They are mainly small enterprises so the volume of their 
shares limited. Moreover, legal arrangements that involve regulating securities 
transactions are very poor. These make discount window activities improve very 
slowly36.
Second, the role of the SBV as lender of last resort is distorted since the government has 
used the SBV to refinance the SOCBs to enable them to channel funds to SOEs and to 
the rural sector (World Bank 1995). Moreover, the refinancing rates have been lower 
than interest rates in the period since February 1997, which could provide more credit to 
banks. But it may discourage them from managing their own liquidity, seeking to
■>6 See, Ha Cue, Banking Review-The SBV, No 14, July 1998.
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borrow from the inter-bank market, and encourage them to borrow from the SBV with 
cheap credits which may affect the last resort function of the central bank.
Open Market Operations (OMO)
Vietnam does not have open market operations, since the securities market was not 
established until 1999, the inter-bank markets for domestic and foreign currencies have 
not developed, and generally there is a low degree of monetisation (Chapter 3). 
However, since 1996, the SBV has been putting in place the basic requirements for 
OMO such as the legal framework, determination of OMO, working rules of a steering 
committee for OMO, and the establishment of State Securities Committee (SSC).
Although OMO have not been introduced due to the necessary condition not being in 
place, T-Bills and Bonds have been issued to the public by the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF) since the early 1990s (25/03/1991). The volume of T-bills was estimated at 
VND 13,193.5 billion up to 1994 (Bach and Nguyen 1999), with the highest interest 
rates around 27 per cent pa at the end of 1993 (Nguyen 1998b). These T-bills and bonds 
are effective instruments of the government to borrow from the public and financial 
sector, in order to finance the budget deficit and important projects such as 
infrastructure and strategic industry.
On June 10th, 1995, open market type operations in the form of T-Bill auctions were 
began in Hanoi (SBV 1995). The amount of winning T-Bill auctions was around VND 
240 billion during four bids in 1995, and the average weighted cut-off rate was 17.6 per 
cent pa (Table 4.6 and Figure 4.3). The MOF has coordinated with the SBV to regulate 
this market.
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The T-Bills market increased modestly in 1996. After 19 bids, nearly VND 980 billion 
T-Bills were sold at an average weighted rate of around 9.0 per cent pa. However, the 
volume of T-Bills sold accounted for around 27 per cent of the amount planned, equal 
to around 12 per cent of total T-Bills issued. The auction was opened only irregularly, 
and the number of eligible participants was limited.
Table 4.6: T-Bill Auctions, 1995-99 (VND Billion)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Total T-Bills Issued 7649 8347 6186
Maturity
3-month - - -
6-month 3207 94 -
9-month 4442 46 -
1-year - 4400 2200 5130 4400
2-year - 3807 3986
Total amount of planned 3598 4090 5130 4400
bids
Amount of successful 243 976 2913.9 4020 301 1.6
bids
( % of planned bids) 27.1 % 71.2% 78.4% 68.4 %
Highest-lowest cut-off 18.0-17.2 13.8-7.89 12.0-9.0 12.0-11.0 11.5 -4.5
rates (%  pa)
Average weighted cut- 17.6 8.96 10.2 11.64
off rates (% pa)
Number of auctions 4 19 37 46 46
Frequently irregularly irregularly Weekly 
after May
Weekly Weekly
Source: SBV (1995-99), IMF (1997a), Nguyen (1998a), Bach and Nguyen (1999).
The T-Bills market was extended in 1997-98. There were 37 bids in 1997 and 46 bids in 
1998, with the amount of successful bids rising from around VND2900 billion in 1997 
to VND4020 billion in 1998. The cut-off rates rose from 10.2 per cent pa to 11.64 per 
cent pa. More than 60 per cent of credit institutions participated in the T-Bills market, 
and from May 1997 T-Bill auctions have operated weekly. In 1999, the number of T- 
Bill auctions was the same as 1998, but the amount of successful bids declined to
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around VND3000 million. The reduction in the amount of successful bids in 1999 was
due mainly to low cut-off yields which were in a range from 11.5 per cent to 4.5 per 
cent pa, and the issuance of the national construction bonds at that time (SBV 1999).
During five years of operations, T-Bill auctions were not only used as a tool of saving 
mobilisation for government, but also considered as an indirect instrument to absorb 
excess reserves for credit institutions, particularly to SOCBs. Since 1995, SOCBs have 
been the biggest successful bidder in the number of bids and volume of T-Bill auctions 
which accounted for more than 80 per cent of total T-Bills auctioned (SBV 1995-99). 
This may have contributed to reduce excess reserves of SOCBs from around 20 per cent 
in March 1996 to 5 per cent of total deposits in March 1998 (see Figure 4.2).
Figure 4.2: Excess Reserve (per cent of total deposits)
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Source: IMF representative office-Hanoi, in Bach and Nguyen (1999).
However, the T-Bills market has experienced some shortcomings during these years of 
operations. These are detailed below:
First, the cut-off rate in the auctions has usually been steered by the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF) (or the cut-off rate was predetermined). This rate depends on the demand for 
funds to finance budget deficits and may not reflect the true demand and supply of 
capital markets. This may affect bank deposit rates if the cut-off rate was steered too 
high and make T-bill auctions slow if it was steered too low.
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Second, the maturity of T-Bills is too long. In Table 4.6, except for 1995, there were 
small amounts of T-Bills that had maturities of less than one year in 1996, and there 
were no T-Bills with such maturity in 1997-99. With a secondary market not yet 
established, the long maturity T-Bills have limited the participation and purchases of 
banks in the T-Bill market in 1998 since most of their mobilised funds were short-term 
ones (SBV 1998), then banks need to buy short-term T-Bills in the case of excess 
reserve. This is different from the experience in other transitional economies and 
developing countries in transition to indirect instruments where short-term government 
bills were preferred. Therefore, the lack of short-term T-Bills hampers the effectiveness 
of this instrument as an indirect instrument of monetary policy.
Figure 4.3: Interest Rates of T-Bill Auctions, 1995-98
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Source: SBV (1995), IMF Representative Office in Hanoi, in Bach and Nguyen (1999).
Third, the liquidity of the T-Bill market is low. This feature is related to the long-term 
T-Bills and the lack of a secondary market. Moreover, it also concerns the fact that the 
SBV discount window is weak. Some commercial banks that have T-Bills wanted to 
discount in the SBV to get funds back but they were refused (Nguyen 1998b). This was 
one factor discouraging the development of the T-Bills market in Vietnam at that time.
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Fourth, the SBV may not need to issue its own bills at the present time, since the T-Bill 
market is not fully developed. If the SBV issues its bills, there will be overcrowding of 
T-bills and SBV bills. This will result in a depressed yield on bills, discourage the 
holding of bills by the financial institutions and may involve the SBV in heavy losses 
(IMF 1997a).
In brief, indirect instruments have been introduced increasingly in Vietnam and they are 
starting to replace direct instruments. Indirect instruments have contributed to the 
control of credit expansion, mobilising funds and reducing excess reserves. However, 
due to the thinness of the financial market, and with a securities market not yet 
established, the role of these instruments in the banking and financial sector is limited. 
The impact of the use of indirect instruments in the financial sector is analysed more 
clearly in the next section.
4.3. Assessing the impact o f using indirect monetary instruments on 
financial sector efficiency and on the degree o f monetary control
As mentioned in previous sections, Vietnam has used RRs and refinancing facilities 
since the early 1990s, while T-Bill auctions have only been in operation since June 10, 
1995. From this date, the SBV has officially used T-Bill auctions as an indirect 
instrument of monetary policy to influence the demand and supply conditions of the 
money market. This date, therefore, is the official start for the use of indirect 
instruments and transition to indirect instruments of monetary policy in Vietnam. The 
sample period to do the analysis in this section should cover from the early 1990s to the 
end of 1999, but due to lack of data, the sample period is limited from 1992Q4 to 
1998Q3. So, from 1992Q4 to 1995Q1 is called the pre-transition period from direct to
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indirect monetary instruments, and from 1995Q2 to 1998Q3 is called the transition 
period (since Vietnam has not yet completed the transition to indirect monetary 
instruments).
The impact of the use of indirect instruments on financial sector efficiency and the 
degree of monetary control can be assessed through examining the change in the level 
and volatility of financial variables between the pre-transition and transition period 
(Alexander et al. 1995).
4.3.1. Variables
Changes in interest rate spreads (SPR) can be used as measures of the efficiency of 
financial intermediation and the level of competition in the banking and financial sector 
within a country (however, they are not comparable across countries since transaction 
costs and other factors vary across countries). A narrowing of interest rate spreads 
suggests an increase in the efficiency of service in the banking sector (for example, it 
indicates lower transaction costs), and vice versa.
The share of credit going to the private sector in total domestic credit (SHARE) can be 
used as a measure for the reallocation of financial resources to the efficient sector. An 
increase in the share of credit to the private sector indicates increased efficiency in the 
reallocation of financial resources.
The level and volatility of three financial variables such as money multiplier (M2/M0), 
the ratio of narrow money to broad money (M1/M2), and short-term interest rates
’7 Other variables such as the deposit market share of banks and the loan market share of banks can be 
used as measures of the banking sector in other countries, but such information is not available in 
Vietnam.
94
(SINT) are used to measure changes in the level of monetary control. Volatility is
measured through the coefficient of variation in the period before and during transition.
For the case of the money multiplier (mm), see Equation 2.3 (Chapter 2). At a given
monetary base (H), if the money multiplier increases, money stock (M) will rise. The
volatility of the money multiplier reflects the degree of monetary control by the central
bank; when the volatility of the money multiplier increases, it underlines the potential
for a loss of monetary control (Alexander et al. 1995).
The conventional formula for M1/M2 is:
. C + DMX/ M2 = -------------------
MX + SD + STD
Where:
C is currency; D is demand deposits; SD is saving deposits; and STD is small time 
deposit.
A decline in the level and volatility of M1/M2 denotes that the shift from short- term 
deposits to long-term deposits and the increase of confidence in the banking sector or 
may be the result of positive and higher real interest rates (Alexander et al 1995).
An increase in the volatility of the short-term interest rate (SINT) indicates that interest 
rate management has become more active or interest rates have become more market 
determined during the transition period. In contrast, the lower volatility of short-term 
interest rates may reflect the fact that the central bank and the market have gained 
experience in operating in the liberalised environment (Alexander et al 1995), and the 
level of monetary control is improved.
4.3.2. Model specification and data
Model specification
The F-test is a test of the stability of regression coefficients over two or more
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subsamples of the data. The Chow-test is a special form of the F-test to examine the 
significance of the shift of the mean of financial variables between two periods, and the 
Goldfeld-Quandt test is another form of F-test to test the volatility of the variables 
between two periods.
The Chow-test and the Goldfeld-Quandt test were carried out on autoregressive 
regressions of order one in the level of financial variables in the form (4.1):
Xt = ßXt(-l) +£t (4.1)
Where Xt is a financial variable at time t; and st is a disturbance term.
Form (4.1) is used to examine the whole sample period. Form (4.2) for the pre­
transition and (4.3) for transition periods:
Xt = ßoXt(-l) +8t (4.2)
Xt = ßjXt(-l) +£t (4.3)
The hypothesis for the Chow test is: Ho: ßo = ß i 
The F statistic is calculated as follows:
(RRSS-URSS)/k 
F (Chow test) -  URSS/(no + n i-2k )
Where: RRSS is the restricted residual sum of squares for the whole period (4.1); URSS 
is the unrestricted residual sum of squares, URSS = RSSo + RSSi; RSS0 is the residual 
sum of squares in the pre-transition period; and RSSi is the residual sum of squares in 
the transition period, k is the number of regressors; no and ni are the number of 
observations in the pre-transition and transition periods (Maddala 1992).
If the F statistic is significant, then the null hypothesis of ßo = ßi is rejected, that is we 
reject the hypothesis of stability between the pre-transition and transition periods.
* The hypothesis for the Goldfeld-Quandt test is homoskedasticity between two periods, 
Hq: ö"o=ö7 and the F ratio for the test is calculated as follows:
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F = < z l=R S S aIü i
G \ R S S  o/no
Where cr^crf is the variance of the financial variables in the pre-transition and 
transition periods (Maddala 1992).
If the F ratio statistic is significant, the null hypothesis of (j^=crj  is rejected, that is, 
we reject the hypothesis of homoskedasticity between the two periods38.
Data
All data are quarterly data series from 1992Q4 to 1998Q3. From 1992Q4 to 1995Q1 is 
called period 0; from 1995Q2 to 1998Q3 is period 1. SHARE (share of private sector 
credit in total credit), M1/M2 and M2/M0 were collected from the SBV. SPR and SINT 
were taken from Mori (1997) and IMF (2000). All variables are analysed in their levels.
4.3.3. Financial Sector Efficiency - Results of Regressions
In Table 4.7, we can see that the mean of the interest rate spreads declined from 0.68 
per cent to 0.59 per cent per month (pm) between the pre-transition and transition 
periods. However, the result of the F test is insignificant at the 5 per cent level, so we 
cannot reject the hypothesis of the stability of regression coefficients between periods. 
This suggests that the efficiency of service in the banking and financial sector was not
38The above tests proposed and carried out here assume that the changes, if any, in the parameters are 
entirely (or only) due to the reform of monetary instruments. In a fair assumption, there may be some 
other factors that can influence the evolution of the parameters such as the development of infrastructure 
in the economy and the development of technology in the banking system (computers, payment system, 
etc). The development of infrastructure such as transport and telecommunications, the use of computing 
systems can improve productivity of banking staff, reduce transaction costs in the banking activities, then 
interest rate spreads (SPR) may be narrowed, short term interest rates may be reduced. With the 
development of such technology, the central bank can have sufficient information on the best time to 
adjust reserve requirements (RRs) to control money base or M2, which means that it influences the 
money multiplier. However, the development of technology in the Vietnamese banking system is slow 
(see the SBV annual report 1996-99), banking staff skills are limited. Then we assume that during the 
period 1992-98, the development of technology and other factors are unchanged, to analyse how the 
changes of the above variables are due to the use of indirect monetary instruments.
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improved or improved very little. The experience of most countries which have 
undertaken transition to indirect instruments show that interest rate spreads initially 
widened during the transition period and then narrowed significantly in the post 
transition period (Alexander et al. 1995). In only some cases, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, 
Mexico, The Philippines, and Sri Lanka, interest rate spreads declined during transition.
The share of credit to the private sector in total credit increased in the pre-transition to 
transition periods, with its mean increasing from 32.85 per cent to 46.66 per cent. This 
is similar to most countries in the transition to indirect monetary instruments. However, 
the F test result is insignificant at the 5 per cent level. These results suggest that 
although share of credit to the private sector was increased, statistical evidence was not 
strong enough to reject the hypothesis that the use of indirect instruments of monetary 
policy from pre-transition to transition periods did not greatly increase the efficiency of 
the financial sector.
T a b le  4.7: T ren d s in F in an cia l V ariab les b etw een  P re and T ra n sitio n  P eriods
Interest rate spreads 
(SPR)
Share of credit to private sector in 
total credit (SHARE)
M ea n 0 0 .68 32 .8 5
M ean i 0 .5 9 4 6 .6 6
F (C h o w  test)
[ F 1,21, 5 per cent— 4 .32 ]
0 .5 2 2 .55
N o te: M e a n 0, a n d  m e a n j  a r e  s a m p l e  m e a n s  f o r  t h e  p r e - t r a n s i t i o n  a n d  t r a n s i t i o n  p e r i o d s ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  
S o u rce: A u t h o r ’s e s t i m a t e s
4.3.4. Monetary control - Results of regressions
In Table 4.8, the mean values of the money multiplier increased between the pre­
transition and transition periods as well as their standard deviations, this is the same as
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in other countries undergoing the transition. The results of the F tests from both Chow 
and Goldfeld-Quandt tests show that the hypothesis of stability of regression 
coefficients and the homoskedasticity hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 5 per cent 
level. These results indicate the potential for maintaining monetary control by the SBV 
in the transition to indirect instruments of monetary policy.
While the M1/M2 ratio declined between the two periods, the Chow test result indicates 
there was no structural break between the two periods. The Goldfeld-Quandt test also 
denotes the variability of the M1/M2 was unchanged. These results imply that there was 
no significant shift toward long-term deposits and improved confidence in the banking 
system. This is similar to the situations in countries such as Egypt and Malaysia in the 
Alexander et al (1995).
T a b le  4 .8 :  T r e n d s  in  M o n e t a r y  I n d ic a t o r s  b e tw e e n  P r e - t r a n s i t io n  a n d
T r a n s it io n P e r io d s
M o n e y  m u l t i p l i e r  M 1 / M 2  R a t i o S h o r t - t e r m  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s
( M 2 / M 0 ) ( S I N T )
M e a n 0 1 .7 9 0 .5 5 2 .2 1
M e a n ! 2 . 1 2 0 .4 8 1 .4 7
F  ( C h o w  t e s t )  
[F 1>21,5% = 4 . 3 2 ]
2 .0 3 0 .21 0 .2 1
S d e v 0 0 . 0 6 4 0 . 0 2 3 0 . 2 0 2
S d e v i 0 . 2 1 7 0 . 0 1 9 0 . 4 0 7
F  r a t i o
( G o l d f e l d - Q u a n d t  t e s t )  
[ F  14,9, 5 % = 3 . 0 1 ]
0 .7 8 0 .3 8 1 .25
N o te :  M e a n 0, a n d  m ean!  a re  sa m p le  m e a n s ;  S d e v 0, S d e v ,  a re  th e  s a m p le  s ta n d a rd  d e v ia t io n s  fo r  the
p re - t ra n s i t io n  an d  t ran s i t io n  p e r io d s ,  r e sp ec tiv e ly .
S o u r c e :  A u th o r ’s e s t im a te s
Finally, short-term interest rate level declined, while volatility increased between the 
pre-transition and transition periods. This can be explained by the fact that interest rates
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in Vietnam were still controlled by the SBV but were liberalised step by step during the 
1990s (see direct instruments section). This is the same as most countries in the 
transition to indirect instruments, where the volatility of short-term interest rates 
increased during the transition period. This may be a sign of more active interest rate 
management or that those interest rates were more market-determined. In the post­
transition period, the volatility of short-term interest rates decreased as the central banks 
and markets gained experience in operating in a liberalised environment (Alexander et 
al. 1995). However, the F-test results do not indicate that the stability of the regression 
coefficients and variability declined between the periods
The above results show that the statistical evidence is too weak to state that the use of 
indirect monetary instruments have increased the efficiency in the financial sector in 
Vietnam, but that during the transition to indirect instruments, the SBV still managed to 
maintain monetary control. This conclusion is supported by the high level of NPLs and 
low profitability in the banking sector (Chapter 3), but inflation was controlled at single 
digit level and macroeconomic stability was maintained during that period.
4.4. Conclusion and policy implications
The reform of monetary instruments, particularly the transition to indirect instruments 
in Vietnam has been performed in the context of financial sector reform and 
comprehensive economic reform. The transition is still underway as it is in other 
transitional economies and developing countries.
In the reform of monetary instruments during the 1990s, the SBV still relied on direct 
instruments and the use of direct instruments contributed to control inflation and 
maintain macroeconomic stability. However, it induced the inefficiency in financial
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intermediation and misallocation of financial resources. Interest rate controls were used
as an effective tool to curb inflation, but financial intermediation produced losses for 
banks. Fixed interest spreads hamper competition between banks and inefficiency. 
Credit ceilings were a good tool to control credit expansion, but it was circumvented by 
banks until monitored. Directed credits to SOEs were stopped in 1992, but SOEs still 
have found it easier than non-SOEs to access bank loans and receive credit privileges. 
During that time, interest rates controls were liberalised step by step and credit ceilings 
were phased out after mid-1998.
Indirect instruments have been increasingly introduced and become more market- 
determined; however, due to low level of monetisation, underdevelopment of money 
market and securities market was not established yet at that time, then the role of 
indirect instruments were limited. RRs have been introduced since 1991, but it was not 
used flexibly to influence liquidity. In contrast, refinancing facilities were used flexibly 
to direct the banking system to borrow from the SBV, which in accordance to the 
inflation trend, despite the fact of rediscount activities were limited. T-Bill auctions 
have been used to mobilise funds and also contribute to reduce excess reserves in the 
banking system, nonetheless the effectiveness of these instruments were restricted due 
to T-Bill maturity being too long and its liquidity being low.
The results from empirical analysis in this chapter show that the use of indirect 
instruments contributed to an increased degree of monetary control. However, the 
evidence is too weak to conclude that the use of indirect instruments increased 
efficiency in the financial sector. This is an important shortcoming of the reform and 
transition to indirect monetary instruments.
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Based on the experience of the transitional economies and developing countries in 
transition to indirect monetary instruments, and based on the macroeconomic conditions 
and level of development of banking and financial sector, and the results of the present 
study, further policy reform on this issue may be suggested as follows:
At this state of transition to indirect instruments, where macroeconomic stability is still 
maintained and financial markets have been developed moderately (Chapter 3), direct 
instruments should be gradually phased out, but the SBV still keeps them in hand when 
needed. Ceilings on lending rates are still set by the SBV; this should be more market 
determined to reflect the true demand and supply of money market. Credit ceilings no 
longer exist, but strengthened regulations on LC are necessary to reduce the foreign 
exchange risks for borrowers and the banking system. Credit to the heavy loss making 
SOEs should be restricted as well as the credit privilege to improve financial discipline, 
reduce NPLs and increase the efficiency in reallocation of financial resources.
As experience is gained in the transition to indirect instruments and the development in 
the financial market, the SBV should increasingly implement indirect instruments and 
begin to replace the direct ones. RRs should be implemented more flexibly as anti­
inflation monetary instruments. The enforcement of compliance should be raised to a 
level playing field to increase the effectiveness of this instrument. Rediscount and 
refinancing facilities should be developed and widened to all credit institutions, and 
refinancing rates should be considered as the key rates to drive market rates. The 
maturity of T-Bills should be shorter (less than one year: 3-9 months) to increase the 
effectiveness of this instrument. The role of the MOF in predetermination of T-Bill cut­
off rates at auctions should be reduced, and the market allowed to determine those rates. 
The operation of the securities market should be promoted and after that OMO would
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soon be able to be implemented.
In the transition to indirect instruments in Vietnam, further reforms of the banking 
system and SOEs are crucial for not only reform of monetary instruments, but also for 
macroeconomic stability and economic growth. A safe and sound banking system that 
will help protect macroeconomic stability, is also a key factor in ensuring that the 
central bank controls of money supply and liquidity are freely and rapidly transmitted. 
Restructuring of the banking system should be implemented, which includes measures 
to merge or close weak Joint Stock Banks, remove a portion of NPLs from banks' 
balance sheets and transfer them to a separate loan recovery agency. The equitisation of 
SOCBs would be necessary to increase capital and gain management experience. 
Moreover, supervising and regulatory frameworks should be improved. Legal system 
should be used to strengthen the rules on bank licensing, bankruptcy, collateral 
valuation and transfer of land use rights etc (IMF 1999a).
SOEs should be further reformed, since their weak performance and high level of NPLs 
undermine the health of economy as well as banking system. Equitisation and other 
methods should be stimulated and introduced to improve SOEs’ performance and foster 
the development of a securities market.
When the banking system is consolidated and SOEs performance is improved, interest 
rates should be fully liberalised to encourage competition between banks and financial 
intermediaries, and to create favourable conditions for the development of the money 
market and at this stage the SBV will have enough conditions to rely fully on indirect 
instruments.
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Chapter 5
EXCHANGE RATE POLICY IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES AND THE EFFECTS OF EXCHANGE 
RATES AND PRICES ON TRADE FLOWS
5.1-Introduction
The Bretton Woods system of exchange rates was established after World War II. 
Under this system, exchange rates were fixed but they could be adjusted in very narrow 
bands to correct “fundamental disequilibrium”. These adjustments were subject to 
international agreement.
In the late 1960s, due to the integration of world capital markets, growing inflation 
differentials which produced speculation over parity changes caused the Bretton Woods 
system to break down. In early 1973, major industrial countries moved to floating 
exchange rate systems. Since the mid-1970s, many developing countries have also 
moved away from pegging to a single currency to pegging to a basket of currencies or 
adopting a more flexible exchange rate arrangement (Aghevli et al. 1991). The shift 
from a single currency fix to fixing to a composite basket of currencies can reduce the
TQadverse effects of fluctuations in the exchange rate of the major currencies" . More 
flexible exchange rate arrangements have been adopted increasingly since domestic 
inflation in many countries rose sharply during the 1980s. As a result these countries
’9 For examples: US$, Pound, D Mark, Francs.
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had to depreciate their currencies to maintain international competitiveness. Moreover, 
under the circumstances of high capital mobility, an adjustable peg or a tightly managed 
float with occasional large adjustment is a very difficult regime to sustain40.
Exchange rate policy in developing countries has been used generally as a 
macroeconomic policy tool to achieve and maintain international competitiveness, and 
so ensure a viable balance of payments (BOP) and anchor domestic prices. These 
objectives of exchange rate policy have been debated extensively, but both 
policymakers and economists have to consider the relative weight of each objective in 
formulating an exchange rate policy (Aghevli et al. 1991). To achieve the first objective 
of exchange rate policy, that is, maintaining international competitiveness, and to ensure 
sustainable BOP, devaluation and other policies such as import tariffs and export 
subsidies had to be considered. The policy that was chosen depended on conditions such 
as the response of trade flows to changes in exchange rates and prices, the Marshal 1- 
Lerner condition, the BOP position, and international agreements on exchange rates.
Deciding on the appropriate policy to follow is important, especially for countries that 
are opening to international trade in the context of the floating exchange rate regimes of 
industrial countries and the more flexible exchange rate arrangements of developing 
countries. As a result of being more open, they became more vulnerable to the 
fluctuation in prices and exchange rates. The size and response time of imports and 
exports to changes in export and import prices and exchange rates are important to 
policy makers. From this information, they can choose appropriate policies such as
40 See IMF (1997c). “With the knowledge that the exchange rates will be changed if pressure becomes 
too intense, strong pressures tend to build up when the market perceptions shift (sometimes quite 
suddenly) to view that the rate is no-longer sustainable. In a situation of high capital mobility, the 
exchange regime needs to be either a very determined peg with consequent constraints on other economic 
policies, or it needs to be a managed float where the exchange rate moves regularly in response to market 
forces although quite possibly with some resistance from intervention and other policy adjustments”- p7.
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import tariffs, export subsidies, or devaluation to improve trade balance and BOP (Chua 
and Sharma 1998).
This chapter reviews the exchange rate regime and exchange rate policy of developing 
countries and theoretical issues that related nominal and real effective exchange rates, 
the effects of exchange rates and prices on trade flows. The review provides the basis 
for analysis of exchange rate policy reform, and the effects of exchange rates and prices 
on trade flows in the subsequent chapters. The chapter is organised as follows: Section 
2 summarises the definition of nominal and real effective exchange rates and their 
calculation methods in developing countries. Section 3 reviews theoretical aspects, 
which are concerned with the effects of exchange rates and prices on trade flows, and a 
literature review of this issue as well. Section 4 introduces the Error Correction Model 
(ECM).
5.2-Nominal and real effective exchange rates
5.2.1- Definitions of nominal and real effective exchange rates
The nominal bilateral exchange rate can be defined as the domestic currency price of a 
unit of foreign currency, for instance the number of Vietnamese dong per US dollar. 
The nominal effective exchange rates are also defined to capture the changes in other 
currency prices to domestic currency price. It can be determined through weighting the 
bilateral exchange rates according to each currency in total imports, exports or trade 
(imports plus exports). Given the diversification of foreign trade in the region and in the 
world as a whole, effective exchange rates provide more useful information on 
relationships among currencies and their weights in foreign trade than bilateral ones. 
That is a reason why effective exchange rates are usually used in the analyses of 
exchange rates and foreign trade.
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The real exchange rate is a measure of the competitiveness of a country in international 
trade. There are two common definitions of the real exchange rates (see Edwards 1988. 
Nguyen and Martin 1987). First, the real exchange rate (RER) is measured as a ratio of 
the price of tradeable to non-tradeable goods (RER = Pt/Pnt)- This definition 
emphasises the rate at which tradeable goods are exchanged for non-tradeables, or the 
costs of domestically producing tradeable goods. Second, the definition of RER is based 
on the concept of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), RER = ER*(Pr/P), where ER is 
nominal exchange rate (bilateral or effective), P and P are foreign and domestic price 
levels, respectively. This definition is popular because of the availability of data. The 
approach implies that all changes in the nominal exchange rate are attributable to 
differences in inflation. However, PPP does not hold exactly in an absolute (level) or 
relative (percentage change) sense, because of substantial differences in productivity 
levels and productivity growth across countries (Fallon et al. 1995: 20).
For developing countries, the RER measured by PPP can combine the price of tradeable 
and non-tradeable goods: RER = ER*(WPI/CPI), where ER is either the nominal 
bilateral or effective exchange rate. WPI is the wholesale price index (or producer price 
index) in foreign countries (industrial countries) and is a proxy for tradeable prices, 
because WPI contains mainly tradeable goods. CPI is the domestic consumer price 
index that is a proxy for non-tradeable prices. Even though the CPI contains some 
tradeables, it is heavily influenced by non-tradeable goods and non-traded activities, 
such as retail sales, so it is a reasonable proxy for non-tradeable prices (Harberger 
1986). Therefore, the PPP measure of RER is used in the next chapter to calculate real 
effective exchange rates in Vietnam.
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5.2.2- Procedure to calculate the nominal and real effective exchange 
rates
There are two common things in calculating the RER and estimating the RER 
misalignment. First, components of BOP including the trade balance and net capital 
inflows are considered to determine a base period in which the RER is judged to be in 
equilibrium. Second, it is necessary to determine the extent to which the equilibrium 
real rate has changed in its fundamental structural determinants (Dodsworth et al. 
1996a). Based on this argument, the procedure to calculate nominal and real effective 
exchange rates suggested by Bahmani-Oskooee (1995) has been applied in many 
developing countries.
Nominal effective exchange rate
The nominal effective exchange rate is calculated through three steps. First, the nominal 
bilateral exchange rates, NERjj between a country and its major trading partners are 
calculated. The formula for nominal bilateral exchange rates is as follows:
NERjj = NERjUS$/NERjUS$
where NERjj is the price of domestic currency of country i (for example, Vietnam) per 
unit of foreign currency j (j = 1 ...n); NERjUS$ is the price of country i’s currency per US 
dollar. NERjUs$ is the price of country j ’s currency per US dollar.
The second step is converting the levels of nominal bilateral exchange rates into an 
index INERjj where 
INERij = (NER'ij/ NERSj)* 100
t, is base time period (month, quarter, year), which is chosen in accordance to the 
Dodsworth et al (1996a) argument at the top of this section.
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The third step is calculating the nominal effective (import-weighted) exchange rate 
(NEERj) index:
NEERi=£ a ijINERij
j=i
Where ay is the share of country i’s imports from trading partner j in each quarter from 
the base time period, ay = 1, n. The import-weighted exchange rate is chosen in this 
study and many studies analysed exchange rates and foreign trade in developing 
countries because: first, an import-weighted exchange rate provides the closest 
approximation to effective exchange rates (based on trade balance effects) for 
developing countries (Crockett and Nsouli 1977). Black (1976) also pointed out that 
import-weighted exchange rates in small open economies approximate the multilateral 
exchange rate model weights and indicate the effects on the trade balance. Second, 
Vietnam’s trade deficit (imports minus exports) was in the range from US$60 million to 
around US$3 billion in the period from 1992 to 1998 (Table 1.2). Thus an import- 
weighted exchange rate will be more appropriate than another weighted exchange rate 
(export or trade weighted) in calculating effective exchange rates in Vietnam at that 
time.
Real effective exchange rate
After calculating the nominal bilateral exchange rates, RERy between country i and its 
major trading partners, there are three further steps to get to the real effective exchange 
rate. First, real bilateral exchange rates, RERy, are determined by the following formula: 
WPT
RER y = NER y
where WPIj is the wholesale price (or producer price) index from country i’s trading 
partners. CPf is consumer price index in country i. This formulation combines two
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approaches to determining the real exchange rate (tradeable and non-tradeable, PPP) as 
mentioned above.
Second, converting the levels of the real bilateral exchange rates into indexes (IRER,,) 
according to the base time period.
IRERjj = (RER'ij/ RER1”,,)* 100 
(t, is base time period)
Third, calculating the import-weighted real effective exchange rates REERj 
REERi=IaijIRERij
J=1
where ajj is the share of country i’s imports from trading partner j in the base time 
period, ajj = 1, n.
Since the bilateral exchange rates are defined as the price of domestic currency per a 
unit of foreign currency, then an increase in NEER or REER reflects depreciation, and a 
decline implies an appreciation of the domestic currency.
5.3-Effects of exchange rates and prices on trade flows
This section reviews the theoretical issues, which related the effects of prices and 
exchange rates on trade flows. These issues concern the first objective of exchange rate 
policy, that is maintaining international competitiveness and a sustainable balance of 
payments (BOP).
Exchange rates and trade flows
Theories and empirical evidence strongly support the idea that exchange rate 
movements have an important role in external adjustment. Through devaluation, prices
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of tradeables relative to non-tradeables are increased, shifting aggregate demand in 
favour of non-tradeables simultaneously with the shift of aggregate supply in favour of 
tradeables41. These changes should reduce demand for tradeables and improve the trade 
balance and current account (see Edwards 1989, Aghevli et al. 1991). A sufficient 
condition for successful devaluation is that the Marshall-Lerner condition holds. The 
well-known Marshall-Lerner condition states that to improve the trade balance, the sum 
of the absolute value of import and export demand price elasticities should be greater 
than unity (with the assumption that the initial trade balance is either zero or relatively 
small). However, devaluation will not improve the trade balance under conditions of 
large trade deficits and small export elasticities.
Devaluation will result in an increase of domestic currency price of imported 
intermediate inputs and thereby consumer goods, and domestic price level, this will 
reduce the value of financial assets, and also reduces aggregate demand through the 
wealth effect. Devaluation will lead to a rise in domestic cost of servicing external debts 
denominated in foreign currencies (see Cooper 1971, Edwards 1989, Aghevli et al. 
1991). Therefore, some governments are reluctant to devalue their currencies to 
improve the trade balance and BOP.
Price effects on Trade flows
Besides devaluation, another way to improve the trade balance is through adjusting 
export and import prices. Dornbusch (1980: 62-68) showed that an X per cent import 
tariff combined with an X per cent export subsidy is equivalent to X per cent 
devaluation. If the effects of prices on trade flows are larger than that of devaluation, 
and other conditions for an effective devaluation are insufficient, policy makers may
41 If a nominal devaluation succeeds in altering real exchange rate (Edwards 1989)
choose an export subsidy and tariff policy rather than devaluation, since devaluation has 
negative effects as mentioned above.
Edwards (1989) had a further analysis on this issue. He stated that a simultaneous 
imposition of import tariffs and export subsidies (of the same rate) will replicate only 
some of the effects of devaluation. Since, import tariffs will lead to an increase in the 
domestic price of importable goods; export subsidies will result in an increase in the 
domestic price of the exportable goods. With the same rates for the tariffs and subsidies, 
the relative price between importables and exportables will be unchanged, but their 
relative price with respect to non-tradeables will increase. Thus, the domestic relative 
price of tradeables as a group will increase and this is similar to the case of a successful 
devaluation. So, in this respect, both tariffs cum subsidies and devaluation policies are 
equivalent.
However, he also pointed out a number of differences between the two policies such as 
a devaluation affects both visible and invisible trade, while tariffs cum subsidies policy 
affects only visible trade; a devaluation affects the domestic currency of both tradeable 
goods and tradeable assets, a tariffs cum subsidies policy affects only the domestic price 
of tradeable goods and services; the most important difference between a devaluation 
and tariffs cum subsidies is concerned with the political economies of these two 
strategies, the chosen policy usually is in favour of a well known lobby group.
Based on the main purpose of this chapter and the next one is to examine the effects of 
exchange rates and prices on trade flows, then the equivalence between a devaluation 
and tariffs cum subsidies policies is focused only.
Literature review
There are some studies, which examine the effects of prices and exchange rates on trade 
flows. The first study to look at the question of whether changes in prices and exchange 
rates have different effects on trade flows was that of Orcutt (1950). He argued that 
during the interwar period, the effects on trade flows of small and temporary changes in 
prices differed from that for large and permanent changes such as caused by 
devaluation. Orcutfs argument was interpreted by Learner and Stern (1970) that the 
trade flows adjust more quickly to large price or exchange rate changes than to small 
price changes.
By using a pooled sample of 13 industrial countries for the period 1953-1969, Junz and 
Rhomberg (1973) concluded that the response of trade flows to changes in prices and 
exchange rates is similar. Wilson and Takacs (1979) estimated the import and export 
demand functions for six industrial countries (Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the 
United Kingdom and the United States), and they concluded that for most countries in 
this sample in the fixed exchange rate period, the length of the full response lags on 
exchange rates seemed to be shorter than for changes in prices. The initial impact of 
exchange rate changes on trade flows tended to be greater than that of price changes. 
Their conclusion supports Orcutfs early conjecture that trade flows respond differently 
to changes in prices and exchange rates.
Bahmani-Oskooee (1986) also estimated the magnitude and the time path of the trade 
flows to changes in the exchange rates and prices for seven countries (namely Brazil, 
Greece, India, Israel, Korea, South Africa and Thailand) in the floating rate period 
(1973-1980). His export and import demand functions included relative prices and 
effective exchange rates, and the Almon lag procedure was imposed. Quarterly data
were used and he found that “imports and exports reactions were quicker and the total 
response time was shorter when an exchange rate, rather than relative prices, caused a 
change in international prices” (Bahmani-Oskooee, 1986:122). His results also support 
Orcutt’s early hypothesis.
Tegene (1991) used two three-variable VAR models to examine the response of exports 
and imports to small changes in relative prices and effective exchange rates. Quarterly 
data of Ethiopia from 1973Q1 to 1985Q4 were used in those models. The results from 
this study showed that the responses of both imports and exports to changes in relative 
prices are larger than to changes in exchange rates and the effect of exchange rate 
shocks to be shorter than for relative price shocks. In addition, variance decomposition 
analysis revealed that changes in prices account for a larger percentage change in inputs 
and exports than exchange rate changes. (Moreover, he concluded that devaluation 
might have an initial adverse effect on the trade balance). His results also support the 
results obtained by Wilson and Takacs (1979) and Bahmani-Oskooee (1986).
Deyak et al (1993) analysed the adjustments of Canadian import demand to changes in 
income, prices and exchange rates. Their model specification used a polynomial lag 
structure, which allows them to examine long run elasticities and short run adjustments 
of imports to changes in these variables. In this model, domestic prices and foreign 
currency export prices were used separately instead of relative import prices (as a ratio 
of import price to domestic price: PM/PD is considered as being homogeneous in 
prices). Quarterly data from 1958 to 1989 were used in this study. The results showed 
that the long run effects of exchange rate changes are similar in magnitude to those of 
domestic and foreign price effects. In the short run, imports react more quickly to 
changes in both prices than to change in exchange rates.
Chua and Sharma (1998) investigated the dynamic response (magnitude and time path) 
of imports and exports to changes in domestic prices, foreign prices and real effective 
exchange rates for Korea, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. These authors used 
VAR models and cointegration analysis to examine the long run relationship and short 
run dynamics of these variables. In these models, domestic and foreign prices are used 
separately to see the responses of consumers to domestic and foreign prices. The real 
effective exchange rate is used to capture the overall competitiveness of a country in 
international markets. Quarterly data from 1974 to 1995 were used. The results showed 
that domestic and foreign prices have a larger impact on trade flows than the real 
effective exchange rates in all cases (real effective exchange rates are shown to have an 
impact only on the imports of Singapore). There was no evidence for significant 
difference in the response time of import demand to shocks in prices and exchange 
rates. However, the response time for export supply varies among countries. In the case 
of Singapore, the response time is similar. Korean exports adjust more quickly to 
changes in real effective exchange rates than in prices. In contrast, exports adjust faster 
to prices than to real exchange rates for the cases of the Philippines and Thailand. 
Finally, Chua and Sharma’s results suggested that in the countries where trade is highly 
restricted, the response of imports and exports to changes in prices is larger than in 
countries where trade is freer.
Bahmani-Oskooee (1998) used the cointegration technique of Johansen and Juselius 
(1990) to estimate the trade elasticities to test the Marshall-Lerner condition in less 
developed countries (the Marshall-Lerner condition is a long run condition that 
postulates that if the sum of import and export demand elasticities add up to more than 
one, devaluation should improve the trade balance in the long run). In this study,
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relative prices for imports and exports, nominal effective exchange rates, income 
(domestic and world income) were used. Quarterly data from 1973Q1 to 1990Q4 for 
Greece, Korea, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore and South Korea were employed. 
The results showed that the sum of the absolute values of price elasticities for import 
and export demands add up to more than one, and the Marshall-Lerner condition is 
satisfied for almost all countries. Hence, devaluation could improve the trade balance.
5.4-Error Correction Model (ECM)
The error correction specification was introduced by Phillips (1957) and Sargan (1964). 
The Error Correction Model (ECM) was developed by Engle and Granger (1987). This 
is a dynamic model that can be used to analyse long and short run relationships among 
variables. In this model, the short-term dynamics of the variables in the system are 
influenced by the deviation from the equilibrium.
The ECM focuses on the non-stationary variables, which have the same order 1, in the 
form of a linear combination. For instance, yt and xt are two 1(1) variables which have a 
linear combination as follows:
y t = a + bx, + £t
Where st is an error term.
If these variables are cointegrated of order 1, then the equilibrium error term st would be 
1(0) or stationary, and gt will rarely drift far from zero if it has a zero mean (Engle and 
Granger 1987). On the other hand, if st can be tested and confirmed as a stationary 
variable then we can conclude that yt and xt are cointegrated of order 1.
The stationarity of residual st can be carried out by the Dickey-Fuller test for unit root:
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Aet = ai£t-i +xt (5.2)
If we can reject the hypothesis a\ = 0, then we can conclude that the residual series does 
not contain a unit root. Hence, we conclude that sequences of endogenous and 
exogenous variables in (5.1) are cointegrated of order (1,1) (see Kalirajan 1995).
If diagnostic checks indicate that the {xt} sequence of (5.2) exhibits serial correlation, 
using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test:
A st~ a iS t - i+ X a >+iAst-i+ 'Ct (5-3)
i= i
and if -2 < ai < 0, we can conclude that residual sequence is stationary and sequences 
of endogenous and exogenous variables in (5.1) are C/(l,l), (see Enders 1995, 
Appendix 8.11). And we can proceed to ECM for these variables in the short run 
according to Engle-Granger (1987).
According to the Granger representation theorem, if there is a cointegrating relationship 
between variables, then a dynamic error correction representation of these variables also 
exists and it can be expressed as follows: 
m m
k y t = a 0+ I  ai\Axt - j+ I a n t y t - j  + ßo-t-i + St (5-4)
i = 0  i = l
where
A is the first difference of variables.
G t-i is the error correction term from the long run equation (5.1) regression. It contains 
the deviation from the long run equilibrium, which will adjust in the short run. ß is the 
speed of adjustment, ß must be negative and the magnitude is in the range (-1< ß<0) to
ensure long run equilibrium is achieved. £ t is the disturbance term.
Equation (5.4) is well known and already proved in the economic literature. In this 
chapter, for illustration, we derive equation (5.4) for the case of a simple dynamic
model, where current value of variable y is influenced by its own one period lagged and 
current and one period lagged value of variable x:
Y t=a+b<Xt+b\Xt-\+rYt-\+£t (5.5)
which can be written as:
Y rY ,-i= a +boXrboXM+b,X,-,+boX,-i+YY,-rYl-,+s. (5-6)
AY,=a +boAX1+(bo+bi)X.-i+(Y-OYt-i+s. (5.7)
AY,=a +boAX,+(Y-i)[Y.-r<t,X t-i|+£t (5.8)
where (j) = (bo+bi)/(l-y) (assuming that y * 1)
(y-1) is called the speed of adjustments 
[Yt-r ^Xt-i] is called the error correction term
If Yt and Xt have a long run relationship, then in the steady state, AXt = AYt = 0 (all t) 
and Yt = (j)Xt. In the case of Yt * <j)Xt, this describes the ‘error’ between Yt and its long- 
run value.
Suppose that Yt.i > <J>Xt.i, for ECM representation this ensures that there is pressure 
from the error correction term. For AYt < 0, then (y-1) must be less than zero to ensure 
that when Yt.i lies above its long run value Yt will be less than Yt.i induced by this 
correction term. Similar to the case of AYt > 0 (Yt-i < Yt). Therefore, if (y-1) < 0, in 
‘disequilibrium’ Yt will move toward its long run path, from both above and below. 
However, if y < 0 or (y-1) <-l then, the correction is explosive. So, -1 < (y-1) < 0, is the 
condition to ensure long run equilibrium is achieved via negative feedback and error 
correction.
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5.5-Conclusion
Since 1973, most developed countries have adopted floating exchange rate regimes and 
many developing countries have increasingly adopted more flexible exchange rate 
arrangements. To achieve the first objective of exchange rate policy, that is maintaining 
international competitiveness and to ensure sustainable BOP for developing countries, 
devaluation and other policies such as import tariffs, export subsidies, etc had to be 
considered.
The responses of trade flows to changes in exchange rates and prices are important 
information to policy makers for choosing the appropriate policy from two possibilities: 
a devaluation or tariffs cum subsidies policy. Effective exchange rates and Error 
Correction Model (ECM) are considered as appropriate instruments to examine the 
responses of trade flows on the change in prices and exchange rates in both the short 
and long run in Vietnam in the next chapters.
Chapter 6
EXCHANGE RATE AND FOREIGN TRADE POLICY  
REFORMS IN VIETNAM
6.1-Introduction
The role of exchange rates in the Vietnamese economy has been increased since the 
comprehensive economic reform (it was neglected in the period before 1988, see 
Chapter 2), and exchange rate policy has attracted more attention from economists, 
policy makers and businessmen as well. These resulted from the development of the 
market-oriented economy and external economic relations with the countries in the 
region and in the world such as through imports and exports, FDI, services, etc.
There were some studies on the exchange rates and exchange rate policy during the 
1990s and particularly after the financial crisis in the region when neighbouring 
countries sharply devalued their currencies. The studies from Nguyen and Le (1995), Le 
and Tran (1995), Le (1996), Vu (1997) mentioned about the managed floating exchange 
rate regime in Vietnam, and exchange rate policy and management of foreign exchange 
from the SBV during that time, and also about the revaluation tendency of VND. They 
argued that the SBV do not need to devalue VND to encourage exports and BOP, to 
limit imports since the increase in imports during that period is a common thing for 
Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) as well as Vietnam in the first period of the
120
development. If the SBV devalued the Dong, this will lead to an increase in import 
prices and inflation, affect foreign debt and threaten stability of the economy in the 
restructuring process. There are some remedies to encourage exports such as improving 
quality of export goods, diversifying the export markets.
Dodsworth et al (1996a) also confirmed the VND was appreciated in the period from 
1992 to 1995 and considered the exchange rate policy in Vietnam during that time was 
appropriate (this will be detailed in the next section). Another study by Ohno (1998) 
showed that from December 1992 to March 1998, the overall competitiveness of 
Vietnam declined by 24 per cent (overall indices weighted by bilateral trade with 
Vietnam), due to dramatic devaluation from neighbouring countries after the financial 
crisis in the region in mid 1997.
This chapter examines the reform of exchange rate policy during the 1990s. Foreign 
trade reform is not the purpose of this chapter, but it is reviewed to provide the basis for 
analysing the effects of exchange rates and prices on trade flows in the next chapter, 
where this information will be used to construct models, interpret results and suggest 
policy reforms. The outline of this chapter is as follows: Section II analyses the reform 
of exchange rate policy that also contains the movements of nominal and real effective 
exchange rates. Section III reviews the foreign trade policy reform and foreign trade 
performance, which includes relaxation on entry to foreign trade, controls of exports and 
imports, taxes on trade, and joining the bilateral and multilateral trade agreements. 
Section IV includes conclusions.
1 2 1
6.2-The reform of exchange rate policy
In the banking and financial reform process, new policies for managing the foreign 
exchange market were introduced. According to a foreign exchange control decree dated 
October 21, 1988, the market was liberalised substantially to attract foreign exchange 
into the banking system, and to adapt the exchange rate system to the new laws 
liberalising foreign trade and investment (Dodsworth et al. 1996a). Business units in all 
economic sectors and individuals were allowed to open accounts of foreign currencies. 
Foreign currencies could be deposited, withdrawn or transferred to individuals or 
economic agents through the banking system. Buying and selling gold, precious metals, 
precious stones and foreign currencies were opened to all businesses and individuals 
according to the law on banking and credit institutions. Besides the gradually 
liberalising of the management of the forex market, the SBV still keeps the right to 
intervene in the forex market when it is needed (as in a financial crisis), in order to 
manage this market, ensure macroeconomic stability and increase effectiveness of 
exchange rate policy. These will be detailed more in the exchange rate policy section 
below.
6.2.1- Exchange rate policy
The SBV implemented the new monetary policy after the two tier-banking system was 
established in 1990. Exchange rate policy has been considered as a part of monetary 
policy and a macroeconomic instrument. As a part of monetary policy, it also has the 
ultimate targets of monetary policy such as maintaining macroeconomic stability, 
controlling inflation and contributing to high and sustainable economic growth. As the 
macroeconomic tool, its main objectives include maintaining competitiveness of VND, 
encouraging exports and controlling imports, improving the BOP, and increasing
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foreign currency reserves. In addition, creating the necessary conditions for the VND to 
be convertible and to contribute to overcoming “dollarisation” in the economy have 
been considered as the objectives of exchange rate policy (Binh and Dinh 1999). 
However, these later objectives are beyond the scope of this chapter, we focus only on 
the objectives which concern competitiveness, external balance of the economy and 
controls of inflation, and maintenance of macroeconomic stability.
The exchange rate policy from early 1989 can be divided into two phases as mentioned 
by Dodsworth et al (1996a: 36):
First, through August 1991, when the authorities adjusted the unified official 
exchange rate at irregular intervals with the explicit objective of maintaining the 
official rate within a range of 10-20 per cent of the parallel market rate; and 
second, from September 1991 to the present, when the authorities introduced the 
market for foreign exchange directly into the exchange rate determination 
process, through the foreign exchange trading floors and subsequently through 
the interbank foreign exchange market.
So, in the period from March 1989 to August 1991, exchange rates were unified and 
adjusted following the market. In the period since September 1991, exchange rates have 
been gradually allowed to be determined by market forces. The details of exchange rate 
policy in the two periods are discussed in the section below.
The period from March 1989 to August 1991
Perceiving that the fixed exchange rate regime with multiple rates was not appropriate 
in the transition to a market oriented economy and to promote exports, the government 
decided to unify the three exchange rates in March 1989. After unification of the 
exchange rates, the Dong was devalued rapidly. The exchange rate applied to 
international trade was devalued from VND900: US$1 in 1988 to VND4500: US$1 in
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1989. The average exchange rate for the transferable rouble was also adjusted 
proportionately (Vu: 1994).
After 1989, the dong was devalued several times. In January 1991, the nominal ER was 
VND6860: US$1; in July 1991 it was VND9000: US$1; and in December 1991, the 
dong fell to VND12900: US$1 (Le 1994: 3). One of main reasons for the dong 
devaluation probably was the collapse of the Soviet Union since the Soviet Union was 
Vietnam’s biggest trading partner in the period from 1976 to 1989. Trade between 
Vietnam and the former Soviet Union accounted for 85 per cent of imports and 67 per 
cent of exports from the non-convertible area (Nguyen 1992). Vietnam imported 
strategic commodities such as steel, petrol, and fertiliser from the Soviet Union and paid 
for these imports by exports to the Soviet Union. Now Vietnam is buying these goods 
on the international markets. The huge aid flows from the former socialist countries to 
Vietnam were also cut when the Soviet Union collapsed. Therefore, the demand for hard 
currency stimulated the dong’s devaluation. In addition, with the changes in the 
government of Cambodia in 1991, Cambodians feared a loss in value of their domestic 
currency, the riel. They wanted to hold gold instead of money. Consequently, there was 
a rush to purchase gold imported from Ho Chi Minh City. This resulted in an abrupt rise 
in the price of gold there, stimulating uncertainty in the dong (Brahm 1992).
To stabilise the dong, the SBV intervened by selling gold in late 1991 and 
simultaneously halted the issue of new dong notes, which created a shortage in the 
domestic currency prior to the Tet holiday. This intervention had positive effects in 
terms of maintaining a realistic exchange rate, while not allowing the black market to 
get out of control and it was praised by foreign economists: “The pragmatism
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demonstrated by the State Bank’s monetary intervention through the use of gold in 
stabilising the Dong adds further credibility to the Vietnamese banking system” (Brahm 
1992: 51).
The devaluation of the VND at that time created incentives for exports and narrowed the 
gap between the official and the parallel market exchange rates (see Table 3.4, Chapter 
3). A study by Dodsworth et al (1996a) showed that Vietnam was highly successful in 
narrowing the premium of the parallel market. The premium in the parallel foreign 
exchange market declined from more than 80 per cent before March 1989 to within a 
band of 0-20 per cent in the period 1989 to 1991.
The parallel market rate can be used as an indicator for exchange rate policy by 
measuring the extent of real exchange rate misalignment. Studies by Edwards (1989) 
and Kamin (1993) showed that the parallel market premium often rises very rapidly 
immediately before a major devaluation and then declines just after devaluation. 
Therefore, there is a positive correlation between the premium and real exchange rate 
overvaluation. So the existence of a parallel market premium indicates an excess 
demand for foreign exchange at the official rate and also overvaluation of the domestic 
currency at the prevailing official rate. Moreover, the premium of the parallel market is 
observable. Many developing countries have used the parallel market premium to make 
judgments about exchange rate policy (Dodsworth et al. 1996a).
The period from September 1991 to the early 1999
In September 1991, the SBV established foreign exchange trading floors in Hanoi and 
Ho Chi Minh City to facilitate foreign exchange transactions. A band of ±0.5 per cent 
of the official exchange rate was applied for all transactions. Due to the inefficiency of
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these floors, an interbank foreign exchange market was subsequently established to 
replace the foreign exchange trading floors (Decision No 204/QD-NHNN on October 
14, 1994). The necessary legal basis was also promulgated by the SBV to assist the 
market to operate properly (SBV 1995). The foreign exchange trading band was still 
±0.5 per cent of the official exchange rates and interbank exchange rates were used as 
basic information by the SBV to set the official exchange rates on the next day. Most 
banks and other financial institutions participated in this market.
In order to provide banks and financial institutions with more room for trading foreign 
exchange according to market conditions and stimulate the activities of the foreign 
exchange market, the SBV widened the band from ±0.5 per cent to ±1 per cent by 
Decision No 311/QD on November 21,1996.
In 1997, demand for foreign currencies was higher than supply particularly when banks 
needed foreign currencies to pay letters of credit (LC) early that year. In March, the band 
was widened to ±5 per cent. From August, due to the financial crisis in the region,
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speculation and hoarding of foreign exchange occurred, increasing pressure on the dong. 
The SBV had to intervene and widened the band to ±10 per cent in October to make 
exchange rates more flexible to market conditions (in the economy and region) and 
facilitate forex transactions.
In 1998, the economy faced more difficulties as a result of the financial crisis such as 
lack of foreign exchange supply, competitiveness was relatively poor due to the heavy 
devaluations by neighbouring countries, and exports were slow. The SBV introduced 
two measures to cope with these difficulties. First, Decision 37/1998 QD-TTg 
promulgated on February 14, 1998 required resident business organisations to surrender 
80 per cent of their new foreign exchange (forex) earnings to commercial banks within 
15 days of receipt (when they needed forex, they could buy back the forex according to 
interbank rates at that time). Second, official exchange rates were devalued from 
VND 11,175: US$1 to VND 11,800: US$1 on February 16 and the band of ±10 per cent 
was maintained (see Figure 6.1). On August 7, the official exchange rate was set to 
VND 12,999: US$1 (which meant that the official exchange rate was devalued by more 
than 16 per cent compared to the period prior to February 16) which was equivalent to 
existing interbank rates (Hoang 1999: 21) and the band was narrowed to ±7 per cent. 
Therefore, from August 7, the official exchange rate was devalued by more than 23 per 
cent compared with the period before February 16 (since interbank forex rates are 
usually traded at the upper band rate)42. This measure put the exchange rates closer to 
the market rates (interbank and free market rates), created conditions for balancing the 
demand of forex for enterprises and banks, and reduced the incentives for speculation 
and hoarding of forex.
42 During the 1998, the dong was depreciated to about 20 per cent (Kokko 1998).
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In early 1999, the SBV further liberalised forex management, official exchange rates 
were abolished and interbank exchange rates were considered as basic rates. The SBV 
required banks and other financial institutions to trade forex in a band of ±0.1 per cent 
of interbank exchange rates, according to Decision 64 and 65/1999/QD-NHNN7 on 
February 25, 1999 (SBV 1999).
In general, exchange rate policy from the late 1980s has been flexible and market- 
oriented. In the context of comprehensive economic reform and financial sector reform, 
this includes the establishment of the two tier banking system and relaxation of the 
management of foreign exchange and foreign trade. The unification of exchange rates 
and the devaluation of the VND following the market, the introduction of trading floors 
and the interbank market for forex have had the effect of bringing a larger share of 
foreign exchange transactions into official markets and creating conditions for official 
exchange rates to be determined by market forces. The evidence of official exchange 
rates being determined by market forces is the parallel market premium remaining 
below 1 per cent in the period from the beginning of 1992 to the end of 1996 (see Figure 
6.3 and Dodsworths et al. 1996a). However, this premium went up to 6 per cent in the 
first half of 1997 (before the financial crisis in the region), to around 14 per cent in the 
second half of 1997 (after the crisis), and fell to 7 per cent in the fourth quarter of 1998. 
This movement of the parallel market premium coincided with two devaluations of the 
VND from the SBV in 1998 and confirm the Edwards (1989) and Kamim (1993) 
findings that premiums often rise immediately before major devaluations and then 
decline after devaluations. In this case, the substantial devaluations by neighbouring 
countries have pressured Vietnam to devaluate its currency.
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The consistency between fiscal and monetary policy and exchange rate policy was the 
key to the successful unification of the foreign exchange market and particularly 
devaluation. The devaluation of the official exchange rate was supported by cutting 
budget deficits and tightening domestic credit. If the supporting policies had been 
lacking, the devaluation may have resulted in only a temporary reduction of the parallel 
market premium. This is strongly suggested from theory and evidence from many 
countries (Dodsworth et al. 1996a). In the case of Vietnam, this is not exceptional. 
During the unification and devaluation of official exchange rates, the SBV implemented 
a tightening of monetary policy and gradually cut the budget deficit (see Table 1.2, 
Chapter 1).
Moreover, the intervention from monetary authorities to stabilise the VND has been 
necessary. As mentioned previously, selling gold to stabilise the VND and halting the 
issue of new notes in late 1991 contributed to reducing inflation and maintaining 
realistic exchange rates at that time. The SBV’s intervention in 1993 when running 
down reserves and the decision that required resident business organisations to 
surrender 80 per cent of their foreign exchange (in a short period), balanced demand and 
supply for forex and stabilised exchange rates.
6.2.2- Nominal and real exchange rate movements
The period 1989-199143
From March 1989, the official exchange rates were devalued from VND900 to 
VND4,500 per US$, resulting in the depreciation of nominal and real effective 
exchange rates of 500 per cent in the plan (for international trade) and about 29 per cent
This section drawn from Dodswoth et al (1996a)
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for outside plans (from VND3,500 to VND4,500 per USS). These devaluations brought 
a massive realignment of the exchange rate and improved Vietnam’s external 
competitiveness. The devaluation and unification, combined with tightening fiscal 
policies, had an impact on public confidence and demand for Vietnamese dong. 
Subsequently, the official rate was revalued by about 10 per cent during the last nine 
months of 1989. Then the real effective rate appreciated by 23 per cent as a result, but it 
was lower than that before reform.
In the period 1990-91, due to relaxation of financial policies in an attempt to mitigate 
the impact of the collapse of the CMEA, the parallel rate depreciated by around 116 per 
cent. The official rate was devalued by 60 per cent in 1990 and by 40 per cent in the first 
eight months of 1991, while inflation was about 70 per cent per year. Exchange rate 
movements tracked closely the inflation differential with Vietnam’s trading partners, 
and the official rate was devalued sufficiently to keep the parallel market premium 
below 20 per cent during most of 1990 and up to July 1991. As a result, while the real 
effective exchange rate fluctuated from month to month, it did not become increasingly 
overvalued, remaining in a band of 100-125 per cent (March 1989 = 100).
When the trading floors were introduced in August 1991, both official and parallel 
markets were devalued sharply. The exchange rate was devalued from VND9,000 to 
about VND 12,000 per US$. By the end of 1991, however, real exchange rate returned to 
the level that had prevailed in March 1989. Since March 1992, official and parallel 
market rates have been stable between the range from VND 10,500 to VND 11,500 
against the US$. The real effective exchange rate has been relatively constant at an 
appreciated level of 30 per cent compared with March 1989.
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The period 1992-1998
The effective import-weighted exchange rates are appropriate for developing countries 
(see Chapter 5) and also for the case of Vietnam where imports always exceed exports. 
The nominal (NEER) and real effective exchange rates (REER) in Vietnam from 1992 
to 1998 were calculated following the Bahmani-Oskooee (1995) formulas in Chapter 5. 
The fourth quarter of 1992 is chosen as the base quarter, since in 1992, current account 
deficit was the lowest in that period. BOP were positive, inflation was low (17.5 per 
cent pa, see Table 1.2), exchange rates were firstly stable and began to be determined by 
market forces (see previous part). This suggests that it could be a reasonable base 
quarter for our analysis.
The thirteen major trading partners of Vietnam in that time were Australia, Canada, 
France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Singapore, South Korea, Sweden, Taiwan, 
Thailand, United Kingdom and United States. Their data are used in the calculations of 
NEER and REER. Since the nominal bilateral exchange rates between Vietnam and its 
trading partners are defined as the price of domestic currency per unit of foreign 
currency, an increase in NEER or REER reflects depreciation, and a decline implies an 
appreciation of the domestic currency.
Three kinds of bilateral exchange rates are used to calculate NEER and REER. They are 
VND/US$ exchange rates of Vietcombank (the biggest of SOCBs and dominating in 
foreign exchange transactions in the banking system, see Chapter 3), and VND/USS 
exchange rates of parallel markets in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh cities.
The results shown that over the period 1992Q4 to 1998Q4, the nominal effective
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exchange rate (NEER) of Vietcombank gradually depreciated by 20 per cent up to 
1995Q2, after that it returned slowly to the 1992 level by 1998Q2 before sharply 
depreciating (Figure 6.2). The Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City parallel rates behaved in a 
similar fashion (see Appendix 6.1 and 6.2). However, over this period the real effective 
exchange rate (REER) gradually appreciated by around 20 per cent. The real effective 
exchange rate appreciated which may be explained by some factors. First, FDI increased 
from more than US$300 million in 1992 to more than US$2 billion in 1997. 
Remittances also increased from around US$60 million in 1992 to more than US$1 
billion in 1996, before declining to more than US$700 million in 1997 (World Bank 
1999: 72). Second, Vietnam’s debt arrears have been rescheduled under Paris Club 
arrangements (Dodsworth et al. 1996a). Third, inflation increased by around 60 per cent 
over the period, although the NEER depreciated, this has not been enough to offset the 
increase in inflation, so the REER appreciated. That will erode Vietnam’s 
competitiveness.
Figure 6.2: Nominal, real effective exchange rates of Vietcombank
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Due to the impact of the financial crisis in the region, FDI slowed to US$800 million in
1998 and US$700 million in 1999 (Table 1.2). Exports also declined since demand for
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exports fell, partly because neighbouring countries (Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and 
South Korea) sharply devalued their currencies. This created pressure for the VN dong 
to depreciate. However, the fluctuation in the NEER and REER due to the crisis has not 
been as great as might have been expected. The NEER has been depreciated by 20 per 
cent in the last two quarters of 1998, it helped to bring the REER to the appreciated 
level by 20 per cent at the end of 1998 for all kinds of effective exchange rates (1992Q4 
= 100), this was equal to the level before the crisis.
Figure 6.3. Premium in Hanoi parallel Foreign Exchange
Market
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The exchange rate and the financial system, and the economy more generally, have not 
been as adversely affected by the financial crisis as neighbouring countries since the 
Vietnamese dong is not freely convertible; foreign exchange transactions and imports 
have been strictly regulated during this time. Since a stock market has not been 
established, this could not be affected by the withdrawing of foreign portfolio capital
(Kokko 1998).
6.3- The reform of foreign trade policy
Foreign trade in Vietnam before comprehensive economic reform was monopolised by 
the government and only a small number of state-trading companies had rights to carry 
out foreign trade. Domestic firms were not allowed to contact directly with foreign 
partners, and they had to resort to trading companies for their external transactions. An 
overvalued exchange rate system and low procurement prices discouraged exports, 
while an extensive system of quotas and licenses impeded imports (IMF 1996).
During 1976 to 1988, foreign trade was underdeveloped. The volume of exports or 
imports was less than US$800 million per year and more than 60 per cent of foreign 
trade was with CMEA countries (non-convertible area). Moreover, structure of exports 
was backward, primary commodities accounted for 77 per cent to 85 per cent of total 
exports (see World Bank 1990, Tran 1992, Nguyen 1992).
Since 1989, external economic relations which include foreign trade were reformed 
substantially. This section provides the basis to examine the effects of prices and 
exchange rates on trade flows in the next section; it covers the changes in foreign trade 
policy and foreign trade performance in this period.
6.3.1-Changes in foreign trade policy
Relaxation of controls on entry to foreign trade
Since 198944, with comprehensive economic reforms (state economic management, 
SOE reform, financial sector reform and external economic relations, the controls over
44 Actually, some foreign trading organisations were allowed to establish from 1988, but the number of 
such organisations in early 1988 was very small (30 units).
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foreign trade were gradually relaxed. The several conditions on private sector 
participation in foreign trade that were imposed in the early 1990s were gradually 
phased out. These conditions were: foreign trade contracts, minimum capital 
requirements, shipment licenses, and business licenses. Foreign contracts were 
abolished in 1992, minimum capital requirements were removed from 1995, shipment 
licenses were abolished in 1996, and export/import licenses have not been required 
since 1998 (TG 1999a: 16). In practice, it was complicated to obtain export/import 
licenses, since it was difficult to have US$200,000 as working capital to meet the 
minimum capital conditions for Vietnamese enterprises, particularly for new enterprises 
(Decision 114/HDBT, April 1992). Also, each license allowed an enterprise to trade 
only the registered items45.
In order to encourage exports and promote balance of payments, Decision No 28/TTg of 
the Prime Minister dated 13/01/1997 allowed enterprises with import/export licenses to 
export goods, other than the registered items (regardless of whether export goods were 
specified in the license or not).
There was a basic change in trade policy from early 1998. According to Decision 
55/1998/QD-TTg of 3 March 1998, all enterprises can trade goods covered under their 
business license and there is no need to obtain export and import licenses, except for 
special goods46. Decision 57/198/ND-CP, dated 31/07/1998, provided the guidelines for 
implementing the Law on Trade (it was approved by the National Assembly in early 
1997). According to this Decision, for goods not under special regulations, all
43 Import and export licences were provided into two categories: first, to production enterprises which 
were allowed to import production inputs and to export the resulting produced products. Second, 
specialised trading or service supplying enterprises, which were allowed to trade a wider range of goods 
(TG 1999a: 16).
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enterprises are encouraged to enter international trade, and do not need permission, 
other than their business licenses. So from early 1989 up to 1998, the controls on entry 
to foreign trade have been relaxed substantially. From the many conditions that had to 
be met in order to enter foreign trade, enterprises now have to obtain a business license.
Relaxation of controls on exports and imports
In 1989, most quotas or targets on exports were eliminated and export subsidies were 
also discontinued. Other controls on exports and imports have been gradually relaxed. 
The history of policy on non-tariff barriers (NTBs) and taxation on trade is detailed 
below.
• Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs)
NTBs in Vietnam have involved mainly quantitative restrictions, and foreign exchange 
allocation and customs procedures.
In 1989, most quotas on exports were eliminated (quotas of 7 export commodities 
remained). From 1993 to 1995 shipment licenses for all goods not subject to regulation 
by technical ministries were phased out. In 1994, shipment licenses were eliminated for 
all exports except rice, timber and petroleum. In 1995, quotas for all export 
commodities were lifted, except for rice.
It is of interest to detail the history of two main export quotas: the quotas for rice, and 
textiles and garments. Quotas for rice exports were established by the government at the 
beginning of each year (the quota for 1997 was 2.0 millions tonnes, for 1998 it was 4.0
46 Garments and textiles exported to quota markets, and the goods prohibited or those under the 
government management (TG 1999a: 16).
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million tones), and allocated to exporters (90 per cent of the export volume was 
allocated at the beginning of the year, and the remainder could be allocated at the end of 
the year with amendments according to actual production (TG 1999a)). Before 1998, all 
quotas for rice exports were allocated to SOEs. In 1998 private firms were permitted to 
export rice. Foreign firms also were allowed to buy rice directly from farmers for export 
(World Bank 1998).
Export quotas for textiles and garments are determined under bilateral agreements with 
the European Union, Canada and Norway (CIE 1998). The enterprises which have 
quotas must have a certain capacity, an export or import license for textiles and 
garments, and the quota volume is based on the performed volume in the previous year. 
In 1998, private enterprises were first allowed to access export quotas for garments and 
in December 1998, nearly 20 per cent of export quotas of garments were auctioned 
(World Bank 1998).
Quotas on import goods have also been reduced gradually in this period. After 1989, 
many quota target controls were lifted, but 12 import commodities remained subject to 
quotas. In 1995, import shipment licenses for a wide range of imported goods were 
eliminated. In 1998, consumer goods imports were restricted by Vietnamese authorities 
to solve the BOP problem. Decision 28/1997/QD-TTg indicated that annual import 
plans for consumer goods should not exceed 20 per cent of export turnover of the 
preceding year. The SBV also restricted the letters of credit (L/Cs) for importing 
consumer goods (L/Cs were limited to producer goods) (TG 1999a, CIE 1998). In 
January 1998, Decision 11/1998QD-TTG reaffirmed the lifting of quotas and licensing 
for consumer goods not subject to specific restrictions and, as well, quotas for importing
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fertiliser were first allocated to selected non-state enterprises (CIE 1998).
There are some goods prohibited47 for export and import, which are determined by the 
government for security, health and environmental reasons. Export and import goods 
under special regulations48 are also existed. These regulations may preserve the 
privileged position of state-owned traders, especially those owned by the regulating 
ministry (CIE 1998), but not for private traders.
Foreign exchange regulations which affect foreign trade in some respects include: 
restrictions on foreign currency reserves, limiting foreign currencies that travellers can 
carry out of the country, profit remittances from foreign invested firms, and foreign 
currency surrender requirements. According to circular 02/TT-NFI7 of June 28, 1997, 
foreign invested entities are generally responsible for their own foreign exchange 
requirements. “Only entities involved in projects producing specific import substitutes, 
specified infrastructure projects and designated important projects are guaranteed 
conversion of local currency into foreign exchange for legitimate purposes. Tables 2.2, 
2.3, and 2.4 present the current list of projects eligible for this treatment” (CIE 1998: 
31).
Travelers are allowed to carry US$7,000 of the country (currently) and profit 
remittances of foreign invested firms are subject to a tax of 5, 7, or 10 per cent 
(depending on the size and sector of the investment) (CIE 1998).
47 Export goods prohibited include arms and military equipment, toxic chemicals, antiquities, narcotics, 
woods, and wild and rare animals. Imported goods prohibited are arms and military equipment, toxic 
chemicals, antiquities, narcotics, fireworks, poisonous toys for children, cigarettes, used consumer goods, 
right hand drive automobiles (TG 1999a).
48 See CIE 1998, Table 2.1, commercial minerals for exports and scrap metal are regulated by the 
Ministry of Industry, wood products for export are regulated by Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development, etc.
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When the financial crisis occurred in the region, the SBV more strictly controlled 
foreign exchange. Decision 396-TTg of April 4, 1998 required all enterprises to open a 
single foreign currency account only at a working bank in Vietnam. Decree 173/QD- 
TTg of September 12, 1998 required all economic organisations to sell 80 per cent of 
their foreign currencies to a Vietnamese commercial bank within 15 days. In Chapter 6, 
this Decision is mentioned as a useful tool in forex management by the SBV against 
hoarding forex activities and balancing forex demand and supply, although it was an 
administrative and temporary solution. In the foreign trade area, this decision was aimed 
at three targets: the first was to reserve foreign exchange needs for certain enterprises 
(mainly SOEs); the second was to control the import of consumer goods; and the third 
was to force foreign invested enterprises to export their products and to buy 
domestically produced inputs. These targets can be interpreted as policy described to 
promote specific industries and to narrow the trade deficit (TG 1999a).
For enterprises, buying foreign exchange from the bank is still difficult. They have to 
apply to the SBV and their requests are not always successful. Foreign invested firms 
are also required to meet certain conditions before opening accounts to borrow from 
abroad, such as minimum borrowings of US$3 million, and the purposes of borrowing 
capital must be for activities such as construction or production (this regulation is to 
encourage foreign firms to buy domestic inputs) (TG 1999a).
• Taxes on Trade 
Export tax
A system of export tax has been applied in Vietnam from the early 1990s. At present,
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the system includes 12 rates (11 rates in 1997) in a range from zero to 45 per cent, with 
an average rate of 14 per cent (TG 1999a: 27). In 1997, rates of export duties on 
commercial goods (CIE 1998: 47) indicate that lower export taxes (from 0 per cent to 5 
per cent) have been applied for agricultural, marine products and mineral fuels such as 
rice, maize, fish and prawns, coal and crude oil etc. This is to encourage export and 
production of agriculture and aquaculture, but they could be encouraged even more with 
no export tax. The higher export tax rates (from 10-20 per cent) are imposed for woods 
and wood products, forestry, etc. The highest rates are imposed for raw materials (zinc, 
tin and metal scrap), these rates may protect the local steel industry. All such taxes 
favour local users of such inputs.
The objectives of export taxes are to raise revenue, to protect domestic consumers from 
price rises due to increase in export demand, and to protect scarce natural resources 
(CIE 1998).
Table 6.1. Export and Import Taxes, 1993-99
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999*
Total (VND Bill) 6,400 9,020 13,300 15,100 13,700 16,600 19,500
Export Tax 1,600 1,220 900 1,200 2,200 4,100 4,700
Import Tax 4,800 7,800 12,400 13,900 11,500 12,500 14,800
Export Tax per
1US$ exports (US$) 
Import Tax per
0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03
1US$ imports (US$) 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.12 0.08 0.09 0.10
Source: GSO authorities, Table 1.2. Author's estimates. 
* include VAT (Value Added Tax)_________________
The export tax per 1US$ of exports can be used as a proxy for actual export taxes. In
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Table 6.1, the export tax per 1USS of exports is in the range from 1 to 5 cents in the 
period from 1993 to 1999. This figure may be underestimated due to smuggling, tax 
evasion and the weakness of the tax system. Nevertheless, this indicates that export 
taxes have not been a big barrier to export. In addition, tax exemptions and duty 
drawbacks have been applied to promote exports and assist some sectors. Some foreign 
investment projects, export producers, and special sectors such as defense, securities, 
and education have been exempted from export tax. Some export enterprises can apply 
for drawback of import duties on imported inputs. “Foreign investment projects have 
special treatment in terms of tax exemption depending on the percentages of exported 
products” (TG 1999a: 27). Moreover, there are a number of policies that assist exporters 
such as export credits at preferential interest rates, export credit guarantees and 
accelerated depreciation according to the new decree on implementation of the 
Amended Law on Domestic Investment (No 07/1998/NC-CP) for domestic export 
oriented investment (CIE 1998: 87). Some exporters may get export bonus funds, that 
are awards for big exporters of the year (export turnover in excess of US$100,000, high 
quality of export goods etc).
Import Taxes
Import tariffs were initially applied in 1988, when the law on import and export duties 
was promulgated. The aims of the tariff system were to protect domestic production and 
to raise state revenue. The tariff system has been changed frequently: in 1988, tariff 
rates from 5 to 50 per cent were imposed on 124 commodities. “In 1989, the maximum 
tariff rate was increased to 120 per cent for some luxury goods and tariff coverage was 
reduced to 80 commodities. The maximum rate of tariff was further increased to 150 per 
cent in 1993 and 200 per cent in 1994” (TG 1999a: 24).
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In Table 6.2, most nominal tariffs were in the range of zero to 10 per cent in the period 
from 1995 to 1999. Average tariffs increased slightly from 12.8 per cent to 13.6 per cent 
in 1998 and 15.9 per cent in 1999 (but actual import tax per 1US$ of imports increased 
from 8 cents to 9 cents in 1998 and 10 cents in 1999 only (Table 6.1), this is evidence 
for tax evasion and weakness of tax system). This increase reflects the import limiting 
policy adopted to cope with the financial crisis in the region. The maximum rates fell 
from 200 per cent in 1995 to 60 per cent in 1996, rose back to 100 per cent in 1997, and 
after that fell to 60 per cent. The variation in tariff rates also fell from around 130 per 
cent to 110 per cent. Thus there remains high dispersion in the tariff structure (some 
production inputs and capital goods had low tariff rates or were exempted from import 
duties, while other finished or consumer goods had high rates. This means several 
industries are highly protected). The number of tariff rates also decreased from 36 to 19 
rates in 1999 to simplify the tariff system49.
Table 6.2. Nominal Tariffs in Vietnam, 1989-99
R an g e  o f T a r iff  R ates 1989 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Oto 10% 62 65 64 62
Above 10 to 20% 20 13 13 ll
Above 20 to 40% 14 17 17 18
Above 40% 4 5 6 7
Total tariff lines (%) 80a 100 100 100 100 100
Average Rate 1/ 12.8 12.3 13.4 13.6 15.9
Maximum Rate 120 150 200 200 60 100 60 60
Variation 2/ 131 127 128 117
Number of Rates 36 31 35 26 19
Source: CIE (1998) and TG (1999a: Table 4, p 25). 
a is absolute number of tariff lines, 1/ It is a simple average,
2/ It is defined as standard deviation of tariff rates as a percentage of the mean of those tariff rates
49 The 19 different tariff rates include 13 basic rates and 6 others for specific commodities (TG 1999a).
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An analysis of effective protection by TG (1999b) showed that the average effective 
rates of protection (ERP) for the economy as a whole in 1996 were in a range of 
between 47.1 per cent and 51.1 per cent. These figures are calculated for 1996 only. 
Nevertheless, these may reflect the fact that ERP are higher than nominal rates of 
protection, which must be considered in the modelling of import activities.
Joining the bilateral and multilateral trading agreements 
in the region and the world
From 1989, Vietnam has diversified its external relationships and has participated in 
bilateral and multilateral trade agreements in the region and the world. In 1992, Vietnam 
and the European Economic Union (now the EU) signed a preferential trade agreement 
which granted quotas for export of garments and textiles to Europe. In 1994, Vietnam 
was granted observer status at GATT and also applied to the WTO for membership. In 
1995, Vietnam joined ASEAN and also became a member of the Asian Free Trade Area 
(AFTA). As a member of AFTA, Vietnam involved commitments to reduce tariffs on 
imports from ASEAN to 0-5 per cent over a ten year period on a wide range of 
industrial and agricultural commodities under the Common Effective Preferential Tariff 
Scheme (CEPT). Vietnam also involved making commitments to eliminate non-tariff 
barriers on goods covered by CEPT and to harmonise customs, investment and 
standards regulations and procedures (CIE 1998). CEPT requires AFTA members to 
submit four lists?0 to “determine the pace and scope of the trade liberalisation” (TG 
1999a: 28).
50 IL: the inclusion list, TEL: the temporary exclusion list, SL: the sensitive list, and GEL: the general 
exception list.
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Under the CEPT, Vietnam immediately undertook to reduce tariff rates of items in the 
IL to no more than 5 per cent by January 1st, 2006. On January 1st, 1996, Vietnam 
submitted the IL of 857 commodities and on January 1997, 640 tariff lines were further 
noted. In 1998, the government published the tariff-reducing schedule under CEPT for 
the items under IL and TEL to the year 2006 (see CIE 1998: Table 3.11). Other lists will 
operate over a longer period^1.
The law on export and import duties was also amended by the National Assembly in 
May 1998. Under the amended law, three categories of tariffs were created. They 
include normal, preferential (MFN) and special preferential rates of tariffs.
Vietnam also formally joined the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) on 
November 17-18, 1998. On July 13, 2000, Vietnam and the United States signed a 
bilateral trade agreement. The agreement concerns comprehensive economic and 
commercial aspects, which include foreign trade, services, investment and intellectual 
property. The agreement is based on the principles of equality, mutual benefit and 
respect for each other’s independence and sovereignty and conformity with the rules and 
standards of the WTO. The signing of a bilateral trade agreement between Vietnam and 
the United States completes the normalisation of economics and commerce between the 
countries; it is expected that it will create more favourable conditions to develop 
bilateral trade, co-operation and investment. It also creates favourable conditions for 
Vietnam to join the WTCf2.
51 “The items in the TEL are to be transferred to the IL by 2003 in 5 equal instalments beginning from 
2000 and then reduced to 0-5 per cent by 2006; the SL consists of unprocessed agricultural products and 
is to be phased into the IL between 2003-06 and to be in the range of 0-5 per cent by 2013, and in 
principle, the GEL should have only the items satisfying Article XX of the GATT which allows measures 
to protect national security, public morals, human, animal or plant life and health, and articles of artistic, 
historic and archaeological value” (TG 1999a: 28).
52 Electronic NhanDan Newspapers on July 14, 2000.
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6.3.2 - Export and import performances
Under the comprehensive economic reforms and the reform of external economic 
relations from 1989 to 1998, foreign trade has increased substantially. Average annual 
growth rates of exports and imports have been from 27 per cent to 28 per cent pa 
(although the Vietnamese economy was affected slightly by the financial crisis in the 
region in 1997-1998). The ratio of foreign trade (exports plus imports) to GDP as a 
proxy for openness has increased from more than 40 per cent in 1989 to more than 80 
per cent in 1997 (it was 4 per cent lower in 1998 due to the effects of financial crisis in 
the region) (Table 6.3).
Table 6.3: Openness of Vietnamese Economy, 1989-98
Share of GDP
89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98
Exports (%) 19.6 21.2 24.7 25.0 23.3 26.1 25.2 31.0 37.7 36.2
Imports (%) 24.8 21.7 25.5 25.6 27.5 33.9 36.6 44.3 43.2 40.0
Source: Table 1.2 (Chapter 1). Author’s estimates
The high growth rate of exports has contributed to economic growth. TG (1999a) 
estimated the impact of GDP growth rate on labour force, investment, and export 
growth rates from 1991 to 1998. The results indicate that a one per cent increase in 
exports will lead to 0.04 per cent increase in GDP in the long run. Export and import 
taxes also are major sources for the state budget. During 1991-92, the share of 
export/import taxes in total state revenue was about 10 per cent; it increased to nearly 25 
per cent in 1995-96, but fell to 21 per cent in 1997-98 (TG 1999a: 31).
Exports
Exports achieved a high growth rate (25 per cent pa average) during the period 1990-98.
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During that period, the structure of exports changed considerably. The share of food in 
total exports decreased gradually from nearly 40 per cent in 1990 to 27 per cent in 1998 
(even though rice exports increased strongly from 1.6 million tons in 1990 to more than 
3.0 million tons in 1998). The share of agricultural non-foods fell sharply from around 
20 per cent in 1990-91 to 8 per cent and 5 per cent during 1995-96, and it was around 2 
per cent in 1997-98. This was similar to the behaviour of the share of fuels to total 
exports; it was around 30 per cent during 1990-91 then declined to less than 20 per cent 
in 1997-98. In contrast, the share of manufactures in total exports has grown 
substantially from less than 20 per cent in 1990-91; it was 36-48 per cent in the 1992-96 
period, and 54-55 per cent during 1997-98 (Appendix 6.3). This export structure reflects 
that Vietnam export goods have mainly included primary commodities, which are less 
value added and depend more on agriculture and natural resources. The exports of 
manufacturing goods have increased substaintly, but the share is much less than other
• STfast-growing developing countries.
Export destinations in the period 1990-98 have changed dramatically. Exports to the 
non-convertible area stopped from 1992 and after that foreign trade to central planned 
economies was cleared by hard foreign currencies (US$), but export shares to these 
countries were small, around 1-2 per cent (see Appendix 6.4). The largest market of 
Vietnam is the EU. It is a growing market and its share of total exports increased from 
around 10 per cent during 1991-93 to more than 30 per cent in 1998. The second largest 
market is Japan. Its export share has fallen but was still around 20 per cent in 1998. The 
third largest market is ASEAN. Its share is around 20 per cent. After that China and 
NAFTA also are big markets for Vietnam’s exports. The Middle East and Africa were
5j Shares of manufacturing goods in total exports of China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand 
in 1996 were 85.4 per cent, 60.6 per cent, 80.5 per cent, 83.3 per cent and 81.5 per cent respectively (TG 
1999a: 32).
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very small markets for Vietnam until 1998. Garments and textiles are mainly exported 
to the EU, seafood usually goes to industrial countries, and crude oil is exported to 
Japan and Singapore.
Imports
Vietnam’s imports grew rapidly in the period before 1997. Average import growth rates 
were from around 39 per cent to 49 per cent pa in the period 1993-96. The strong import 
growth is as a result of demand for development of the economy and the “open-door" 
policy. However, import growth slowed down in 1997-98, due to the financial crisis in 
the region and the import restriction policies of the governments to reduce the trade 
deficit and improve the BOPs.
Vietnam imports mainly manufactured goods to meet the demand for industrialisation 
and modernisation. The share of manufactures in total imports has been around 77 per 
cent to 86 per cent during that period (Appendix 6.3). Machinery and transport 
equipment have the largest share in total imports (more than 30 per cent). The second 
largest is basic manufactures, with a share of more than 20 per cent. Chemicals have a 
share in the range from 15 per cent to 20 per cent of total imports. Fuels also have been 
important import goods for Vietnam, with a share from around 7 per cent to 10 per cent. 
Vietnam has to import all its petroleum while exporting crude oils, as the oil refinery 
industry is in the first stage of construction. Primary commodities have been imported 
for consumption and production, but their share is relatively small (from 12 per cent to 
20 per cent) (Appendix 6.3). Domestic production can provide a major part of domestic 
consumption. Moreover, government wants to restrict the consumption of luxury goods 
and reduce the current account deficit.
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ASEAN has been the largest import market during this period; its share in total imports 
has been around 30 per cent. After that Mainland China, Japan and South Korea have 
been the second, third and fourth largest import markets, with their shares from 10 per 
cent to 17 per cent. The EU is also a big import partner and has a share of around 10 per 
cent (Appendix 6.4).
6.3- Conclusion
In summary, after comprehensive economic reform in 1989, the managements of Forex 
and foreign trade have been relaxed. The SBV has adopted a managed float exchange 
rate regime and has implemented a flexible and market oriented foreign exchange rate 
policy. This makes exchange rates become more and more market determined. During 
the period 1992-1998, nominal effective exchange rate has been depreciated around 20 
per cent, but the real effective rate has appreciated by around 20-30 per cent. This may 
lead to reduction in the competitiveness of Vietnam’s export goods and discourage 
exports.
After nearly a decade, foreign trade policies have been reformed considerably and 
contributed to a high growth rate of exports and imports, which have positive effects on 
economic development. Entry into foreign trade has been opened widely in all sectors. 
NTBs and trade taxes have been reduced generally (except for import regulation in 
1997-98 due to the financial crisis in the region). External relations have been 
developed. Vietnam joined ASEAN and APEC, and signed a bilateral trade agreement 
with the United States in the July 2000, that creates favourable conditions for foreign 
trade.
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However, the level of protection in the form of quantitative restrictions and tariffs is still 
high. There are some problems in entering APEC and the WTO. Other reforms such as 
financial sector reform, SOE reform, and reform of the import-substitution strategy, 
need to be coordinated better to support foreign trade. These must be considered in the 
models in the next section that analyses the impacts of prices and exchange rates on 
trade flows.
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Chapter 7
THE EFFECTS OF PRICES AND EXCHANGE RATES ON 
TRADE FLOWS IN VIETNAM
7.1. Introduction
Based on the theoretical issues, which concern the effects of exchange rates and prices 
on trade flows, Error Correction Models (ECMs) in Chapter 5 and the reforms of 
exchange rate and foreign trade policies, which were examined in Chapter 6, this 
chapter uses the ECMs to analyse the effects of exchange rates and prices on trade flows 
in both the short and long runs in Vietnam during the period 1992-1998. The Marshall- 
Lerner conditions for Vietnam are also calculated through regressions of long run export 
and import models.
As mentioned in Chapter 6, some studies on exchange rate issues in Vietnam were most 
likely based on institutional and policy changes, and used very simple econometric 
models,54 and particularly the effects of exchange rates and prices on trade flows were 
not mentioned until recently. Therefore, this chapter may provide another approach to 
do research on exchange rates in Vietnam, and the results from this study may be used 
to evaluate the appropriateness of exchange rate policy, and also provide evidence for 
policy makers to choose appropriate policies such as import tariffs cum export 
subsidies, or devaluation to improve exports and trade balance in the next period.
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The chapter is organised as follows: Section 1 specifies long run and short run ECMs 
for exports and imports, and describes the data sources. Section 2 contains empirical 
results and interpretations. Section 3 includes the conclusion and policy implications.
7.2. Model specifications and data description
The ECM that was introduced in Chapter 5 is used in this section to specify models for 
export and import demands in both short and long runs. Data are also described below.
7.2.1-Export demand models
Long run export demand models
Changes in world demand for a country’s exports should depend on changes in world 
income, relative export prices and exchange rates. It can be specified in log-linear form 
for Vietnam as below^5:
LnXd, =a + bLn YW, + cLn
P vN X
y P wxt
\
+ dLnE, + v,
Jt
(7.1)
where:
Ln is the log linear term
X  is index of volume of Vietnam’s exports to its trading partners 
YW is weighted average of real GDP of Vietnam’s trading partners.
54see Le and Tran (1995).
55 The equation (7.1) is taken from the Bahmani-Oskooee (1986) paper. It was also used in Houthaker and 
Magee (1969), and Khan (1974), but as they used data from prior to the floating rate system, the exchange 
rate variable (E) was excluded from their equations. The export equation adopted for this analysis is 
mainly the ‘demand’ equation such as (7.1), since in the micro level (commodity level), Vietnam has 
particular commodities such as rice and coffee (Vietnam has been ranked in the top 3 of rice and coffee 
exporting countries in the world during the period 1992-99, see Vo (2001) and Nguyen (1999)), it reflects 
some market power for Vietnamese exports. However, in the garment exports, Vietnam has supply 
constraints to provide high quality garments for export. In the macro level (aggregate level), Vietnam still 
is a small exporting country in the world, the proportion of Vietnam’s export value to the world export 
value is from 0.07 per cent to 0.20 per cent during the period 1992-99 (see Appendix: 8.10). Therefore, 
Vietnam is a price taker; supply of Vietnam’s export goods only^ffects the quantity of few export goods, 
but not^df the price. So our specification based mainly on the demand equation is reasonable, and the 
supply side may not be important in this context (for the case of Vietnam).
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PVNx is Vietnam’s export price index.
Avxt is the world’s export price index of primary commodities and non-ferrous base 
metals.
E is the nominal import-weighted effective exchange rate. It is defined as the number of 
units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency. (Three exchange rates which 
were calculated in Chapter 6 are used in this study: first, VCBE- the rates from 
Vietcombank, which is the largest state-owned commercial bank. It dominates foreign 
exchange transactions in the banking system. Second, HNE- the rates from the parallel 
markets in Hanoi. Third, HCME- the rates from the parallel market in HoChiMinh 
City), v is an error term.
b is the income elasticity. We expect that b > 0, since an increase in world income 
should increase demand for exports and vice versa, c is the price elasticity. It is expected 
to be negative (c < 0), because lower prices should lead to an increase in export 
demand, d is the exchange rate elasticity. An increase in exchange rates indicates a 
depreciation. We expect d to be positive (d > 0), which implies a depreciation of 
domestic currency promotes exports.
The relative export price index, P vnx /Avxt, is used instead of using the ratio export 
price index to the weighted average of the export price index of trading partners (which 
was used in the Bahmani-Oskooee 1986 models), for two reasons:
First, the export structures of Vietnam and its 13 trading partners are different. The 
majority of export goods from Vietnam are primary commodities. Appendix 6.3 
(Chapter 6) shows that the share of primary commodities in total exports was 85 per 
cent in 1990 and 55 per cent-52 per cent in the period 1992-96. The share fell to around
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45-46 per cent in 1997-98. Manufactures exports from Vietnam are mainly garments 
and textiles, which are based on labour intensive industries. In contrast, the export 
structures of Vietnam’s 13 major trading partners (used in these models) are dominated 
by manufactured goods (see Appendix 7.11). Therefore, the use of the export price 
index from Vietnam’s trading partners in the denominator of the relative export price 
index is not appropriate, as it may affect the homogeneity of the relative export price. 
Using P wxt instead of the export prices of trading partners may avoid the non­
homogeneity problem.
Second, because the integration of world trade is so comprehensive, the world’s export 
price index is a key indicator for exporters to take into account in international trade 
rather than single prices of goods or export prices in specific countries.
Adding seasonal factors (fourth quarter: S4) into equation (7.1) to account for increase 
in the demand on the occasions of Christmas and New Year in importing countries, we 
have:
LnXd,
_ f PVNX ̂a + bLnYW , + cLn\
\  iWXT J t
+ d LnE, + S4 + v, (7.2)
In the foreign trade section (Chapter 6), NTBs (non-tariff barriers) and taxes on exports 
in Vietnam were analysed. Quotas on exports were considered as targets (they were not 
fixed). Sometimes, exports did not reach these targets or they may even have exceeded 
the targets. Taxes on exports were only from 1 to 5 cents per dollar of exports during the 
period 1993-1999. Therefore, NTBs and taxes on exports in that period were not a big 
barrier to exports. So, we can ignore them in estimating export demand models in both 
the short and long run.
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After the regression of equation (7.2) and the stationarity of residual is tested to confirm 
the long relationship between variables, the analysis can then proceed to ECM for 
export demand in the short run according to Engle-Granger (1987), (see Chapter 5).
Error Correction Models for export demand
The ECM for export demand can be specified as
h\ hi hi f  PvfJYi ^
DLnXl^Vo + YVuDLnxt, + I 1Y 2 i D
i=l /=o i=o PwXCi
+
s t - i (7.3)
+Z  Vi.DLnEt-i + p v l_l + T]
i=0
where
DLn is the first difference operator of the log linear variable.
v,.j is the error correction term (from the regression results on equation 7.2)
rjt is the disturbance term
We expect — 1 < p <0 to ensure the long run equilibrium is achieved (see Chapter 5).
7.2.2- Import demand models
Long run import demand models
Aggregate import demand for a country is hypothesed to be a function of domestic real 
income, the ratio of import prices to domestic prices (assuming a degree of 
substitutability between imports and domestic goods), the real import penetration ratio, 
and exchange rates56. The long run import demand model for Vietnam is expressed in 
the log linear form as follows:
LnMJt = a + ß  LnIND, +yLn
PvNM
Pd
+ 8 LnRIPR, + A-LnEi + s, (7.4)
Where
56 Bahmani-Oskooee (1986) used equation (7.4) in his study, except for the real import penetration ratio.
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M is the index of the volume of Vietnam’s imports from its trading partners.
IND is real domestic industrial output, used as a proxy for real income (IND usually has 
been around 30 per cent of GDP; quarterly data on Vietnam’s GDP are not available).
Pvnm is Vietnam’s import price index 
P d is the domestic price index (CPI)
RIPR is the real import-penetration rate
E is the nominal import weighted effective exchange rate (similar to export demand 
models, three kinds of exchange rates are included: VCBE, EINE and HCME)
8 is an error term.
Adding a seasonal factor (fourth quarter: S4) into equation (7.4) to account for 
increasing demand for imports on the occasions of the New Year, Lunar new year 
festival, and the end of the financial year, we have the long run import models as shown 
below:
LnMl  = a  + ß  LnlND, +yLn
( PvNM ^
Pd
+ 8 LnRIPR, + &LnE, + S4 + Si (7.5)
7/
ß is the income elasticity (industrial production elasticity), which is expected to be 
positive, since an increase in industrial production should lead to an increase in import 
demand. However, the sign of ß could be negative because of import substitution of the 
industries; imported goods may be substituted by the domestic products made by import 
-substitution industries, y is the price elasticity. The sign of y is expected to be negative, 
which means lower relative import prices will lead to an increase in the demand for 
imports. The coefficient on the real import penetration rate£ is expected to be positive,
because a rise in real import penetration indicates a relaxation in import restrictions 
promotes imports. The elasticity of the exchange rate variable X is expected to be
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negative, since the effective exchange rates used in these models are defined as the 
number of units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency. An increase in the 
exchange rate denotes a depreciation of the domestic currency, making imported goods 
more expensive compared to domestic goods. Therefore, the depreciation should reduce 
import demand.
It is necessary to discuss import penetration ratio further which are defined as the ratio 
of total imports to total domestic consumption (imports/(gross domestic production + 
imports - exports)). Generally, an increase in the import penetration ratio may result 
from the worsening competitiveness of domestic suppliers, or from relaxation or 
removal of restrictions on imports. Import penetration can be considered as a reasonable 
proxy for the level of protection (particularly non-tariff protection) in these models for 
the case of Vietnam where the level of protection has been high and may have affected 
imports. As mentioned in the previous part, NTBs and tariffs have gradually been 
reduced from the beginning of the 1990s to 1996, although they were increased from 
1997 to avoid harmful effects from the financial crisis in the region and improve the 
trade balance and the BOP. The share of import goods which were subject to 
quantitative restrictions under 1999 regulations (using the 1996-import structure) was 
24 per cent, and the nominal average tariff was in the range from 12.3 per cent to 13.6 
per cent. So the change in the average tariff was just 1.3 per cent in the period 1995 to 
1998. As this tariff change is small in the short term, we can ignore it in the import 
models (see Edwards 1989) and we concentrate only on the NTBs that can be proxied 
by the import penetration ratio.
The import penetration ratio calculated in nominal terms is usually subject to distortion
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due to inflation increases and changes in the real exchange rate. Therefore, use of the 
real import penetration ratio may avoid this problem (the change in the real term reflects 
the change in the volume of domestic consumption accounted for by imports, not just 
changes in the price of imports. The pattern of behaviour of the real import penetration 
ratio in Vietnam from 1992 to 1998 reflects the theory above (see Appendix 7.10). From 
1992 to 1996, the rise in the import penetration ratio has coincided with the relaxation 
on import restrictions, and it slowed down since 1997 when import restrictions increase 
slightly. This is evidence to support the use of the import penetration ratio in the import 
demand models.
After estimating the long run import equations (7.5), the stationarity of the residuals can 
be tested by using the DF and ADF tests (similar to export models). If the residuals are 
stationary, 1(0), it can be concluded that the variables in the long run import models are 
cointegrated of order 1, and the Error Correction Models for import demand in the short 
run can be specified.
Error Correction Models for import demand
The ECM for import demand is specified as follows:
PVNMiN 
P D i
, m\ j ml m3 (
DLnM^ = (f*o+Y,<f>\iDLnM + YJ(j)2iDLnINDt-i+ Y,(j>T,flLn
i=l i —0 /—0 f
m4 m 5
+ Z ^4 iDLnRIPRt~i+ Z <f>5iDLnEt-i + <Tet-\ + Mt 
1=0 1=0
J t - i (7.6)
where
DLn is the first difference operator.
et_i is the error correction term (from regression results on equation 7.5), and o is the 
speed of adjustment.
/it is the disturbance term.
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7.2.3- Data description
All data used in the estimation of these models are quarterly, concerning the period from 
1992Q4 to 1998Q4 for Vietnam and its 13 major trading partners (Australia, Canada, 
France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Singapore, South Korea, Sweden, Taiwan, 
Thailand, United Kingdom, and United States). Not only are these countries major 
trading partners of Vietnam, but also they have sufficient data for the analysis.
The data were collected from the following sources:
a) Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade (1990-2000), OECD publication. Various issues
b) Direction of Trade Statistics quarterly (DOTS). Various issues
c) International Financial Statistics (Monthly). Various issues
d) International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1990-1999.
e) Monthly Bulletin of Statistics of the Republic of China, 1992-1999
f) Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1992-1999
g) Major Statistics of Korean Economy, 1992-1999.
h) DX database, Faculty of Economics and Commerce-ANU
i) The State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) Annual Reports, 1995-1998 and General 
Statistical Office of Vietnam (GSO) authorities.
j) Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis, Statistical 
Division, United Nations.
All data are expressed in index form, 1992Q4 =100. Most variables were introduced in 
both short and long run ECMs for exports and imports, There are some details for data 
description:
• Y = real GDP index. Quarterly data are available all countries except Thailand. In
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the case of Thailand, we lack GDP quarterly data from 1992-1995. Using annual 
data of real GDP and volume of imports from 1990-1998, we estimate the equation: 
Yt = a +bMt +ut, then using available quarterly data of M to obtain estimated 
quarterly data (Y) of Y. After that Yj is adjusted: Yi+ Y2+ Y3+ Y4 = Y (which is 
actual annual real GDP) (see Chow and Lin, 1976, Bahmani-Oskooee, 1986).
.  YWi = coijYJ j = 1...13, ytOij=l
p
Where coij is the export share of Vietnam’s export in the market of partner j
• Ptx = Pvnx/Pwxt is the relative export price index of Vietnam (related to the world 
export price index of primary commodities and non-ferrous metals).
• Pwxc is the world export price index of preliminary commodities. They include 
export price indexes of food, agricultural non-food, and fuels (coal, crude oil and 
natural gas); these indexes affect export price indexes of Vietnam, since most export 
goods from Vietnam are food, agricultural non-food and fuels. These indexes are 
weighted according to VN export shares of food, agricultural non-food and fuels 
from the stars system (APSEM-ANU).
• Px = Pvnx/Pwxc is the relative weighted export price index of Vietnam (including 
export price indexes of food, agricultural non-food, and fuels)
• Pm = Pvnm/P d is the relative import price index of Vietnam
• RIPR = Vietnam’s real import-penetration ratio (RIPR = imports/(gross industrial 
production + imports - exports)). Gross Industrial Production at 1992 price in VND. 
Import and Export values in US$ are converted into VND according to the 
VND/US$ exchange rate of Vietcombank in December 1992.
• S4 = seasonal factor = (0,0,0,1).
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7.3. Empirical results and interpretations
7.3.1-Unit root tests
Before conducting the ECM analysis, testing the order of integration of variables is 
necessary to confirm that all variables in the system have the same order. In the DF 
and ADF tests, lag lengths of tested variables are considered, depending on the number 
of observations, type of data (monthly, quarterly). The quarterly data contain 25 
observations only, and so four lags are appropriate for DF and ADF tests.
The unit root test results in Table 7.1 show that all variables for both export and import 
models in logarithm form of levels do not pass DF tests (their statistics are 
insignificant). There are three variables which have significant statistics in the ADF 
tests at the 10 per cent level (LnVCBE and LnHCME are significant at lag 3, LnHNE is 
significant at lag 2 and 3). LnM is significant at the 5 per cent level in lag 1 (Table 7.1).
There is not sufficient evidence to say that these four variables are stationary, but these
i3e.cC
tests suggest that they are stationary in lag form, which passes ADF tests. If they are 
stationary, they may still be used in these models (Dagenais and Muet 1992).
DF test results for first difference logarithm linear forms of all variables are significant, 
but ADF tests are significant for only four variables. Therefore, according to the DF test 
results, we can conclude that all variables in logarithm linear form have the same order 
1(1), and their first differences are 1(0).
57 This is conventional, but the combination of variables which have different orders such as (2) and (1) or 
(1) and (0) may be accepted (see Dagenais and Muet, 1992).
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T a b le  7.1 : U n it  R o o t T e s t  R e su lts
S a m p l e  p e r i o d  f r o m  1 9 9 4 Q 1  t o  1 9 9 8 Q 4
D F  r e g r e s s i o n  i n c l u d e  an  i n t e r c e p t  b u t  n o t  a  t r e n d
LnX LnYW LnPX LnPTX LnVCBE LnHNE
DF -1.89 -0.63 0.26 -0.17 -2.01 -2.17
ADF(l) -2.14 -0.70 0.10 -0.42 -1.98 -2.06
ADF(2) -1.76 -0.87 0.13 -0.55 -2.45 -2.67*
ADF(3) -2.22 -1.48 0.70 -0.59 -2.74* -2.68*
ADF(4) -1.76 -1.03 0.76 -0.44 -1.98 -1.99
LnHCME LnM LnIND LnPM LnRIPR
DF -2.02 -1.92 -0.58 -0.15 -1.65
ADF(l) -1.98 -3.31** -0.17 -0.33 -1.60
ADF(2) -2.46 -2.20 -0.08 -0.62 -1.66
ADF(3) -2.81* -1.95 -0.77 -0.60 -1.42
ADF(4) -2.00 -1.71 -0.63 -0.85 -1.65
S a m p l e  p e r i o d  f r o m  1 9 9 4 Q 2  to  1 9 9 8 Q 4  
D F  r e g r e s s i o n  i n c l u d e  a n  i n t e r c e p t  b u t  n o t  a  t r e n d
DLnX DLnYW DLnPX DLnPTX DLnVCBE DLnHNE
DF -8.71** -5.68** -3.70** -3.75** -4.33** -4.75**
ADF(l) -2.55 -4.22** -2.17 -2.64* -1.75 -1.33
ADF(2) -2.49 -4.37** -2.58 -2.26 -1.39 -1.33
ADF(3) -1.83 -0.82 -2.23 -2.04 -2.35 -2.60
ADF(4) -1.24 -0.80 -2.20 -2.45 -1.81 -1.71
DLnHCME DLnM DLnIND DLnPM D LnRIPR
DF -4.36** -6.61** -10.47** -2.70* -4.10**
ADF(l) -1.75 -1.79 -5.48** -1.46 -3.13**
ADF(2) -1.39 -1.15 -6.79** -1.51 -1.39
ADF(3) -2.45 -0.48 -4.38** -1.76 -0.73
ADF(4) -1.82 -0.52 -2.86* -1.75 -1.06
Note: ** is s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  5 p e r  c e n t  l e v e l  ( g i v e n  b y  D F  r e g r e s s i o n s ) ,  * is s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  10 p e r  c e n t  l ev e l  
( c r i t i c a l  v a l u e s  a r e  - 2 . 6 2  f o r  D F  t e s t  w i t h  c o n s t a n t  b u t  n o  t i m e  t r e n d  f o r  2 5  o b s e r v a t i o n s ,  f r o m  E n d e r s
( 1 9 9 5 :  4 1 9 ) ) .
7.3.2- Export demand model results
The results of long-run export demand equation regressions for the three models using 
the three different import-weighted effective exchange rates (VCBE, HNE and HCME) 
are reported in Table 7.2. In all three models, foreign income elasticities have positive
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signs and they are highly significant (at the 1 per cent level). Their magnitudes are very 
large, ceteri paribus, a one per cent increase in world income will lead to an increase of 
around 6.5 per cent of exports. It means world income has a huge effect on export 
demand.
Price elasticities in all models have expected signs (negative), but their magnitudes are 
small (approximately from 0.31 to 0.33) and statistically significant at the 10 per cent 
level for the case of the Hanoi parallel market effective exchange rate (Model 2) and 11 
per cent for the cases of Vietcombank (Model 1) and HoChiMinh City parallel market 
exchange rate (Model 3). This indicates that a fall in relative export prices has a small 
effect in terms of increasing the export volume and this also reflects the fact that the 
competitiveness of Vietnam’s export goods is low.
Elasticities of exchange rates in export demand models have positive signs and they are 
highly significant at the 1 per cent level. The exchange rates are expressed as the price 
of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency, so an increase in exchange rates 
denotes depreciation of the domestic currency. This result suggests that devaluation 
could have stimulated exports in the period. A one per cent depreciation of exchange 
rates will lead to around 0.95 per cent increase in exports for Model 1 and 3, and 1.10 
per cent for model 2. This difference may result from larger fluctuations of exchange 
rates in the Hanoi parallel market than in HCM City and Vietcombank.
These models have high R squared and R bar squared (from 0.96 to 0.97); this reflects 
the fitness of the models. Three models passed all F tests and diagnostic tests. 
Therefore, we can reject the hypothesis that all coefficients of these variables are equal
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to zero. There is no evidence of serial correlation, function forms are correct, and there
are no problems with respect to normality and heteroscedasticity.
T a b le  7.2: L on g-ru n  export dem and  eq u ation  regression  resu lts
(  P vN x \
L n X t  = a  + b L n Y W ,  + c L n + d  L n E t  + 54 + 1/,
\  PwXT J/
24 observations used for estimation from 1993Q1 to 1998Q4
Variables Coefficients
M odel 1 M od el 2 M od el 3
(V C B E ) (H N E ) (H C M E )
a -12 .258*** -12 .444*** -12 .327***
( - 1 6 . 0 3 ) ( - 1 5 . 9 7 ) ( - 1 5 . 9 1 )
L n Y W t 6 .489*** 6.449*** 6.509***
( 1 9 . 2 6 ) ( 1 9 . 4 4 ) ( 1 9 . 3 8 )
L n  ( P v n x / P w x t )  t -0 .3 0 7 a -0 .331* -0 .3 0 6 a
( - 1 .6 8 ) ( - 1 . 8 5 ) ( - 1 . 6 9 )
L n E t 0.944*** 1.103*** 0 .959***
( 3 .4 6 ) ( 3 .6 1 ) ( 3 . 4 9 )
S 4 -0 .052*** -0 .055*** -0 .052***
( - 3 .4 8 ) ( - 3 . 7 2 ) ( - 3 . 5 0 )
R2 0.97 0.97 0.97
R : 0.96 0.96 0.96
F(4, 19) 139.37 [.000] 144.33 [.000] 140.21 [.000]
Serial correlation x2(4): 4.708 [.319] 6.355 [.174] 4.635 [.327]
Function form x2(l): 0.840 [.359] 1.135 [.287] 0.996 [.318]
Normality x2(2): 2.300 [.317] 2.166 [.339] 2.162 [.339]
Heteroscedasticity x2( 0 : 0.801 [.371] 1.042 [.307] 0.674 [.412]
N o t e :  ***, ** a n d  * a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  1% , 5 %  a n d  1 0 %  le v e l ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .
a  is s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  1 1 %  lev e l .  T h e  v a lu e s  in b r a c k e t s  a r e  T - r a t i o s  a n d  s q u a r e d  b r a c k e t s  a r e  p r o b a b i l i t i e s .
The results have some similarities to the results from the Bahmani-Oskooee (1986) 
models. Real income elasticities were positive and significant in most of the cases. Price 
elasticities in export models for South Korea, Israel, and Greece were less than unity 
and they had the expected signs. Elasticities of exchange rates for Vietnamese exports
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are similar to the cases of Greece, India and Israel.
Table 7.3: Test for cointegration of variables in the long-run export demand
equations - DF test for residual Vt
Dvt = aivt.i + xt
( H0: ai= 0, residual is nonstationary)
23 observations used for estimation from 1993Q2 to 1998Q4
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(VCBE) (HNE) (HCME)
a i -1.247*** -1.210*** -1.237***
( - 5 .6 7 ) ( - 5 .4 5 ) ( - 5 .5 7 )
R2 0.59 0.57 0.58
Serial correlation x2(4): 5.851 [.211] 7.495 [.112] 5.778 [.216]
Function form x 20 ) : 0.065 [.798] 0.170 [.680] 0.124 [.725]
Normality x2( 2 ): 1.362 [.506] 1.605 [.448] 1.404 [.496]
Heterosccdasticity x2( 0 : 1.269 [.260] 1.759 [.185] 1.352 [.245]
Note: *** is significant at 1 per cent level
The values in brackets are T-ratios and squared brackets are probabilities.
DF tests for non-stationarity of the residuals of long run export demand equations (with 
no and with constant terms) and ADF tests of residuals of models with constant terms 
indicate that residuals of long-run export demand equations are stationary (Table 7.3 
and Appendix 7.1). Thus we can conclude that all variables in the long-run export 
demand equations are cointegrated at order 1 or that they have a long-run relationship. 
The cointegration test results above allow us to estimate ECM models for export 
demand in the short-run according to Engle-Granger (1987).
Table 7.4 reported the results of ECMs for export demand. The results in Model 1 and 3 
are similar, and the magnitudes of coefficients in Model 2 are slightly higher than in 
Models 1 and 3. This may result from active movements of exchange rates in Hanoi’s 
parallel market. However, the overall results in the three models are the same.
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T ab le  7.4: E rror C orrection  M odel for  exp ort dem and
D L n X l  =  +  y nD L n x U  + i v ' 2iDLnYW ,-i +  y/^DLn^ P V N X 0 3 
PWXTOJ,
V w D L n E
21 observa tions used  for es tim atio n  from  1993Q 4 to 1998Q 4
V ariab les C oeffic ien ts
M odel 1 M od el 2 M odel 3
(V C B E ) (H N E ) (H C M E )
V o 0.021 0 .015 0.020
D L n X 1,.,
( 1 . 1 0 ) ( 0 . 8 5 ) ( 1 .1 0 )
-0 .134 -0 .175 -0 .129
( - 0 .5 8 ) ( - 0 . 7 7 ) ' ( - 0 .5 6 )
D L n Y W ( -2.041 -1 .518 -2 .058
( - 0 .7 7 ) ( - 0 . 6 1 ) ( - 0 .7 7 )
D L n Y W t.] 1.553 1.819 1.602
( 1 .0 6 ) ( 1 . 2 8 ) ( 1 . 1 0 )
D L n  YW t.2 -1 .080 -0 .509 -1 .107
( - 0 .5 6 ) ( - 0 . 2 4 ) ( - 0 .5 7 )
D L nY W t.s 2.946** 3 .386** 2.976**
( 2 . 3 0 ) ( 2 . 5 9 ) ( 2 .3 2 )
D L n  ( P v n x / P w x t )  t -0 .581* -0 .614* -0.580*
( - 1 .8 2 ) ( - 1 . 8 1 ) ( - 1 .8 2 )
D L n E t 0.131 0.270 0.124
( 0 .3 0 ) ( 0 . 5 8 ) ( 0 . 2 8 )
V t. j  ( E r r o r  c o r r e c t i o n  t e r m ) -0 .859** -0 .839** -0 .851**
( - 2 .9 1 ) ( - 2 . 8 2 ) ( - 2 .9 1 )
R 2 0.83 0.82 0.83
R 2 0.72 0 .70 0.71
F(8, 12) 7 .299 [.001] 6.955 [.002] 7.261 [.000]
Seria l co rre la tio n  x2(4): 5.188 [.269] 5 .666 [.226] 5.044 [.283]
F u n c tio n  form  x2( 0 : 2 .612  [.106] 2 .502  [.114] 2.783 [.095]
N o rm ality  y ? ( 2 ) : 0.659 [.719] 0.698 [.705] 0.678 [.712]
H ete ro sced astic ity  %2(1): 1.225 [.268] 1.154 [.283] 1.205 [.272]
Note: ** a n d  * a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  5 %  a n d  1 0 %  le v e l ,  r e s p e c t iv e l y .
T h e  v a l u e s  in  b r a c k e t s  a r e  T - r a t i o  a n d  s q u a r e d  b r a c k e t s  a r e  p r o b a b i l i t i e s .  T h e  l a g g e d  l e n g t h s  o f  v a r i a b l e s
a r e  s e l e c t e d  b y  u s i n g  t h e  S c h w a r z  B a y e s i a n  C r i t e r i o n  ( S B C ) .
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Coefficients of lagt of first differences of log exports are negative, but insignificant and 
their magnitudes are small (from 0.13 to 0.17). This indicates that exports of the current 
quarter may be influenced slightly by the last quarter.
Coefficients on world income from current time up to lag 2 are not statistically 
significant in all three models. However, they are only significant at lag 3 and have 
positive (expected) signs. Their magnitudes are from 2.95 to 3.39. These income 
elasticities are large but they are still smaller than in the long run and these suggest that 
a one per cent increase in world income in the previous 3rd quarter will lead to an 
increase of around 3 per cent in current export volume (it takes time to change 
technologies, products, etc), and it also indicates that world income is the biggest factor 
in stimulating exports during that time.
Price elasticities in all three models have the expected signs (negative) and are 
significant at the 10 per cent level. A one per cent decrease in relative export prices 
could lead to between 0.58 and 0.61 per cent increase in export demand. The results 
suggest that export demand has been encouraged by lower prices of exports, although 
they are less than unity and their effects on exports occurred only in the current period.
Exchange rate depreciation in the short run also has positive effects on export demand, 
but the coefficients are insignificant. The exchange rate elasticities are very small (from 
0.12 to 0.27), and also smaller than those in the long run. These denote that exchange 
rate depreciations may have small effects in terms of promoting exports.
So, in the short term, exchange rates have smaller effects on exports (or no effects since 
coefficients are insignificant) than relative prices. These results are consistent with the
results of Wilson and Takacs (1979), Bahmani-Oskooee (1986), and Chua and Shama 
(1998). However, our empirical results have given no evidence that exports adjust more 
quickly to changes in exchange rates than in prices.
Coefficients of error correction terms for the “speed of adjustment" are negative and 
they are in the range from -0.86 to -0.84 for the three models. These negative values in 
the interval {-1, 0} of the speed of adjustment ensure the long run equilibrium is 
achieved in all models, and they suggest that from 84 to 86 per cent of any quarter’s 
deviation between the actual export volume and the long run equilibrium, is 
incorporated into the next quarter's growth of export volume.
These models also passed all F tests and diagnostic tests. R squared and R bar squared 
values were from 0.83 to 0.70. Residuals of the ECM for export demand are stationary, 
confirming that these variables in the ECM for export demand are 1(0) and their 
residuals must be 1(0), so the above results are plausible (see Table 7.4 and Appendix 
7.2).
Sensitivity of the study
To test the sensitivity of the export demand models in order to increase the plausibility 
of this study, Pwxt (the world’s export price index of total primary commodities and 
non-ferrous metals) in the previous models is replaced by Pwxc (world’s export price 
index of preliminary commodities). Pwxc includes export price indexes of food, 
agricultural non-food, and fuels. These indexes may affect the export price index of 
Vietnam, since most of its export goods are food, agricultural non-food and fuels 
(foreign trade section in this chapter). These indexes are weighted according to
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Vietnam’s export shares of food, agricultural non-food and fuels from the Stars system- 
ANU. However, only yearly data are available, so we assume the share of above export 
goods in each quarter is the same as their share in the yearly data.
The results in Appendix 7.5 indicate that the long run effects of world income and 
exchange rates on exports are very similar to the previous models. Only the price 
elasticities are slightly larger than in the official models, but less significant (they are 
statistically significant at 13 and 17 per cent levels). These models passed all diagnostic 
tests. Residuals of these regressions are also stationary (Appendix 7.6 and 7.7).
Short run effects of world income are higher, relative prices of exports are lower and not 
significant, and exchange rate effects on exports are like the previous models. So the 
weighted price index of preliminary commodities have weaker effects on trade flows 
than Pwxt (the world’s export price index of total primary commodities and non-ferrous 
metals). The weaker effects of Pwxc may be explained by the lack of quarterly data of 
the export structure. The responses of trade flows to the change in export prices may be 
less well revealed in annual data. The speed of adjustments is in the same range [0.89 
and 0.92] and the coefficients are significant at the 1 per cent level, ensuring that the 
long run equilibrium is achieved. Once again, these ECM passed all F and diagnostic 
tests, and their residuals are stationary. These results support the results in the previous 
models.
7.3.3- Import demand model results
Long run elasticities of industrial output (domestic production) have negative signs and 
they are statistically significant in Model 2 only. The magnitudes of these elasticities are
168
around 0.5 (Table 7.5). The negative signs may result from the import substitution
58strategy . This tells us that an increase in industrial output under existing policies may 
reduce import demand in the long run.
T a b le  7.5: L on g-ru n  im port dem and eq u ation  regression s resu lts
(  PVNM
L n M t  =cc+ BLnIND, + yLn\  „ + SLnRJPR,  + ÄRnEi + S 4  + £,
V  Pd ; t
23 observations used for estimation from 1993Q2 to 1998Q4
Variables Coefficients
M od el 1 M od el 2 M odel 3
(V C B E ) (H N E ) (H C M E )
a 4.778* 4.665* 4.521
(1-73) (1.83) (1.65)
L n IN D , -0 .510 -0 .485* -0 .485
(-1.65) (-1.81) (-1.58)
Ln(PvNM/PD)t -1 .531** -1 .495** -1.473*
(-2.15) (-2.29) (-2.08)
L n R IP R t 0 .925*** 0.918*** 0 .920***
(8.82) (9.22) (8.82)
L n E t -0 .206 -0.203 -0 .156
(-0.42) (-0.42) (-0.33)
S 4 0.028* 0.029* 0.028*
(1.94) (1.96) (1.93)
R2 0.96 0.96 0.96
R 2 0.95 0.95 0.95
F(5, 17) 77.35 [.000] 77.32 [.000] 77.00 [.000]
Serial correlation x2(4): 7.020 [.135] 6.918 [.140] 6.853 [.144]
Function form x2(l): 2.973 [.085] 3.102 [.078] 2.889 [.089]
Normality x2( 2): 0.607 [.738] 0.655 [.721] 0.601 [.740]
Heteroscedasticity x2( 0 : 1.703 [.192] 1.653 [.199] 1.655 [.198]
Note: *** ,** and * are significant at 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent level, respectively.
The values in brackets are T-ratios and squared brackets are probabilities.
58 The signs of import substitution were revealed through two points: First, FD1 has been directed to 
import substitution industries, “a large share of incoming FDI is focused on import substitution... only 
about a quarter of FDI capital in the industrial sector has been intended mainly for exports...and foreign 
investment has been directed to capital intensive import substitution rather than labour intensive export 
production” (Kokko 1997: 15). Second, regulations on foreign trade are in favour of import substitution.
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Long run elasticities of relative import prices have the expected signs (negative) and 
they are statistically significant at the 5-10 per cent level. The results indicate that a 1 
per cent fall in relative import prices will lead to a 1.5 per cent rise of import demand. In 
contrast, exchange rate elasticities in all models are small. Their magnitudes are from 
0.16 to 0.21 and statistically insignificant, but they still have the expected signs 
(negative). The results indicate that exchange rate devaluation may have a small effect 
in reducing import demand or import demand has a small negative response or no 
response to the change in exchange rates.
Table 7.6: Test for cointegration of variables in the long-run import demand
equations - DF test for residual St
D8t = a18t.i +Xt
( H0: ai= 0, residual is nonstationary)
22 observations used for estimation from 1993Q3 to 1998Q4
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(VCBE) (HNE) (HCME)
«/ -0.712*** -0.729*** -0.722***
(-3.30) (-3.36) (-3.34)
R2 0.34 0.35 0.35
Serial correlation x2(4): 6.759 [.149] 7.157 [.128] 6.974 [.137]
Function form x2(l): 0.087 [.768] 0.072 [.788] 0.079 [.778]
Normality x2(2): 0.821 [.663] 0.891 [.640] 0.795 [.672]
Heteroscedasticity x2( 0 : 3.174 [.075] 3.270 [.071] 3.196 [.074]
Nöte: *** and * are significant at 1 per cent and 10 per cent level 
The values in brackets are T-ratios and squared brackets are probabilities.
Elasticities of the real import penetration ratio (RIPR) have the expected signs and are 
highly significant at the 1 per cent level. The results suggest that a 1 per cent increase in 
RIPR will lead to 0.92 per cent increase in import demand. This means that relaxation
Imported consumer goods have been restricted to below 20 per cent of total export revenue. Tariffs and 
NTBs are in favour of capital goods and intermediates (Kokko 1997).
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of import restrictions (mainly NTBs) should have a significant impact in terms of 
liberalising imports.
T ab le  7.7: E rror C orrection  M odel for  im p ort d em and
D L n M l = h  + (/)nDLnMU +</>20D L nIN D t + </>30D Ln
V
PVNM  ] ' .
+Z ^ 4 .LnRIPR, 
r />  ) t i=D -/ +
(f>i0D LnE , + P,
22 observations used for estimation from 1993Q3 to 1998Q4
Variables Coefficients
M od el 1 M od el 2 M od el 3
(V C B E ) (H N E ) (H C M E )
4>o -0 .004 -0 .005 -0 .004
( - 0 .3 6 ) ( - 0 . 4 0 ) ( - 0 .3 8 )
D L n .lf1,., -0 .113 -0 .139 -0 .113
( - 0 .4 9 ) ( - 0 . 5 9 ) ( - 0 .4 9 )
D LnIN D t 0.364 0.529 0.390
( 0 . 7 9 ) ( 1 . 1 3 ) ( 0 . 8 4 )
DLn ( P v n m / P d) , -1 .750* -1 .460* -1 .717*
( - 1 . 9 5 ) ( - 1 . 7 6 ) ( - 1 . 9 1 )
DLnRIPRr 0.781*** 0 .757*** 0.772***
( 4 . 0 5 ) ( 3 . 9 0 ) ( 4 . 0 2 )
D LnRIPRf.i -0 .197 -0 .173 -0 .194
( - 0 . 7 8 ) ( - 0 . 6 5 ) ( - 0 . 7 6 )
D L nE t -0 .559 -0 .390 -0 .516
( - 1 .1 9 ) ( - 0 . 8 3 ) ( - 1 . 1 0 )
£t.l (E rror  c o r r e c t io n  term ) -0 .688** -0 .722** -0 .701**
( - 2 . 3 3 ) ( - 2 . 3 9 ) ( - 2 .3 6 )
R2 0.74 0.73 0.74
R 2 0.61 0.60 0.61
F(7, 14) 5.78 [.003] 5.473 [.003] 5.732 [.003]
Serial correlation x2(4): 6.185 [.186] 8.654 [.070] 6.241 [.182]
Function form x20 ) : 0.017 [.897] 0.003 [.955] 0.012 [.912]
Normality x2(2): 0.087 [.957] 0.070 [.967] 0.077 [.962]
Heteroscedasticity x2( 0 : 0.603 [.437] 0.899 [.343] 0.661 [.416]
N o t e :  *** ,** and * are s ig n i f i c a n t  at 1 per  cen t ,  5 per c e n t  and 10 per  c e n t  l e v e l ,  r e s p e c t iv e ly
T h e  v a l u e s  in b r a c k e ts  are T -r a t io s  and sq u a r ed  b rack ets  are p r o b a b i l i t ie s .
T h e  la g g e d  len g th s  o f  v a r ia b le s  are s e l e c t e d  b y  u s in g  th e  S c h w a r z  B a y e s ia n  C r iter ion  ( S B C ) .
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Fourth quarter dummy variables are significant and have expected signs. This reflects 
the fact that import demand usually increases in the fourth quarter compared to other 
quarters to meet the increasing demand at that time.
R squared and R bar squared values are around 0.96. The F test and all diagnostic tests 
are passed, except the functional forms are slightly statistically significant at the 10 per 
cent level. This suggests that the models may be lacking some variables. Cointegration 
tests (DF and ADF) indicate that the residuals of the long run import demand models are 
stationary (Table 7.6). This means that all variables in long run import demand models 
are cointegrated of order 1. Thus we can proceed to analysis of the ECM for import 
demand in the short run.
Table 7.7 shows that short run import demand in the last quarter has a small negative 
effect (its elasticities are from 0.11 to 0.13) on the current quarter, and this effect could 
be zero since its coefficients are statistically insignificant.
Elasticities of the first difference of industrial output have positive signs but are not 
significant. So, in the short run, import demand may be encouraged due to increase in 
the industrial output, but it is not sustained in the long run.
Similar to the results from the long run models, RIPR still has positive elasticities for 
the current time period (lag one period variable has a negative sign, but it is very small), 
and their magnitudes are from 0.76 to 0.78. This means that relaxation of import 
restrictions could liberalise imports in the short as well as the long run.
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The elasticities of relative import prices are statistically significant at the 10 per cent 
level and they have negative signs. A one per cent decrease in the relative prices could 
stimulate a 1.7 per cent increase of imports. Exchange rate elasticities have the expected 
signs (negative), but they are not significant. Their magnitudes are from around 0.4 to 
0.55 and they are larger than in the long run. These results indicate that devaluation may 
have a small or no effect on imports, while higher relative prices have significant effects 
in reducing imports.
The speed of adjustment in the range from -0.72 to -0.69 denotes that long run 
equilibrium is achieved and that in each quarter 69 per cent to 72 per cent of the 
deviation from the long run equilibrium will be adjusted in the next quarter. All F and 
diagnostic tests are passed. The residuals of ECMs are also stationary (Table 7.8 and 
Appendix 7.4). These provide evidence for the plausibility of the models.
Table 7.8: Test for cointegration of variables in the ECM for import demand
- DF test for residual f,it
Dpt — bj/it-i +
21 observations used for estimation from 1993Q4 to 1998Q4
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(VCBE) (HNE) (HCME)
bi -0.766*** -0.782*** -0.766***
(-3.98) (-4.09) (-3.99)
R2 0.44 0.45 0.44
Serial correlation x2(4): 6.272 [.180] 5.625 [.229] 6.099 [.192]
Function form x20 ) : 0.482 [.487] 0.617 [.432] 0.457 [.499]
Normality x2(2): 0.362 [.834] 0.148 [.929] 0.346 [.841]
Heteroscedasticity x2( 0 : 3.661 [.056] 1.664 [.197] 3.484 [.062]
Note: *** is significant at 1% level.
The values in brackets are T-ratios and squared brackets are probabilities.
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7.4. Conclusion and policy implications
Exchange rates and world income movements have larger effects on exports than do 
prices. This means that devaluation could stimulate exports over the long run. However, 
in the short run, price effects on exports are larger than exchange rate effects. The 
estimated speed of adjustment of around -0.85 also ensures equilibrium is achieved. 
There is no evidence of differences in the time response in exports to price and 
exchange rate movements. The coefficients in Model 2 (using the Hanoi parallel market 
exchange rates) are usually larger than in the other models estimated.
Responses of import demand to change in relative import prices are definitely larger 
than to changes in the exchange rates. In fact, devaluation may have a small or no effect 
on imports. The speed of adjustment coefficients in the ECM for imports are negative 
and indicate that from 0.69 to 0.72 per cent of any quarter deviation between the actual 
imports and the long run equilibrium is incorporated into the next quarter growth of 
imports. The coefficients estimated in Model 1 (using Vietcombank exchange rates) are 
usually larger than in Models 2 and 3 (using parallel exchange rates). Since imports are 
more controlled than exports in terms of foreign currency regulations, imports depend 
more on exchange rates from the Vietcombank which is the biggest state owned 
commercial bank in Vietnam and in charge of providing foreign exchange for foreign 
trade, especially to SOEs. Vietcombank also dominates foreign exchange transactions in 
the banking system.
The results from estimation of the models show that the Marshall-Lerner condition for 
successful use of devaluation to improving exports and trade balance in Vietnam holds
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for the 1990s. Elasticities for long run export demand (ex) are from -0.31 to -0.33, and 
elasticities for long run import demand (sm) are from -1.47 to -1.53. Thus, the sum of 
absolute values of sx and cm are from 1.78 to 1.86, definitely greater than unity.
Therefore, during the 1990s, price effects on imports (both in the short and the long run) 
and exports in the short run are larger than the corresponding exchange rate effects. 
Relaxation of import controls also has significant effects on import growth. This 
indicates that uses of tariffs, quotas and export price policy are more effective than 
devaluation in controlling imports (in both the short and the long run) and encouraging 
exports in the short run. This supports the appropriateness of exchange rate policy by 
the SBV during that period in terms of choosing tariffs, quotas and export price policy 
rather than the devaluation to promoting exports and limiting imports, especially when 
the economy has been in restructuring, banking and financial system are not deep and 
sound in that period. The devaluation may have negative effects and threaten 
macroeconomic stability to the economy.
However, exchange rates have larger effects than prices in the export models in the long 
run and Marshall-Lerner condition holds, suggesting devaluation could be used to 
stimulate exports and improve trade balance. As mentioned in the previous part, 
Vietnam joined ASEAN and AFTA from 1995, the bilateral trade agreement between 
Vietnam and the United States was signed on July 2000, and Vietnam also applied to 
join the WTO in 1995. These agreements require Vietnam to commit to reducing tariffs 
and other import restrictions. So, in the long run, Vietnam cannot retain tariffs and 
import restrictions, which have used previously. An exchange rate policy that can be 
used to encourage exports and control imports will be essential to Vietnam in the future.
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Chapter 8
THE LINKS BETWEEN INFLATION, EXCHANGE RATE, 
AND MONEY SUPPLY IN VIETNAM
8.1. Introduction
The examination of exchange rate movements in Chapter 6 showed that although 
nominal effective exchange rates depreciated by 20 per cent during the period 1992- 
1998, the real ones appreciated by around 20-30 per cent. The results from ECMs in 
Chapter 7 indicated that in the long run, exchange rates have larger effects than export 
prices in stimulating exports and the Marshall-Lerner condition for Vietnam holds. 
Moreover, joining bilateral and multilateral trade agreements requires Vietnam to 
commit to reducing tariffs and other trade restrictions in the near future. Therefore, the 
necessity and sufficient conditions for devaluing VND to promote exports and trade 
balance have been found. However, before the devaluation is implemented, the dynamic 
links between exchange rates and other important macroeconomic variables such as 
inflation, and money supply need to be considered carefully, in order to ensure 
successful devaluation, stimulate exports and the trade balance, and maintain 
macroeconomic stability.
Based on the cointegration technique, vector error correction model (VECMs), vector
autoregression (VAR) models and its conventional techniques such as Granger causality
tests, variance decomposition and impulse response analyses, this chapter examines the
dynamic links between inflation, exchange rates and money supply in both the short and
176
long run. Particularly, this chapter focuses on the questions: is there a long run 
relationship between inflation, exchange rates and money supply in Vietnam during the 
period 1993-1998? Has the money supply growth and exchange rate depreciation led to 
a higher rate of inflation during that time?
The outline of this chapter is as follows: Section 2 reviews theoretical issues and 
previous studies, which concern the links between inflation, exchange rate and money 
supply. Section 3 summarises the VAR model and VECM for three variables. Section 4 
specifies the VECM for Vietnam; Section 5 contains empirical results and 
interpretations; Section 6 includes the conclusion and policy implications.
8.2. Literature review
The links between inflation, exchange rate and money supply are core questions in 
economics and have been analysed by many authors. In this chapter, some prominent 
theories and previous studies that concern this relationship are reviewed.
8.2.1-The link between inflation, exchange rate and money supply
Exchange rate and inflation
The movements of exchange rate can influence domestic prices through their effects on 
aggregate supply and demand. On the supply side, the exchange rate could affect the 
prices of imported goods directly. If the exchange rate is depreciated the prices of 
imported intermediate inputs will be higher, which lead to an increase in the prices of 
domestically produced goods (Edwards 1989). On the demand side, a real depreciation 
of the exchange rate could increase foreign demand for domestic goods and services, 
and domestic producers may increase output prices. With the expansion of domestic
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demand that may bid up wages and input prices, these bring inflation (see Deravi et al. 
1995, Kahn-1987).
The exchange rate could affect inflation, but in turn inflation may affect the exchange 
rate through purchasing power parity (PPF). As mentioned in Chapter 5, the real 
exchange rate determinant through PPP indicates that when domestic price increases, 
that will cause pressure to depreciate the nominal exchange rate (assume foreign price is 
unchanged), in order to restore the equilibrium level for the real exchange rate.
Money supply and inflation
The increase in the money supply increases aggregate demand. That results in an 
increase in both price level and real GDP in the short run, but in the long run, real GDP 
moves towards its original level and the price level continues to rise. The ways in which 
money growth affects inflation and exchange rate in an open economy was shown by 
Deravi et al (1995: 44):
Money growth influences the inflation rate primarily through its effect on 
aggregate demand. Increases in the money stock lower interest rates and 
stimulate interest-sensitive spending, putting upward pressure on domestic 
prices. Alternatively, money may stimulate domestic demand directly through its 
liquidity or expectation effects. Similarly, portfolio effects will work in an open 
economy to alter the relative price of the domestic currency. These exchange 
rates, in turn, may reinforce the links from money to inflation.
On the other hand, inflation also affects money supply. Unanticipated inflation can 
bring an increase in expenditure and reduction in investment and output. It will bring 
pressure to increase money supply to restore the original level of investment and output.
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Money supply and exchange rate
In the monetary theory of BOP, the international monetarists believe that “Money will 
flow into a country where the money supply rises more slowly than national product, 
and out of a country where the money supply grows faster than the national product" 
(Eltis 1981: 2). So, if money supply rises more slowly than national product, resuiting 
in a reduction in inflation rate, and with money inflows, supply of foreign currencies 
will exceed demand; then there will be a tendency to raise domestic currency or 
appreciate the exchange rate. The inverse is true if money supply rises faster than 
national product. Thus a tight monetary policy will lead to a reduction in the inflation 
rate and an appreciated exchange rate.
In a country where government implements monetary policy, when the central bank 
performs open market operations to purchase domestic securities, this will increase 
domestic money supply (see Chapter 2) and reduce the interest rate on the domestic 
currency denominated assets, whose demand falls and then the domestic currency will 
be depreciated. On the other hand, the central bank can achieve domestic currency 
depreciation by selling domestic currency denominated assets and buying foreign 
currency denominated assets in the foreign exchange market.
8.2.2- Previous studies
Some economists using econometric models have also examined the relationship 
between the exchange rate, money supply and inflation. Whitt, Koch, and Rosensweig 
(1986) used time series models to examine this relationship, and they found that the 
exchange rate Granger causes the price level. Sachs (1985) and Kahn (1987) also used 
structural models, and they found that feedback from the price level to exchange rate 
increases the inflationary impact of a dollar depreciation. Deravi et al (1995) used a
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three vector autoregressive model of exchange rates, price level, and money supply 
(M2) to trace the links between these variables. There are only three of the above 
variables used in this model because: “In modelling the monetary approach to exchange 
rates, we purposely have chosen not to expand the system to include short and long­
term interest rates and other monetary or financial variables that might impact the 
behaviour of exchange rates” (Deravi et al. 1995: 43). In this model, Granger causality 
tests, variance decomposition and impulse response were analysed and their results 
showed that exchange rates and price level were monetary phenomena and money 
supply Granger causes both these variables. The variance decomposition results 
suggested that the money supply and exchange rates contributed to 9 per cent and 11 
per cent of the inflation rate variation for order 1, and around 28 per cent - 43 per cent 
and 41 per cent - 49 per cent respectively for order 2 after 48 months. The results in 
impulse response analysis also indicated that a depreciated dollar leads to a higher rate 
of inflation over a two-year period.
There are not many studies which examine the links between inflation, exchange rate 
and money supply in Vietnam. Dodsworth et al (1996b) analysed the stabilisation 
policies in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos since the late 1980s. The VAR models for two 
variables: inflation and exchange rate, and inflation and money supply were carried out 
to answer the question of whether money growth and exchange rate movements lead or 
lag inflation in the short run in these countries. Monthly data from December 1990 to 
December 1995 were used in this model for the consumer price index, domestic 
currency, domestic money (M2), broad money (M3) and the parallel nominal exchange 
rate. All series were expressed in natural logarithms and used the first difference of 
these. Their results for Vietnam showed that:
All four monetary aggregates are significantly related to future inflation rates 1-
6 months ahead. However, inflation does not affect money growth, nor changes
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in the exchange rate in the short run...the higher money growth or exchange rate 
depreciation indeed leads to higher inflation rates in the short run” (Dodsworth 
et al. 1996b: 23).
In this model, however, variance decomposition and impulse response analyses had not 
been examined. Besides that, if effective exchange rates had been used in this model, 
the relationship between, exchange rate, money aggregates and inflation could have 
been explained more clearly.
Ngo (1997) analysed dollarisation in Vietnam from the 1980s to 1995, also confirming 
that fiscal deficits financed mostly by monetary expansion were the most important 
factors of inflation. Vo (1997) used a model of seigniorage, inflation and expectation to 
analyse the successful combating of inflation in Vietnam from the 1980s to 1995. He 
found that money growth rates, the expected depreciation rate and the deposit interest 
rates, were the key determinants of the inflation rate.
8.3- A VAR model and VECM for three variables
The VAR model has been analysed by many econometricians (see Lutkepohl 1993; 
Enders 1995; Pesaran and Pesaran 1997). Based on the above authors’ analyses, in this 
section, we only introduce very briefly the VAR model for three variables with 
conventional VAR analyses such as the Granger-causality test, variance decomposition, 
and impulse response analysis, in order to understand basic questions of this model 
before an analysis is undertaken.
8.3.1-The VAR Model
The VAR model can be expressed in two forms: the structural form and the reduced 
form. They are as follows:
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The structural form
The structural form of the VAR model is a form which expresses the endogenous 
variables as being dependent on the current realisation of other endogenous variables 
and the lags of each of the endogenous variables, exogenous variables, constant and 
disturbance terms (Enders 1995).
y . , = a i o + b i t o + b i2 y 3t + £ a i ^ + £ « 1 2 ^ - 1 + £ a i 3iy 3t - i + ß iw . + £ u
1=1 1=1 1=1
y 2 t“ a 20+ ^2iy i t+ ^22y 3t+ ^ a 21iy it- i+ ^ a 22iy 2 t-i+ ^ a 23i^3t-i+ p2Wt + S 2t ,1=1 i=l i=l (o. I )
y3,= a30+V n + V a +£ a3uyit-i+£  a32iy2.-i+t a33iy3t-i+ß3w<+e3,
The system of equations (8.1) is a structural form of a 3 variable VAR model; y it, y2t. y3t 
depend on the current realisation of other endogenous variables, and the lags of each of 
the endogenous variables, exogenous variable wt, constant Oi0 and disturbance terms £lt 
(i — 1 ...3).
Or in matrix form with a slight modification of (8.1)
BYt= To + f  1 Yt-i + r 2Yt.2 + ...+ r pYt.p + Tw Wt + (8.2)
Where
B  =
1 " b l l  " b 12
_ b 21 * _ b 2 2 ; Y t =
y..
y 2t ^ r o =
a i 0 
a  20 ; r i =
a . . .  a . a .  - .  
i l l  121 131
CL CL CL
21 i 2 2 i  2 3 i
_ b 31  “ b 3 2  1 y3. a  3 0 3 11 3 2 1 3 3 1
IIT
> y . t - i
y 2 t - i
T  =’ 1 w
0
 
0
_
 
(N
°
 
CQ_
.<sT
 0
"k 11
w t
w t
11w « 1.
6 2 ,
y 3 . - i °  0 ß 3 w t 8 3 <
i = 1 ,2_p: number of lags
Yt: vector of jointly endogenous variables at time t 
Yt-ü vector of lagged endogenous variables at time t-i
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Wt: vector of exogenous variables at time t
: vector of white-noise disturbances at time t
EU ,) = 0
f l  t = i
EU, 0 =  1[0 otherwise
Z is a (3x3) symmetric positive definite matrix
B: a (3x3) matrix of coefficients of endogenous variables
To: vector (3x1) of constant terms
r  ji (3x3) matrices of autoregressive coefficients for i = 1, 2...p 
r w: a (3x3) matrix of coefficients of exogenous variables
The reduced form
The reduced form of the VAR model is a form which expresses the value of a variable 
in terms of each of its own lags, lags of other endogenous variables, current and past 
values of exogenous variables, and disturbance terms (Enders 1995).
Multiply both sides of (8.2) by B'1
B'1BYt= B lr 0 +B-'riYl.| + B-'r2Yt.2 +. . .+ B‘lr pYt.p +B-'rwW, + B 1 £f
Yt = Ao + AiYt-i + A2Yt.2 + ...+ ApYt-p + T'Wt + ut (8.3)
Where
Ao = B-‘ro; A, = B-'r, ... Ap = B-'U; V  = B’Vw 
ut = B']en Vector of white-noise disturbances
E(ut) = 0
t = i
otherwise
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(Q is an (3x3) symmetric positive definite matrix, Q = B'1 £ B'1 )
(8.3) is called the reduced form of the VAR (p) model, and we assume that it is stable.
(8.3) can be rewritten as a moving average representation:
co oo
Yt = initial conditions + ^ Clul_l + ^ DiWt_i (8.4)
»=0 (=0
See Lutkepohl (1993), and Pesaran and Pesaran (1997). 
where
Cj = AiQ-i + A2Q.2 + ...+ ApCj.p
For i > 1
Cj = 0 for i < 0;
Co =In; C, = A,
D,= Ci\|/
Granger-causality Test
The idea of the Granger causality test is that the past can cause the future, but the future 
cannot cause the past, and it is also possible that there is no causal relationship between 
them. This means that when the lags of a variable have explanatory power to the current 
value of another variable, we can say that the former variable ‘Granger causes’ the latter 
variable. See the example in the form (8.5) below:
From (8.3) we have a reduced form VAR(p) model:
yi« = v , o + ^ . i i y , t - i + ^ i 2 i y 2 t- i + ^ , 3 i y3,- i+<p,4w . + u ,t 
1=1 1=1 1=1
y 2t =  V20 +  i ^ 2 1 i y i . - i  +  f  ^ 2 i y 2 t- i  +  f  ^23iy 3 . - i  +  <f, 2 4 W t +  U2. <8 '5)
1=1 1=1 1=1
y 3< =  v 30 + t + 3  l i y i . - i  +  + t W s t - i  + <p3 4 w  . +  U3.1 = 1 1 = 1 1 = 1
184
In (8.5), for example, the test is whether lags of variable y3t Granger cause yu and y2t. 
And the hypothesis is that
H0 : <t>i3i = <}>23i = 0 (for all i = l...p)
The test is carried out by Microfit 4.0 and it includes two stages: first, estimating 
equations for yu and y2t, using lagged values of yu, y2t, and y3t and calculating Qu 
which is a variance-covariance matrix of the unrestricted system; second, re-estimating 
the two equations (yu and y2t) excluding the lagged value of y3t and calculating Qr 
which is a variance-covariance matrix of the restricted system; after that calculating the 
likelihood ratio statistic:
(T-c)(Log|Qr| - log|Qu|) (Enders 1995: 316). 
where
T = number of useable observations
c = number of parameters estimated in each equation of the unrestricted system 
Log|Qr| and log|Qu| are natural logarithms of the determinants of Qr and Qu.
This statistic has a ^distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of 
restrictions in the system.
If the Likelihood Ratio statistic is significant, we can reject Ho: <j>i3i = (J)23i = 0 (for all i 
= 1.. .p), and conclude that y3t “Granger causes” yu and y2t.
The Granger Causality test may give misleading results if the variables in the VAR 
model are non stationary (Pesaran and Pesaran 1997: 131).
Forecast error variance decomposition
This calculates the proportion of the uncertainty in a forecast that is attributable to one 
source of shocks.
From (8.4), we have:
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( 8 .6 )Yt = initial conditions + ^ C (5  xs t_i + ^ DIWI_I
/=0 /=0
Then: Var(y,+k) = £ c ,Q C ;  =
i=0 1=0
If Z is diagonal and we define Dj = C j B ’ 1 so
k k k n k
Var(yj^ k) = a „ Y j d l j [ + a n Y j d;n  +■■■ + &„„J^d;jn = (8-7)
/=0 /=0 /=0 r=l /=0
where
Gji is the iith element of Z and djjr is the jrth element of Di
The proportion of Var(yj,t+k) associated with £it is
And the proportion of Var(yj t+k) associated with Sjt is
Z ^
2
i j  1
t ° ~ ± *
2
i .jr
r= 1
Z ^ :
a
" I J ‘
/ = o
2
( 8.8)
(8.9)
This proportion of Var(yJt+k) associated with Sjt is calculated and reported by Micro fit 
4 .0 .
Impulse response analysis
This explores the impact on each of the variables over time from a single shock to the 
system.
Usually, from (8.6)
co co
Yt = initial conditions + ^ C lB~ls l_l + ^ D iWt_i
i=0 /=0
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The first derivative o f yjt until time s with respect to s f, ( ~J,+X ) was calculated andOK
ds
plotted by M icrofit 4.0. (Note: initial conditions and exogenous variables have no 
effects in this derivative).
The VAR model is a very good tool to examine the interactive relationship between 
variables, but there are still some disadvantages that include the difficulty in 
interpreting the results.
8.3.2- The VECM and cointegration
The cointegration techniques suggested by Engel and Granger (1987) allow us to 
identify and estimate the long run relationship between a set o f time series variables 
(The cointegration for single equations and error correction models was examined in 
Chapters 5 and 7). Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990) developed a 
powerful test to detect and estimate the number o f cointegration vectors for a VAR 
system of non-stationary variables.
The Johansen procedure applied for the reduced form o f the VAR model such as (8.3): 
Y t = Ao + AiYt-i + A 2Y t-2 + ...+ ApYt-p + T'Wt + ut
In this case, Y t is assumed as a vector of time series (yu, y2t, y3t ) \  it includes 3 variables 
that are non-stationary, and Wt is assumed as a vector o f a dummy variable, p is 
selected lag length. Other assumptions are the same as in (8.3).
According to Johansen, the VAR system like (8.3) can be rewritten in the form below, 
which is called the vector error correction model (VECM):
AYt -  Ao + K iA Y t_i + K2AYt.2 + ...+Kp.iAYt-p+i + n Y t-p + T'Wt + u( (8.10) 
where:
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- f l- )
n = -('-iA,)
where I is an (3x3) identity matrix; Ay is an (3x3) matrix of parameters and already- 
defined in (8.3).
Model (8.10) is considered as a traditional first difference VAR model, except for the 
term nY t.p. The cointegration test focuses on the matrix n , which contains the long run 
relationships between the Yt variables. The rank of n  is equal to the number of 
independent cointegrating vectors. If rank (IT) = 0, the matrix n  is the null matrix and 
(8.10) is a traditional VAR model in the first difference. If rank (Id) = 3 (full rank), this 
indicates the vector process Yt is stationary in levels. And if rank (IT) = 1, it means there 
is only one cointegrating vector and the term nY t.p is the error correction factor. There 
are also 2 cointegrating vectors (multiple cointegrating vectors) when the rank (IT) = 2 
(see Johansen and Juselius 1990).
As we know the rank of a matrix is equal to the number of its characteristic roots that 
differ from zero. In practice, the estimates of matrix n  and the characteristic roots can 
be obtained. There are two common test statistics used to examine the number of 
characteristic roots that are different from zero. They are as follows:
/ U  = - r l > (  l-A,)
i=r+1
/L„x = -7’ln(1-'U')
where T is the number of useable observations, and A, and Ar+i are the estimated values 
of the characteristic roots (eigenvalues) from the estimated U matrix.
188
The first test statistic is the trace statistic (Atrace), its null hypothesis is that the number of 
cointegration vectors is less than or equal to r against a general alternative. The second 
test statistic is the maximum eigenvalue statistic (Amax), which tests the null hypothesis 
that there are r cointegrating vectors against the alternative of r +1 cointegrating vectors. 
The critical values for the A(race and Amax are also provided in Johansen and Juselius 
(1990).
8.4. The VECMs for the inflation, exchange rate and money supply in 
Vietnam
This section includes model specifications and data description. They are as below:
8.4.1. Model specifications
Long run models
Drawing on Deravi et al (1995), and based on the particular economic conditions and 
data set in Vietnam, the long-term VECMs (they are also VAR models in levels) for 
inflation, exchange rates and money supply are set up. These models are expressed in 
reduced forms where inflation, exchange rates and money supply each depend on their 
own lags, lags of other variables, constant (vj0) and disturbance terms (ujt, i = 1...3). See 
the models below:
p p  p
LnCPI, =  v t0 + £  fa uLnCP+ £  fa2lLnE + £  + a„
/ = ! / = ! / = 1
P P P
LnE, =  v 20 + £  <j>luL n C P + £  </>22,LnE,-, + £  ^23,LnM l ,  + « 2, (81
(=1 /=1 /=1
£  P P
LnM  f = + </>i\iLnCP1t-i + X  </,n lLnE,-l + X  ^33,^ATis-, + m3,
7=1 7 = 1 7 = 1
where
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LnCPI, is the domestic Consumer Price Index in the logarithm form at time t. The CPI is 
used in this model instead of inflation, since a positive percentage rate of change in CPI 
is called inflation, which will be used in the short run of these models.
LnE, are the import-weighted effective exchange rates in the logarithm forms at time t. 
The import-weighted effective exchange rates of Vietcombank (VCBE) and Hanoi 
parallel market (HNE) are used in these models to compare their effects on the CPI and 
money supply and vice versa. The import-weighted effective exchange rates of 
HoChiMinh parallel market (HCME) are not used here because its pattern and effects 
on trade are similar to VCBE (see Chapter 6)
LnM] is the money supply in a logarithm form at time t. Both Ml and M2 are used in 
these models to examine the different responses of other variables on Ml and M2 in the 
interactive relationship among variables. (M3 data are not available).
Vio are constant terms (i = 1 ...3)
u,t are white-noise disturbance terms (i = 1...3)
p is the maximum number of lags.
Before testing cointegration between variables in the models (8.11), DF and ADF tests 
for stationarity of these variables are needed. If these variables are integrated of order 
one, 1(1), we will proceed to the cointegration tests. The Johansen procedure to test the 
cointegration in the multivariate system is used. If the above variables are cointegrated, 
then an error correction term that contains long run relationships among the variables is 
reintroduced back into a short run VECM.
Short run models
The short run VECMs for CPI, exchange rates and money supply are presented as 
follows:
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( 8. 12)
DLnCPI, = <9,o + X 6! \,DLnCPIl_j + Y e\2iDLnEt- + Y  dlvDLnM'h + 0\aECT,-p + C
1=1 1=1 /= 1
DLnE, = 6>,0 +YJ02\iDLnCPI,_i + Y ß^D L nE ^  + ̂ < 923 ,DLnMU + <924 ECT,-n + 4a 
/=1 /= 1  /  =  1
dz,«m ;s’ = <930 + Yj ^\iDLnCPIi-> + Yß™DLnE>-i+ Y PK‘DLnM<-'+ ^4 +
i=l /=l (=1
where
DLnCPI, is the first difference of LnCPI,. It indicates the growth rate of CPI, and a 
positive percentage rate of change in CPI is called inflation.
DLnE, is the first difference of LnE,. E, is defined as the price of domestic currency per 
unit of foreign currency. Therefore, an increase in DLnE, is called the depreciation of 
domestic currency, and an appreciation for the inverse case.
DLnM", is the first difference of LnM,. It denotes the money supply growth rate.
ECT,.p is the error correction term, which is a residual obtained from regressions in 
models (8.11), at the last lag.
Q, is the disturbance term
In Models (8.12), tests for block non-causality, variance decompositions and impulse 
responses are examined as a VAR model, which is introduced in the previous parts.
Other variables such as domestic interest rates or international interest rates are 
excluded from these models since, during that time, domestic interest rates have been 
controlled by the SBV; they have not been moved flexibly and reflected truly demand 
and supply of funds. Moreover, the Dong is not convertible, the capital market in 
Vietnam is not freely mobilised yet. So, the economy is less influenced by international 
interest rates. In addition, other variables do not appear in these models so as not to 
impact the interactive relationship between the CPI, exchange rates and money supply.
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8.4.2- Data description
The data used in these long and short run VAR models are quarterly data series of 
exchange rates, CPI and money supply. Exchange rate data include import-weighted 
effective exchange rates of the Vietcombank (VCBE) and Hanoi Parallel market (HNE). 
These exchange rates are calculated in Chapter 6. CPI data are from the SBV annual 
reports (1995-1999). Money supply data contain Ml and M2, and are collected from the 
SBV authorities. All data are expressed in the indexes from 1992Q4 to 1998Q3, 
1992Q4 =100.
8.5. Empirical results and interpretations 
8.5.1. Long run models and cointegration tests
The DF and ADF test results (see Appendix 8.8) indicate that CPI and both Ml and M2 
are 1(1) and their first differences are stationary, 1(0). Import-weighted effective 
exchange rates of Vietcombank (VCBE) and Hanoi parallel market (HNE) are 1(1) and 
their first differences are also 1(0) (see Table 7.1, Chapter 7).
With all variables in the level integrated in the same order 1, we can proceed to the 
cointegration tests. There are four long run models (see Models 8.11), which are used to 
examine the relationship between CPI, exchange rate and money supply. Model 1 
contains CPI, VCBE and Ml. Model 2 includes CPI, VCBE and M2. Model 3 contains 
CPI, HNE and M l. Model 4 contains CPI, HNE and M2.
Before testing the cointegration of VAR models, the test of lag length is important in 
order to find the optimal lag length of these models. The unrestricted VAR models with 
CPI, exchange rates and money supply variables were estimated at order 3 (since we
have a small number of observations-24, see Table 8.1).
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Among the information criteria, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Schwarz 
Bayesian Criterion (SBC) are chosen in this study to select the lag length of our models, 
but the SBC usually gives a lag length that is shorter than the AIC (Pesaran and Pesaran 
1997). Table 8.1 indicates that Models 2 and 4, have the highest SBC values in order 1; 
Models 1 and 3 have similar highest SBC values in order 1 and 2. Since the number of 
observations of these data is small (24), we do not take the risk of over-parameterisation 
and to be able to compare the results in all four models, therefore, order 1 is chosen for 
all four VAR models.
Table 8.1: Test Statistics for Selecting the Order of the VAR Models
Based on 21 observations from 1993Q3 to 1998Q3. Order of VAR = 3 
List of variables included in the unrestrcited VAR:
LnCPI LnE LnMs & CONST
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Order AIC SBC AIC SBC AIC SBC AIC SBC
3 185.26 169.59 184.98 169.31 184.54 168.87 187.42 171.75
2 186.16 175.19 188.03 177.06 186.79 175.82 188.93 177.96
1 179.37 173.1 187.81 181.55 181.78 175.51 188.75 182.49
0 120.47 118.9 125.85 124.28 121.55 119.98 125.47 123.9
Note: LnE and LnMs contain logarithms of VCBE and HNE, Ml and M2, respectively. 
AIC is Akaike Information Criterion, SBC is Schwarz Bayesian Criterion.
Source: These results are calculated by Microfit 4.0,______________________________
The tests to determine the numbers of cointegration vectors were reported in Table 8.2. 
The trace and max eigenvalue statistics indicate that the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration (r = 0) for all four models are rejected. Both these statistics are significant 
at the 5 per cent level to support the null hypothesis that there is one cointegrating 
vector for all four models. However, the null hypothesis of two cointegrating vectors 
are weakly supported, since trace statistics are insignificant in Model 1 and significant 
at the 10 per cent level for Model 2 and 3 (similar to eigenvalue statistics for Models 2
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and 4). Therefore with the Log-likehood ratio of restrictions, DF and ADF tests are 
necessary to confirm the case of two cointegrating vectors.
Table 8.2: Test for Multiple Cointegrating Vectors
Cointegration with restricted intercepts and no trends in the VAR 
21 observations from 1993Q3 to 1998Q3
HO H1 95% Critical 90% Critical Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Values Values Order =1 Order = 1 Order = 1 Order = 1
1-Trace Statistics
r = 0 r> =1 34.87 31.93 63.46** 63.61** 68.62** 67.09**
—t A n V II ro 20.18 17.88 17.65 18.39* 19.52* 21.67**
r <=2 r = 3 9.16 7.53 2.87 2.32 2.87 2.3
2-Max Eigenvalue Statistics
r = 0 r =1 22.04 19.86 45.81** 45.22** 49.10** 45.41**
r<=1 r = 2 15.87 13.81 14.78* 16.07** 16.65* 19.37**
r <=2 r = 3 9.16 7.53 2.87 2.32 2.88 2.3
Note: ** and * are significant at 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Lists of eigenvalues in descending order in these models are as follows: 
Model 1: 0.887, 0.505, 0.128; Model 2: 0.884, 0.535, 0.105;
Model 3: 0.903, 0.547, 0.128; Model 4: 0.885, 0.602, 0.104.
Source: Author's estimates by using Microfit 4.0.__________________
Table 8.3 reports the normalised cointegrating vectors and their tests of restrictions in 
the above four models. Since our main purposes of this Chapter are to examine the 
effects of exchange rate depreciation and money supply growth on inflation, the 
cointegrating vectors are normalised by LnCPI. In addition, the Log-likelihood ratio 
statistics of testing restrictions of coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 per 
cent level, which suggests that the null hypothesis of coefficients of LnCPI are equal to 
one and coefficients of other variables are equal to zero which is rejected (similar to the 
null hypothesis of coefficients of LnE are equal to one and coefficients of other 
variables equal to zero). These support the hypothesis of two cointegrating vectors.
The stationary tests of residuals from all cointegrating vectors in the four models were
carried out by DF and ADF tests. The results in Appendix 8.1 show that all residuals
passed the DF and ADF tests but a few of them passed marginally (DF and ADF test
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results are significant at the 10 per cent level). Therefore, there are two cointegrating 
vectors for each model, and we select one cointegrating vector for each model based on 
the sign and size of coefficients as suggested by the economic theory and the one that 
has better DF and ADF test results for its residuals in Appendix 8.1. The following are 
selected long run equilibrium relationships for the LnCPI equations:
Model 1: LnCPI = 1,309*LnVCBE + 0.559*LnMl -  1.814
Model 2: LnCPI = 0.893*LnVCBE + 0.407*LnM2 -  0.634 (8.13)
Model 3: LnCPI = 1.642*LnHNE + 0.522*LnMl -  2.405 
Model 4: LnCPI = 1.105*LnHNE + 0.388*LnM2 -  1.017
T a b le  8.3: The  N orm alised  C oin tegrating  Vectors and th e ir LR T es ts  o f R estric tions
C oin tegrating  Vectors LR Tests  o f R estric tions
M odel 1: LnCPI, LnVCBE, LnM1, C O N ST 
(-1 .000, 0 .708, 0.429, -0.251)
(-1 .000, 1.309, 0.559, -1.814)
C H S Q (4 )=23 .66  [.000] 
(A 1 = 0 ; A 2 = 1 ; A 3 = 0 ; A 4 = 0  and 
B1 =1; B 2= 0 ; B 3= 0 ; B 4 = 0 )
M odel 2: LnCPI, LnVCBE, LnM2, C O N ST 
(-1 .000 , 0 .685, 0.363, -0.057) 
(-1 .000, 0.893, 0.407, -0.634)
C H S Q (4 )= 18 .23  [.001]
M odel 3: LnCPI, LnHNE, LnM1, C O N ST 
(-1 .000, 0.954, 0.419, -0.729) 
(-1 .000, 1.642, 0.522, -2.405)
C H S Q (4 )= 2 7 .1 1 [.000]
M odel 4: LnCPI, LnHNE, LnM2, C O N ST 
(-1 .000, 0.894, 0.357, -0.475) 
(-1 .000, 1.105, 0.388, -1.017)
C H S Q (4 )= 2 1 .33 [ 000]
Note: LR is  t h e  lo g -  l ik e l ih o o d  r a t io , C H S Q  is C h i sq u a r e d . V a lu e s  in th e  s q u a r e  b r a c k e t s  a re  
p r o b a b i l it ie s .
All coefficients of exchange rates and money supply in the LnCPI in the long run have 
correct signs (positive). This is appropriate with the macroeconomic theories, when the 
exchange rates depreciated and money supply increased, which will lead to an increase 
in CPI and cause inflation. The elasticities of exchange rates are larger than that of 
money supply in all four equations. Coefficients of both exchange rate and money
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supply in the equations, which have Ml bigger than in the equations, which include M2. 
This may result from Ml that is more active than M2 (M2 includes Ml plus time and 
saving deposits).
In short, the equations in (8.13) indicate that CPIs have been affected by exchange rates 
and money supply in the long run. A 1 per cent increase in the exchange rates can lead 
to 0.89 - 1.64 per cent increase in CPI and 1 per cent increase in the money supply can 
bring an increase of 0.39 - 0.56 per cent in CPI.
In the long run models, cointegrating vectors are selected and their residuals are 
confirmed to be stationary, then we can proceed to the short run models.
8.5.2. Short run models
In the short run, the links between inflation, exchange rate depreciation and money 
supply growth can be studied more clearly through testing Granger-causality, 
corresponding variance decompositions and impulse-response functions.
We have four VECMs in the short run, resulting from the long run models. Each VECM 
contains a constant, the log first difference of all the three variables and the error 
correction terms obtained form the residuals of the selected cointegrating vectors in four 
equations in (8.13). The order 1 for each VECM is applied and error correction terms 
also imposed lag 1 to correspond to the long run models.
The purpose of this section is not to estimate the coefficients of variables in the models, 
but it is necessary to briefly review the results of single equation regression in all
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models to get more information and check the paucity of our short run models before 
examining subsequent sections.
The results of single equation regressions in all four models are reported from Appendix 
8.2 to 8.5. In the inflation rate (DLnCPI) equations in all models, coefficients of 
depreciation rates in the last quarter DlnE(-l) (which indicates DLnVCBE(-l) and 
DLnHNE(-l)) have correct signs (positive), but they are small (from 0.002 to 0.14) and 
not statistically significant. These suggest that depreciation rates have little effect (or no 
effect) to increase inflation in the short run. In contrast, coefficients of money supply
c
growth rates in the lag 1 quarter (DLnM (-l)} are larger than those of DLnE(-l) and 
they are significant in all models. These coefficients all have positive signs, but 
coefficients in the cases of M2 (from 0.40 to 0.47) are bigger than in the cases of Ml 
(from 0.26 to 0.27). The volume of M2 is usually bigger than Ml, so it may have a 
larger effect on inflation rate. These results indicate that growth rates of money supply 
in the last quarter have strong effects to increase inflation in the current quarter. The 
speeds of adjustment (coefficients of error correction terms in the last quarter) are very 
small (from 0.001 to 0.007) and not significant. Their signs are negative in Model 1 and 
are positive in other models^9, but they are acceptable, since all characteristic roots in 
the difference equation system are less than one in absolute values (see Table 8.2). 
Those represented by an error correction imply convergence. Thus, any deviation from 
equilibrium level is incorporated for a relatively long period of time.
59 See Enders (1995: 412). “As in any difference equation system, the speed of adjustment term can be 
positive or negative. The critical factor is whether the characteristic roots of the system are all less than 
unity in absolute value. Notice that these roots are the estimated values of Aj from the matrix of canonical 
correlations. In a sense, the Johansen (1988) procedure is a method to determine whether the 
characteristic roots of the difference equation system represented by an error correction system imply 
convergence”.
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Inflation has positive effects to stimulate depreciation rates, since coefficients of 
inflation rates are positive in depreciation rate equations (DLnE) in the short run in all 
models and significant in Models 1 and 3. Coefficients of inflation rates (DLnCPI) in 
lag 1 quarter are negative and significant in the money supply growth rate equations 
(DLnM ). These reflect the fact that when inflation increases, the SBV has to reduce the 
growth rate of money supply to avoid further inflation and keep stability for the 
economy. This is detailed in the subsequent sections.
R squared from all equations is in the range from 0.22 to 0.47. Most diagnostic tests are 
passed. However, there are slight problems of function forms in Models 2 and 4 that 
may result from the short time series data.
Granger-causality tests
The results of block Granger non-causality tests were reported in Table 8.4. The log- 
likelihood ratio (LR) statistics of money supply growth and exchange rate depreciation 
tests of Granger causality to inflation are significant at the 5 per cent and around 10 per 
cent level for Models 1, 3 and 2, respectively. Thus, we can reject the hypothesis that 
coefficients of lag 1 of money supply growth and depreciation rates in the inflation rate 
equations in Models 1,2 and 3 are equal to zero. This means that growth rates of money 
supply and depreciation rates in the past have explanatory power in the prediction of 
inflation.
Growth rates of money supply Granger cause both inflation and depreciation, but this is 
presented more clearly in the case of Ml than the case of M2. On the other hand, 
inflation and exchange rate depreciation also influence growth rates of money supply in 
the future in all models.
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Table 8.4 also reveals that exchange rate depreciation does not Granger cause inflation 
and growth rates of money supply in all models. In contrast, inflation and growth rates 
of money supply Granger cause modest exchange rate depreciation (LR tests are 
significant at the 10 per cent level in all models). LR tests also reject the hypothesis of 
deletion of constant or error correction terms (ECT) in these models.
T ab le  8.4: L og-L ik e lih o o d  R atio (L R ) T ests o f  B lo ck  G ran ger  N o n -C a u sa lity
M odel 1
(C P I ,
V C B E ,  M l )
M od el 2
(C P I ,
V C B E ,  M 2 )
M od el 3
(C P I ,  H N E ,  
M l )
M od el 4
(C P I ,  H N E ,  
M 2 )
DLnMs & DLnE -> DLnCPI 9 11** 4.01a 8 .2 0 ** 2.87
DLnCPI -> DLnMs & DLnE 11.89*** 5.85* 13 7 9 *** 6.93**
DLnMs DLnCPI & DLnE 10.07*** 4.04a 8.77** 3.38b
DLnCPI & DLnE -> DLnMs 8.44** 4.53* 8.09** 4.67*
DLnE -» DLnCPI & DLnMs 0.008 0.74 0.27 0.46
DLnCPI & DLnMs DLnE 5.46* 4.47* 5.78* 5.15*
LR tests of Deletion of:
CONST 17 ly*** 21.60*** 19.37*** 19.98***
ECTi ( i  = 1  . . . 4 ) 10.67** 7.25* 11.75*** 8.16**
N ö t e :  * * * ,  **  and  * are s ig n i f i c a n t  the  1 per  cent ,  5 per  c en t  and 10 per c e n t  l e v e l ,  r e s p e c t iv e ly ,  
a and b are s ig n i f i c a n t  at the  13 per  c en t  and 18 per c en t  l e v e l ,  r e s p e c t iv e ly .
T h e s e  te s ts  are  carr ied  out  b y  M ic r o f i t  4 .0 .
In sum, the results of causality tests indicate that both exchange rate depreciation and 
money supply growth Granger cause the inflation. The growth rates of money supply 
affect inflation and exchange rate depreciation in the future, while exchange rate 
depreciation does not influence the future money supply growth and inflation. In 
addition, inflation also influences the exchange rate depreciation and then reveals the
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possibility of adjusting money growth rates by the SBV to stabilise the economy. We 
can see the interrelationship between these variables more accurately through forecast 
error variance decomposition in the next section.
Forecast error variance decomposition
Before analysing variance decompositions and impulse responses, it is necessary to 
confirm the combination of variables in the VECM is linear or non-linear, in order to 
choose the orthogonal or general case of variance decompositions as well as impulse 
responses. The covariance matrices of errors from all VECM models in the short run are 
reported in Appendix 8.6. These matrices are considered diagonal matrices since their 
covariances are very small and approaching zero, this suggests that combinations of 
variables in these models are linear. Therefore, we can apply the orthogonal case for 
both variance decompositions and impulse responses.
In this section, the forecast error variances of each variable are decomposed into the 
proportion attributable to each of the random shocks. The results of forecast error 
variances of inflation are reported in Table 8.5. The time horizon equals 12 quarters 
taking in all decompositions since, after 3 quarters in all models, the proportions of 
variances of each variable attributable to each shock are constant. At the forecast 
horizon of 12 quarters, the variations of inflation were explained by their own shock 
from around 70 per cent to 83 per cent in four models.
Money supply growth is the most important source of variability for inflation. The 
shocks of Ml growth contribute a substantial change from around 23 per cent to 28 per 
cent of inflation variations (Models 1 and 3), the contributions of Ml growth to 
inflation variation are larger than for the case of M2 (from around 12 per cent to 15 per
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cent) in Models 2 and 4 (Ml is more active and flexible than M2 since M2 includes Ml 
plus time and saving deposits). In contrast, depreciation of exchange rate accounts for 
only around 0.4 per cent to 3.9 per cent of the forecast error variance of inflation in the 
case of Vietcombank exchange rates and from around 2.6 per cent to 6.0 per cent for the 
case of Hanoi parallel market rates (Models 3 and 4). This means that the shocks of 
exchange rate depreciation affect the variation of inflation only a little. These results are 
consistent with the Granger causality tests in Table 8.4.
Table 8.5: The Variance Decomposition of Inflation Rate (DLnCPI)
20 observations from 1993Q4 to 1998Q3 
Proportion of forecast variance explained by changes in:
Time Horizon DLnCPI DLnE DLnMs
Q uarter M odel 1 (C P I, V C B E , M l)
1 72.18 0.37 27.45
3 70.99 0.41 28.60
6 70.71 0.41 28.88
9 70.71 0.41 28.88
12 70.71 0.41 28.88
M odel 2 (C P I, V C B E , M 2)
1 81.40 3.83 14.77
3 81.02 3.86 15.12
6 80.98 3.87 15.15
9 80.98 3.87 15.15
12 80.98 3.87 15.15
M odel 3 (C P I, H N E , M l)
1 73.59 2.59 23.82
3 71.52 3.68 24.80
6 71.35 3.72 24.93
9 71.35 3.72 24.93
12 71.35 3.72 24.93
M odel 4 (C P I, H N E , M 2)
1 83.66 5.28 11.06
3 81.99 6.07 11.94
6 81.96 6.08 11.96
9 81.96 6.08 11.96
12 81.96 6.08 11.96
Source: Author’s estimates by using Microfit 4.0
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The variance decompositions of exchange rate depreciation and money supply growths 
are reported in Appendix 8.7. Inflation accounts for from around 24 per cent to 27 per 
cent of forecast error variance of exchange rate depreciations in all models, while the 
shocks of money supply growth explained only from around 5 per cent to 9 per cent of 
exchange rate depreciation in these models. Similarly to the variance decomposition of 
exchange rate depreciation, inflation also contributes to money supply growth’s 
variations from 20 per cent to 30 per cent. Depreciation accounts for less than 1 per cent 
of the variance of money growth in the cases of VCBE and they account for around 4 
per cent to 9 per cent of money growth variances for HNE (HNE and Ml are more 
active and flexible than VCBE and M2).
So through variance decompositions, money growth is determined as a major source of 
variation of inflation, while exchange rate depreciation has contributed a small 
proportion of inflation’s variation. One again, the shocks of inflation account for a large 
proportion of variations of both exchange rate depreciation and money growth. The 
impact of the shock from each variable to others will be illustrated more clearly by 
impulse response analysis in the section below.
Impulse response analysis
In this section, the direction and magnitude of response from each variable to one 
standard error shock of another variable is examined. Microfit 4.0 was used to carry out 
this impulse response in the orthogonalised impulse response case, as mentioned in the 
previous part.
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• Exchange rate depreciation and inflation
From Figures 8.1 to 8.4, inflation is increased to respond to an SE shock from exchange 
rate depreciations in the first quarters in all four models. After the first quarter, inflation 
starts to fall sharply to below zero level and then returns to zero level and dies on the 
sixth or seventh quarter. The magnitudes of inflation responses are relatively small, they 
reached the highest level from 0.15 per cent to 0.23 per cent in these models.
These results are coincident with forecast error variance decompositions and consistent 
with economic theory. Since exchange rate depreciation will result in an increase in the 
domestic currency price of imported intermediate inputs, this will increase the prices of 
final goods including non-tradable goods (see Edwards 1989).
Figure 81 O rthogonalised Impulse R esp o n ses  to one SE sh ock  in th e equation for
DLVC8E- M odell
/  OLCPI
Figure 8.2: Orthogonalised Impulse R esp on ses to one SE shock  in the equation for
DLHNE-Model 2
/  OLCPI
H orizon H orizon
Figure 8.3 Orthogonalised Impulse R esp o n ses to one SE shock  in the equation for Figure 8 i  Orthogonalised Impulse R esp on ses to one SE shock in the equation for
During the 1990s, Vietnam imported mainly machinery and intermediate goods and 
imports were usually in excess of exports (Chapter 6). However, exchange rates and
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foreign exchange transactions have been managed by the SBV60. So exchange rate 
depreciation may have led to an increase in inflation at only very small levels in the 
short term.
Figure 35: Orthogonalised Impulse Responses to one SE shock in the equation for
DLCP1- Modell
/  DLVCBE
Figure 86 Orthogonalised Impulse Responses to one SE shock in the equation for
DLCP1-Mcdel2
/  DLVCBE
Horizon
Figure 8.7: Orthogonalised Impulse Responses to one SE shock in the equation for
DLCPI-Model 3
/  DLHNE
Figure 8.8: Orthogonalised Impulse Responses to one SE shock in the equation for
DLCPI-Model 4
DLHNE
On the other hand, the exchange rate depreciation also increased in response to an SE 
shock from inflation in all models; this is showed from Figures 8.5 to 8.8. However, the 
responses of depreciation rates are above zero level in only the first 2 quarters, then they 
go down and come back to a zero level after the fourth quarter. Under purchasing power 
parity (PPP) condition, an increase in domestic price level (suppose foreign price is 
constant) could make real exchange rates appreciate, and then create pressure to 
depreciate nominal exchange rates to restore the equilibrium level of real exchange 
rates. As mentioned above, real exchange rates of VND against US$ still appreciate
60 Although exchange rates have been more market determined and foreign exchange managements have 
been liberalised during the 1990s (see Chapter 6).
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during this time, then a shock of inflation could lead to a further appreciation of real 
exchange rates, thus increasing the pressure to depreciate the nominal exchange rates. 
This issue must be taken into account for policy makers and economists when they 
implement monetary and exchange rate policies, to maintain macroeconomic stability.
• Money Growth and Inflation
Figure 810: Orthogonalised Impulse Responses to one SE shock in the equation for
DLM2-Model 2
0 004r ,
Figure 8.9: Orthogonalised Impulse Responses to one SE shock in the equation for
DLM1- Modell
0.005t .
/  DLCPI
Figure 8.12: Orthogonalised Impulse Responses to one SE shock in the equation forFigure 8.11: Orthogonalised Impulse Responses to one SE shock in the equation for
All Figures from 8.9 to 8.12 show that inflation rates in all models are increased 
strongly in the first quarter and then reduced to the zero level in a period of the 2 
following quarters in response to the SE shocks of money supply growth. The highest 
level of inflation response to money growth shock reaches from 0.35 per cent to 0.5 per 
cent in all models, larger than the responses of inflation to exchange rate depreciation.
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In the four Figures from 8.13 to 8.16, money supply growths are reduced sharply to 
below the zero level during 1 quarter, and they are turned up to zero in the second 
quarter to respond to the shock of inflation (M2 responses to a shock of inflation are 
slower than Ml). The magnitude of reduction in Ml to respond to the shock of inflation 
is -1.0 per cent, that is the highest level of response of all variables in the impulse 
response analysis in these models. This indicates that the growth rates of money supply 
were controlled effectively by the SBV to cope with inflation in order to stabilise the 
economy.
Figure 8.13: Orthogonalised Impulse Responses to one SE shock in the equation for
DLCR - Model 1
/  DLM1
Figure 8.14: Orthogonalised Impulse Responses to one SE shock in the equation for
/  DLM2
Horizon
F ig u r e  8.15: Orthogonalised Impulse Responses to one SE shock in the equation for
DLCR-Model 3
Figure 816: Orthogonalised Impulse Responses to one SE shock in the equation for
DLCP1 - Model 4
/  DLM1 /  DLM2
H orizon
• Money growth and exchange rate depreciation
Exchange rate depreciations (for both VCBE and HNE) rose by around 0.4 per cent 
during the first 2 quarters in response to a shock of money growth in all four models
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(see from Figures 8.17 to 8.20). The increase in depreciation rates when there is a shock 
of money growth is also consistent with macroeconomic theory. Since money supply 
increases, this will reduce the interest rates on the domestic currency denominated 
assets; demand for them falls then domestic currency will be depreciated. Besides that, 
money growth will raise the inflation rate, which may indirectly affect the depreciation 
rates.
Figure 8.17: Orthogonalised Impulse Responses to one SE shock in the equation for 
DLM1 - Modell
/ DLVCBE
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Horizon
Figure 819: Orthogonalised Impulse Responses to one SE shock in the equation for
Figure 818 Orthogonalised Impulse Responses to one SE shock in the equation for
DLM2 - Model 2
Figure 820: Orthogonalised Impulse Responses to one SE shock in the equation for
So from impulse response analysis, we can conclude as follows:
The inflation rate increased to respond to an SE shock of depreciation rates, and the 
depreciation rate also rose to respond to an SE shock of the inflation rate. The inflation 
rate increased substantially to respond to an SE shock of the growth rates of money 
supply, but in turn money growth decreased sharply to respond to an SE shock of 
inflation. The depreciation rates increased to respond to an SE shock of money growth.
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The empirical results in this chapter are consistent with the findings in Chapter 4, which 
showed that the use of indirect instruments contributed to increased monetary control by 
the SBV during that time. The results in this chapter are also similar to results of the 
VAR model for two variables from Dodsworth et al. (1996b) (higher money growth or 
exchange rate depreciation indeed led to higher inflation rates in the short run in 
Vietnam in the period 1990 - 1995). The results also coincided with Vo’s (1997) results 
(growth rate of money supply M2 and exchange rate depreciation were key factors to 
determine the inflation rate in the 1980s and 1990s in Vietnam).
However, our results in Granger causality tests and other tests differ from the findings 
of Dodsworth et al. (1996b). These authors found that inflation did not affect money 
growth and exchange rate depreciation in the short run in Vietnam in the period 1990 - 
1995, while our results show that inflation did affect money growth and exchange rate 
depreciation. This difference may occur since there is a difference in period of time, 
where foreign trade between Vietnam and its partners has been more developed, 
exchange rates are more market determined and also the SBV's ability to control money 
supply in response to a shock of inflation has been increased.
8.6. Conclusion and policy implications
The dynamic links between inflation, exchange rate and money supply in the period 
from 1993 to 1998 were examined by using VECMs, cointegration and VAR techniques 
in this chapter. The results from this empirical study show that CPI, exchange rates and 
money supply have a long run relationship. Exchange rates have a larger effect on CPI 
than money supply; a 1 per cent increase in exchange rates leads to a 0.89-1.64 per cent 
increase in CPI, and a 1 per cent increase in money supply results in a 0.39-0.56 per 
cent increase in CPI in the long run.
208
In the short run, through Granger causality tests, the results show that both exchange 
rate depreciations and growth rates of money supply Granger cause the inflation. 
Money supply growth has affected inflation and exchange rate depreciation in the 
future, while exchange rate depreciation alone does not influence or weakly influence 
inflation. In addition, inflation also stimulates depreciation.
The results of forecast error variance decomposition and impulse response analyses 
indicate that money growth is the most important source of variation (from 12 per cent 
to 30 per cent) of inflation and inflation increases substantially to respond to a shock of 
money growth. Exchange rate depreciations account for a small proportion of inflation’s 
variation (from 0.4 per cent to 6.0 per cent) and inflation still rises to respond to the 
shock of depreciation, even though the response is weak. The shock of inflation can be 
explained for large proportions of variations of both the depreciation and money growth 
rates (24 per cent to 27 per cent for the variation of depreciation and 24 per cent to 30 
per cent for variation of the money growth rates). Exchange rate depreciation is 
increased to respond to the shock of inflation, but money growth is brought down 
substantially. This reflects the effective controls of money supply by the SBV during 
that time.
These analyses are mainly consistent with the previous studies, which show that money 
growth and exchange rate depreciation could have led to a higher rate of inflation in the 
short run.
The results from analyses in both the long and short run in this chapter and previous 
chapters suggest that devaluation can be implemented in the near future to encourage
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exports and improve current account balance and BOP, and also reduce the real 
exchange rate appreciation in the short run. Because, the depreciations have a small 
effect on stimulating inflation in the short run (assume money supply growth is 
constant), they also have positive effects on encouraging exports (although exchange 
rate’s effects on exports in the long run are larger than that in the short run) and limiting 
imports, and the Marshall-Lerner condition holds (Chapter 6). In addition, regional and 
multiple trade agreements between Vietnam and other countries require the reductions 
in tariffs and other barriers to foreign trade. Therefore, Vietnam has to rely on the 
flexible exchange rate policy to encourage exports and BOP rather than using tariffs and 
export price policy in the previous period.
However, this study shows that the depreciations of exchange rates do have a strong 
effect to stimulate inflation in the long run, and money growth rates are the most 
important source to generate inflation in both short and long runs. The potential of high 
inflation is possible if the SBV implements an easy monetary policy. Therefore, it is 
necessary to coordinate closely between monetary and exchange rate policies to 
perform successfully the devaluation of domestic currency. The effective controls of 
money supply are the most important measure to control inflation and this must be put 
as the first priority of the SBV.
Controlling money supply in the face of large capital inflows as in Vietnam in the 
previous period (see Table 1.2) is not an easy job for the SBV. The large capital inflows 
will cause an increase in domestic inflation (more currencies to buy few goods) and real 
exchange rate appreciation (excess supply for foreign currencies). To sterilise these 
consequences of large capital flows, indirect monetary instruments such as OMO,
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refinancing, RRs, foreign exchange swaps, and variable deposit requirements have been 
implemented.
The foreign exchange swaps, variable deposit requirements are effective tools in terms 
of sterilising capital flows that have been successfully implemented in Indonesia and 
Spain. Especially, through foreign exchange swaps, the central bank can make an 
agreement to sell foreign exchange against the domestic currency and simultaneously to 
buy it at a specific date in the future. The foreign exchange is bought by banks and may 
be invested abroad or be lent to domestic residents, but its effects are to reduce the 
domestic currency base (at given money multiplier, money supply will be reduced). 
With foreign exchange swaps, the central banks are highly flexible at times to buy and 
sell foreign exchange (Lee 1997). Foreign exchange swaps have been implemented in 
Vietnam since 1998, but they are still little used. Although this instrument still has 
disadvantages61, with the development of the financial sector and experience gained by 
the SBV during the banking and financial reform, this instrument could be increasingly 
introduced in the near future.
Other macroeconomic policies such as fiscal policy, reform of SOEs, and external 
economic relation policies are considered when implementing the devaluation policy in 
order to stimulate exports and to improve BOP, but inflation still must be controlled and 
macroeconomic stability maintained.
61 This instrument may cause losses for the central bank if the difference between the spot rate and 
forward rate is smaller than the interest rate differential between the foreign and domestic markets; this 
also contains the foreign exchange risk when the central bank converts foreign currency into local 
currency (Lee 1997)
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Chapter 9
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the reforms of monetary and exchange rate 
policies in Vietnam during the 1990s. The thesis focuses on the transition from direct to 
indirect monetary policy instruments, the effects of exchange rates and prices on trade 
flows and the possibility and a policy coordination to use devaluation as a tool to 
encourage exports, improve the trade balance and BOP.
Theories and experiences from transitional economies and developing countries showed 
that in the expansion of domestic and international financial markets, indirect 
instruments have more advantages than direct ones in terms of financial intermediation 
and allocating financial resources. The use of indirect instruments allows monetary 
authorities more flexibility in implementing monetary policy. The transition from CPEs 
to a market economy changes the nature of financial and banking systems. In this 
context, therefore, monetary and exchange rate policies and their instruments must be 
changed basically. The transition from direct to indirect monetary instruments is an 
indispensable required process. However, the pace and use of indirect instruments 
depend on the macroeconomic conditions and the development of the financial market.
Prior to 1980 the Vietnamese economy followed the Soviet economic model. In the 
period 1979-1980, this model revealed its inappropriateness. Moreover, a US embargo 
and a cut in foreign aid from the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe Countries
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worsened the economic situation and put the Vietnamese economy in a serious 
recession. This created the critical demand for economic reform. During the period 
1980-88, some partial economic reforms were undertaken in agricultural and industrial 
areas, but these reforms did not make fundamental changes in the economy. In 
particularly, the reform of ‘price-wage-money’ in 1985 failed and caused a severe crisis 
in the economy. Therefore, the comprehensive reform package was necessary. In March 
1989, the comprehensive economic reform was launched, which includes the reform of 
state managements, SOE reform, financial sector reform, and external economic 
relation reform. As a result, the economy achieved a high growth rate and 
macroeconomic stability during the 1990s. It also significantly contributed to the 
development of the private sector and poverty alleviation. Since 1998, Vietnamese 
economy was still slightly affected by the financial crisis in the region and faced 
difficulties in FDI reduction, slow GDP growth rate, poor performance of SOEs and the 
problems of efficiency and soundness in the banking system. These require further 
reforms to stimulate the growth of the economy.
As in the Soviet economic model and other CPEs, Vietnam had a passive financial and 
a mono-banking systems in the period before 1988. Monetary policy only provided 
money (cash) and credits to the real sector according to the production plans set by the 
government. Exchange rates were considered as a convertible tool to clear barter trade 
between Vietnam and other countries in the CMEA. After 1988 the banking system 
started to reform and in 1990, the two tier banking system was established in the context 
of financial sector reform. After 10 years of reform, the two tier banking system has 
been developed in both the number of financial institutions and their assets, these 
created a framework and facilitated the reforms of monetary and exchange rate policies. 
However, the degree of monetisation being low, money markets are underdeveloped.
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The problems of bank soundness and outstanding issue of SOEs limit the scope and 
effectiveness of monetary and exchange rate policy. These must be considered when 
analysing monetary and exchange rate policies during that time.
Since the two tier banking system was established in 1990, the SBV has firstly 
conducted monetary policy in the environment of a market oriented economy. The 
ultimate targets of monetary policy are to stabilise the value of VND, restrain inflation 
and contribute to economic growth. Based on the macroeconomic conditions and the 
development of financial market, the SBV has used both direct instruments such as 
interest rate controls, credit ceilings, directed credits, and indirect instruments which 
include reserve requirements, refinancing facilities, and open market type operations (T- 
bill auctions) to achieve these targets.
During that time, the SBV relied still more on direct instruments than indirect ones. 
Direct instruments were used as effective tools to control inflation and maintain 
macroeconomic stability and they have been liberalised step by step. However, the use 
of direct instruments induced the inefficiency in financial intermediation and 
misallocation of financial resources. Indirect instruments have been increasingly 
introduced, but their role is limited due to low level of monetisation, underdevelopment 
of the money market and securities market not being established at that time. The 
results from empirical analysis indicated that the use of indirect instruments contributed 
to increase the degree of money control from the SBV, but it was not enough evidence 
to conclude that the use of indirect instruments improved financial sector efficiency.
Further reforms of indirect instruments are necessary because Vietnam has not 
completed its transition from direct to indirect instruments nor the transition to a market
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oriented economy. In the next period, direct instruments should be more liberalised and 
gradually phased out, but the SBV must still keep them in hand when needed. Indirect 
instruments should be increasingly and effectively implemented and begin to replace 
the direct ones. However, other reforms such as the restructuring of the banking system, 
improving legal frameworks, scrutinising balance sheets of commercial banks and 
stimulating SOE reform are needed to support the transition from direct to indirect 
instruments.
Flexible exchange rate arrangements have been adopted by some developing countries 
since the mid -1970s. Exchange rate policy in these countries has been used generally as 
a macroeconomic tool to achieve and maintain international competitiveness, and a 
viable BOPs. The theories and empirical evidence from developing countries strongly 
support the idea that devaluation can be used to improve exports, trade balance and 
BOPs. The impact of devaluation on trade flows is considered as equivalent to the 
effects of import tariffs and export subsidies.
Exchange rate policy in Vietnam since 1990 has been considered as a part of monetary 
policy and it has been implemented flexibly and market oriented. During the period 
1992 - 1998, nominal effective exchange rates were depreciated by 20 per cent, but the 
real effective exchange rates were appreciated by around 20 per cent to 30 per cent. 
Foreign trade policy was also reformed in terms of relaxing controls of foreign trade, 
reducing tariffs and NTBs, and as a result, exports and imports grew on average by 20 
per cent to 30 per cent pa, and consequently, the current account and BOP were 
improved.
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The effects of exchange rates and prices on trade flows in Vietnam were examined from 
1992 to 1998. The results from ECMs for exports and imports in both the short and long 
runs indicated that prices have larger effects than exchange rates in the short run for 
exports and in both the short and long runs for imports. In contrast, exchange rates have 
larger effects on trade flows in the long run for exports and the Marshal 1-Lerner 
condition holds. Moreover, joining bilateral and multilateral trade agreements require 
Vietnam to commit to reducing tariffs and other trade restrictions in the near future. So, 
in the long run, Vietnam cannot retain tariffs and import restrictions, which have been 
used in the last period. These suggest that devaluation could be used to encourage 
exports in the near future.
The possibility of using devaluation to promote exports can be considered more 
carefully when the dynamic links between inflation, exchange rate and money supply 
are examined. The results from VECMs show that exchange rates and money supply 
indeed lead to higher inflation in the long run. In the short run, both money growth and 
exchange rate depreciation are major sources to increase inflation (particularly, the 
money growth contributed to 30 per cent of inflation variation), but exchange rate 
depreciation alone increased inflation very little. Therefore, the devaluation can be used 
to stimulate exports and reduce the appreciation of real exchange rates in the short run. 
However, the devaluation policy needs close coordination with monetary policy, in 
which money supply must be controlled effectively. In the condition of large capital 
inflows, indirect monetary policy instruments such as OMO, foreign exchange 
forwards, variable deposit requirements are considered as appropriate tools to sterilise 
capital inflows, to avoid inflation and real exchange rate appreciation.
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Although the statistical system in Vietnam has been improved step by step, data 
collection is still difficult for economists who are doing research on the Vietnamese 
economy. Most data used in this thesis are quarterly data covering the period 1992 to 
1998. As the length of the time series data is short, the results of econometric models in 
this thesis should be viewed with ‘normal' caution. If the data are sufficient, a CGE 
(Computable General Equilibrium) model with more variables and more equations may 
be useful to examine the effects of exchange rates and prices on trade flows.
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Appendices
Appendix 3.1. Vietnam: Overdue Loans of Deposit Money Banks, 1994-98 1/
1994 1995 1996 1997 Sep-98
In billions of VND
Deposit Money Banks 3,152 3,337 4,726 7,682 8,592
SOCBs 3,004 3,052 4,209 5,769 6,246
Non-SOCBs 148 285 517 1,913 2,346
As % of total loans
Deposit Money Banks 8.9 7.9 9.3 12.3 12.5
SOCBs 11.1 9.1 11.0 12.0 11.3
Non-SOCBs 1.7 3.3 4.2 13.5 17.5
As % of total assets
Deposit Money Banks 5.6 4.8 5.5 7.4 7.3
SOCBs 6.7 5.2 6.4 7.1 6.5
Non-SOCBs 1.3 2.9 2.6 8.5 10.6
As % of total overdues
SOEs 58.8 49.7 44.2 34.8 35.5
Cooperatives 2.1 2.1 1.7 1.3 1.6
Joint-stock companies 3.4 5.3 11.8 45.7 46.1
Joint venture 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.6 1.3
Private sector 35.7 42.7 41.7 17.5 15.6
As % of total loans to the sector
SOEs 9.1 6.9 7.8 8.6 8.5
Cooperatives 22.5 26.3 29.7 40.2 43.0
Joint-stock companies 4.5 3.7 7.4 34.3 37.6
Joint venture 0.3 0.4 1.0 1.2 2.7
Private sector 11.7 12.7 14.9 8.1 7.4
Note: 1/ Comprising 4 SOCBs and 24 non-SOCBs. 
Source: IMF (1999b: 27)
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Note: SLR is Short-term lending rate. Author estimates the real SLR. 
Source: Mori (1997), SBV (1995-98), Bach and Nguyen (1999).
Appendix 4.1: Monthly Short-Term Lending Interest Rate,
01/1989-12/1998
Appendix 4.2: Monthly Medium and long-Term Lending 
Interest Rates, 01/1989-12/1998
Nominal MLR
Real MLR
Note: MLR is Medium and long-term lending rate. Author estimates the real MLR. 
I Source: Mori (1997), SBV (1995-98), Bach and Nguyen (1999).
Appendix 4.3: Credit Share of the Big Six Commercial Banks (Per cent)
Y ear T otal V ie tcom
bank
A gri
bank
ID BV Incom
bank
E X IM
bank
M aritim e
bank
1993 100 21.9 27.6 28.8 17.4 2.8 1.4
1994 100 19.8 29.9 25.2 20 .0 3.6 1.6
1995 100 21.1 31.5 21.4 21 .0 3.5 1.5
Note: EXIM bank is the Export and Import Bank, Maritime bank is the Maritime Commercial 
Stock Bank.
Source: Amano(1997: 14).
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Appendix 4.4: Capital mobilisation from 955 People’s Credit Funds and
Cooperatives in 1998
C ap ita l m ob ilised Less than Less than From  2 From  5 O ver
(V N D  B ill) 1 2 T o 5 T o 10 10
N u m b er o f  C red it 624 204 93 19 15
F un d s and  C oopera tives 
( %  in  to ta l) 65.34 21.36 9.74 1.99 1.57
Source: SBV, 1998. Banking Review, July 7.
Appendix 6.1: Nominal, real effective Exchange rates of Hanoi's 
Parallel Market and CPI
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Appendix 6.2: Nominal, real effective exchange rates of HCM City's 
parallel Market and CPI
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Appendix 6.3. Vietnam’s Structure of Exports and Imports (Per cent), 1990-98
EXPORTS 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
0 - Food and live animals 38.7 33.7 23.1 21.6 34.0 27.9 25.5 Z J . J 27.2
1 - Beverages and tobacco 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
2 - Crude matls excl fuels 19.5 20.1 8.1 7.9 7.0 5.3 4.1 2.4 1.9
3 - Mineral fuels etc 26.8 30.0 23.8 23.9 22.1 17.3 21.4 19.6 15.1
4 - Animal, vegetable oil, fat 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.8 0.7 0.3 0.3
5 - Chemicals 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.7 0.4 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.0
6 - Basic manufactures 5.4 5.3 19.6 17.3 6.3 13.6 6.9 5.9 5.8
7 - Machines, transport equip 0.5 0.3 6.9 5.3 1.3 5.5 2.8 6.9 8.3
8 - Mis manufacture goods 7.8 10.2 17.1 22.8 28.1 28.0 37.1 40.3 39.9
9 - Goods not classd by kind 0.7 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.3
Total primary commodities 85.3 83.8 55.4 53.5 63.4 51.4 51.9 45.7 44.7
for exports (0+1+2+4+3)
Food (Of 1) 38.8 33.7 23.1 21.6 34.1 28.0 25.7 23.4 27.4
Agriculture non-food (2+4) 19.8 20.1 8.4 8.0 7.2 6.1 4.9 2.7 2.2
Fuels (3) 26.8 30.0 23.8 23.9 22.1 17.3 21.4 19.6 15.1
Total manufactures (5+6+7+8) 13.9 16.1 44.2 46.1 36.1 48.3 47.7 54.1 55.0
IMPORTS 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
0 - Food and live animals 7.2 4.8 2.6 3.0 3.3 4.2 3.1 4.0 4.1
\ - Beverages and tobacco 1.3 0.5 1.8 2.3 4.8 4.9 3.6 2.5 3.3
2 - Crude matls excl fuels 2.6 5.6 2.8 1.6 2.4 2.6 2.1 1.7 2.0
3 - Mineral fuels etc 1.8 2.0 12.4 12.7 11.8 8.5 6.0 8.5 6.6
4 - Animal, vegetable oil, fat 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.8 0.8 0.7 1.0
5 - Chemicals 17.8 33.2 21.5 14.8 14.6 16.0 13.9 16.0 16.6
6 - Basic manufactures 25.2 19.4 19.4 22.9 23.6 25.4 26.1 24.3 23.8
7 - Machines, transport equip 37.3 28.5 32.5 37.4 32.9 31.5 38.1 32.3 31.6
8 - Mis manufacture goods 5.4 5.3 6.2 4.7 5.6 5.4 5.6 7.0 6.9
9 - Goods not classd by kind 1.4 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.7 3.0 4.1
Total primary commodities 12.8 13.0 19.8 19.9 22.7 21.0 15.6 17.4 17.1
for imports (0+1+2+4+3)
Total manufactures (5+6+7+8) 85.7 86.4 79.6 79.8 76.7 78.3 83.7 79.5 78.9
Source: IEDB - Stars
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Appendix 6.4. Exports by Destinations and Imports by Original Countries
(Per cent), 1990-98
1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8
T O T A L  E X P O R T S 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
EEC-12 7.0 12.4 12.3 16.3 22.9 20.4 23.8 30.1 33.7
Japan 39.5 38.1 25.1 26.1 30.0 25.9 29.4 25.8 19.8
ASEAN (incl SING) 19.6 18.0 11.1 14.3 15.5 11.7 14.4 15.3 18.3
Mainland China 1/ 10.9 10.6 6.4 6.4 7.5 7.6 7.4 7.3 5.1
Korea, Rep 0.0 2.4 1.7 2.2 2.5 2.9 3.4 2.8 2.0
NAFTA 2/ 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.5 2.0 4.1 6.2 6.3 8.6
Australia+New Zealand 1.0 1.4 4.3 4.2 4.8 3.3 4.7 5.4 5.7
Cent Planned Europe 7.3 1.4 0.8 0.8 1.3 1.3 1.6 2.2 2.4
Middle East 0.2 0.2 26.7 20.1 0.5 15.2 0.3 0.2 0.4
Africa 3.3 1.0 1.6 0.9 1.4 1.2 1.3 0.8 0.4
Rest o f the World 10.3 13.8 9.4 8.2 11.4 6.4 7.5 3.8 3.7
T O T A L  IM P O R T S 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
EEC-12 16.9 13.7 9.7 10.7 10.7 8.5 12.8 11.5 11.1
Japan 22.7 13.0 11.4 12.0 9.5 9.9 10.8 12.8 14.3
ASEAN (incl SING) 7.6 13.1 24.5 31.2 33.4 30.4 24.1 30.2 31.5
Mainland China 1/ 15.0 24.2 26.5 14.8 12.8 14.7 13.8 17.2 16.7
Korea, Rep 0.0 11.9 11.0 13.8 15.2 14.6 15.2 16.0 14.3
NAFTA 2/ 1.6 1.2 0.4 0.4 2.8 3.0 6.2 3.2 3.4
Australia+New Zealand 1.8 2.1 1.1 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.7 2.5
Cent Planned Europe 20.0 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.8 0.7 1.7 3.6 3.4
Middle East 0.3 8.2 6.3 2.5 0.2 3.3 0.6 0.4 0.4
Africa 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Rest o f the World 13.6 12.2 8.4 12.5 12.9 13.3 12.9 3.4 2.2
Note: 1/ including China, Hongkong and Macau; 2/ including United States, Canada and Mexico 
Source: IEDB - Stars, 2000
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Appendix 7.1: Test for cointegration of variables in the long-run export 
demand equations - DF test for the residuals
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(VCBE) (HNE) (HCME)
DF regressions include an intercept but not a trend
DF -4.53** -4.43** -4.51**
A D F ( l ) -3 .3 5 * * - 3 .5 3 * * - 3 .3 4 * *
A D F ( 2 ) -3 .4 2 * * - 3 .6 5 * * -3 .4 4 * *
A D F ( 3 ) -1 .9 8 -1 .9 6 -2.01
A D F ( 4 ) -2 .4 0 -2 .3 4 -2 .4 2
DF regressions include an intercept and a linear trend
DF -4.33** -4.23** -4.30**
A D F ( l ) -3 .1 9 - 3 .3 6 * -3 .1 8
A D F ( 2 ) -3 .2 7 * -3 .4 8 * -3 .2 8 *
A D F ( 3 ) -1 .7 6 - 1 .7 2 -1 .7 9
A D F ( 4 ) -2 .1 7 - 2 .0 9 - 2 .1 9
Note: ** and * are significant at 5%  and 10% level, respectively
Appendix 7.2: Test for cointegration of variables in the ECM for export 
demand - DF test for the residuals
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(VCBE) (HNE) (HCME)
DF regressions include an intercept but not a trend
DF -3.74** -3.74** -3.81**
A D F ( l ) -1 .6 7 - 1 .7 2 -1 .7 0
A D F ( 2 ) -1 .8 7 - 1 .9 7 -1 .8 5
A D F ( 3 ) -2 .8 0 * - 2 .7 2 * -2 .7 8 *
A D F ( 4 ) -2 .1 2 -1 .9 5 -2 .1 3
DF regressions include an intercept and a linear trend
DF -5.06** -4.93** -5.13**
A D F ( l ) -2 .5 6 -2 .5 7 -2 .5 8
A D F ( 2 ) -2 .9 4 -3 .01 -2 .9 2
A D F ( 3 ) -4 .1 2 * * - 3 .9 5 * * -4 .0 8 * *
A D F ( 4 ) -4 .3 6 * * - 3 .7 1 * - 4 .3 4 * *
Note: ** and * are significant at 5%  and 10% level, respectively
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Appendix 7.3: Test for cointegration of variables in the long-run import demand
equations - DF test for the residuals
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(VCBE) (HNE) (HCME)
DF regressions include an intercept but not a trend
DF -3.05** -3.11** -3.07**
A D F ( l ) -2 .9 6 * -2 .9 7 * -2 .9 6 *
A D F ( 2 ) -2 .3 2 -2 .2 7 -2 .3 4
A D F ( 3 ) -2 .7 7 * - 2 .8 4 * -2 .8 2 *
A D F ( 4 ) -2 .7 2 * -2 .7 3 * -2 .7 3 *
DF regressions include an intercept and a linear trend
DF -3.17 -3.24* -3.19
A D F ( l ) -3 .2 4 * - 3 .2 7 * -3 .2 3 *
A D F ( 2 ) -2 .6 6 - 2 .6 4 -2 .6 8
A D F ( 3 ) -2 .9 9 - 3 .0 7 -3 .0 3
A D F ( 4 ) -3 .0 0 -3 .0 3 -3 .01
Note: ** and * are significant at 5%  and 10% level, respectively
Appendix 7.4: Test for cointegration of variables in the ECM for import demand
- DF test for the residuals
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(VCBE) (HNE) (HCME)
DF regressions include an intercept but not a trend
DF -2.72* -2.89* -2.72*
A D F ( l ) -2 .8 6 * -2 .9 2 * -2 .8 5 *
A D F ( 2 ) -1 .9 3 -1 .8 6 - 1 .9 4
A D F ( 3 ) -1 .4 7 -1 .5 0 -1 .4 8
A D F ( 4 ) -2 .0 9 -1 .9 2 -2 .0 8
DF regressions include an intercept and a linear trend
DF -2.77 -3.05 -2.79
A D F ( l ) -3 .5 9 * -3 .8 3 * * -3 .5 5 *
A D F ( 2 ) -2.71 -2 .7 0 -2 .7 0
A D F ( 3 ) -2 .2 4 -2 .5 3 -2 .2 6
A D F ( 4 ) -3 .3 4 * - 3 .5 3 * -3 .3 4 *
Note: ** and * are significant at 5%  and 10% level, respectively
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Sensitivity of analysis:
A p p e n d i x  7 .5 :  L o n g - r u n  e x p o r t  d e m a n d  e q u a t i o n  r e g r e s s i o n  r e s u l t s
L n X l = a  + b L n Y W  t + cLn
' PVNX \  ,
~ —  + d L n E t + S A  +  v ,
K rwxc )  t
2 4  o b s e rv a t io n s  u sed  fo r  e s tim a tio n  f ro m  1993Q 1 to  1 9 9 8 Q 4
V a r ia b le s C o e f f ic ie n ts
M o d e l  1 M o d e l  2 M o d e l  3
( V C B E ) ( H N E ) ( H C M E )
a - 1 2 .1 9 4 * * * - 1 2 .3 7 3 * * * - 1 2 .2 6 1 * * *
(-1 5 .7 1 ) ( -1 5 .6 4 ) ( -1 5 .5 8 )
LnYW , 6 .5 5 1 * * * 6 .5 2 4 * * * 6 .5 6 8 * * *
(1 6 .6 8 ) (1 6 .8 6 ) (1 6 .7 7 )
Ln(PVNX/PW XC)t - 0 .3 7 8 1’ - 0 .4 1 6 ” - 0 .3 7 6 1'
(-1 .4 4 ) ( -1 .6 1 ) ( -1 .4 3 )
LnE, 0 .9 2 2 * * * 1 .0 7 5 * * * 0 .9 3 6 * * *
(3 .3 2 ) (3 .4 6 ) (3 .3 4 )
S4 - 0 .0 5 2 * * * - 0 .0 5 4 * * * - 0 .0 5 2 * * *
( -3 .3 9 ) ( -3 .6 2 ) ( -3 .4 1 )
R2 0 .9 7 0 .9 7 0 .9 7
R 2 0 .9 6 0 .9 6 0 .9 6
F (4 , 19) 134 .32  [.0 0 0 ] 1 3 8 .8 4  [ .0 0 0 ] 1 3 4 .9 9  [ .0 0 0 ]
S e r ia l c o r r e la t io n  %2(4 ): 4 .6 8 8  [ .3 2 1 ] 5 .9 6 3  [ .2 0 2 ] 4 .5 9 7  [ .3 3 1 ]
F u n c tio n  fo rm  x2( 0 : 0 .6 9 3  [.4 0 5 ] 0 .9 0 6  [ .3 4 1 ] 0 .8 3 6  [ .3 6 1 ]
N o rm a l i ty 2 .2 3 6  [.3 2 7 ] 2 .1 1 1  [ .3 4 8 ] 2 .1 1 1  [ .3 4 8 ]
H e te r o s c e d a s t ic i ty  x 2( l ) : 0 .8 1 7  [.3 6 6 ] 1 .0 8 6  [ .2 9 7 ] 0 .6 9 4  [ .4 0 5 ]
N o te: *** and ** are sign ifican t at 1% and 5% level, respectively, 
a is sign ifican t at 17% level, b is significant at 13% level.
T he values in b rackets are T -ratios and squared brackets are p robabilities.
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Appendix 7.6: Test for cointegration of variables in the long-run export 
demand equations - DF test for residual vt (Case for Pwxc)
Dvt = a/v,., + x t 
( H0: ai= 0, residual is nonstationary)
23 observations used for estimation from 1993Q2 to 1998Q4
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(VCBE) (HNE) (HCME)
0/ -1.257*** -1.218*** -1.247***
(-5.71) (-5.50) (-5.62)
R2 0.60 0.58 0.59
Serial correlation %2(4): 5.744 [.219] 7.237 [.124] 5.674 [.225]
Function form x2(l): 0.036 [.849] 0.099 [.753] 0.080 [.777]
Normality '£{2 ): 1.531 [.465] 1.744 [.418] 1.569 [.456]
Heteroscedasticity x2( 0 : 1.048 [.306] 1.448 [.229] 1.104 [.293]
Note: *** and ** are significant at 1% level
The values in brackets are T-ratios and squared brackets are probabilities.
Appendix 7.7: Test for cointegration of variables in the long-run export 
demand equations - DF test for residual v( (Pwxc)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(VCBE) (HNE) (HCME)
DF regressions include an intercept but not a trend
DF -4.55** -4.43** -4.52**
ADF(l) -3.36** -3.48** -3.34**
ADF(2) -3.46** -3.62** -3.46**
ADF(3) -1.98 -1.93 -2.00
ADF(4) -2.37 -2.29 -2.39
DF regressions include an intercept and a linear trend
DF -4.34** -4.22** -4.31**
ADF(l) -3.19 -3.29* -3.17
ADF(2) -3.30* -3.45* -3.30*
ADF(3) -1.72 -1.65 -1.75
ADF(4) -2.12 -2.03 -2.14
Note: ** and * are significant at 5% and 10% level, respectively
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A p p en d ix  7.8: E rror  C orrection  M od el for exp ort d em an d  (C ase o f  Pw xc)
D L n X ?  =  V f 0 +  ' L y uD L n X ? -l
/ = i
3 0 /
+ 1  v  2iD L n Y W  , - i  + X  V v DLn\
i= 0  / = 0  \
PvNXi \  0
---------  + Y . ^ 4, D L n E ,
r w x a  f - o
- i  +  p y ^  +  n ,
21 ob serv a tio n s used  for estim ation  from  1993Q 4 to 1998Q 4
V ariab les C oeffic ien ts
M od el 1 M od el 2 M odel 3
(V C B E ) (H N E ) (H C M E )
V o 0.013 0.005 0.013
D L n X ‘l,.i
(0 .6 2 ) (0 .2 4 ) (0 .6 2 )
-0 .157 -0 .235 -0.152
( -0 .6 2 ) ( -0 .9 5 ) ' ( -0 .6 0 )
D L n Y W t -0 .910 0.113 -0.931
( -0 .3 1 ) (0 .0 4 ) (0 .3 1 )
D L n Y W f.j 1.435 1.783 1.484
(0 .9 4 ) (1 .1 9 ) (0 .9 8 )
D L n  YW t.2 -0 .426 0.553 -0 .453
( -0 .1 9 ) (0 .2 4 ) (-0 .2 1 )
D L n  YWf.3 3 .198** 3.628** 3 .229**
(2 .2 9 ) (2 .5 5 ) (2 .3 1 )
D L  n ( P v n x / P w x c )  t -0 .372 -0 .342 -0 .372
( -0 .7 6 ) ( -0 .6 6 ) (-0 .7 5 )
D L n E t 0.173 0.433 0.165
(0 .3 5 ) (0 .8 5 ) (0 .3 3 )
V t . j  (E rro r  c o rre c tio n  te rm ) -0 .917*** -0 .886** -0 .910***
( -3 .0 5 ) (-2 .8 9 ) (-3 .0 5 )
R 2 0.80 0.79 0.80
R 2 0.67 0.65 0.66
F(8 , 12) 5.988 [.003] 5.694 [.004] 5.955 [.003]
Seria l co rre la tio n  x2(4): 4 .682  [.321] 3.011 [.556] 4 .726  [.317]
F u n c tio n  form  x2( l) : 3 .206  [.073] 2.701 [.100] 3.300 [.069]
N o rm ality  x2(2): 0 .448  [.799] 0.502 [.778] 0.465 [.793]
H e te ro sced astic ity  x2( 0 : 0.862  [.353] 0 .424  [.515] 0 .834  [.361]
N o te: ***, ** an d  * a re  s ig n if ic a n t a t 1% , 5 %  an d  10%  lev e l, re sp e c tiv e ly
T h e  v a lu e s  in b ra c k e ts  a re  T -ra tio  an d  sq u a re d  b rack e ts  a re  p ro b a b ili tie s . T h e  lag g ed  len g th s o f
v a r ia b le s  a re  s e le c te d  b y  u s in g  S c h w a rz  B a y e s ia n  C rite rio n  (S B C ).
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A ppendix  7.9: Test for cointegration of variables in the ECM  for export dem and
- DF test for the residuals (Case o f Pwxc)
M odel 1 M odel 2 M odel 3
(VCBE) (HNE) (H CM E)
DF regressions include an intercept but not a trend
D F -3 .8 6 * * -3 .8 1 * * -3 .9 2 * *
A D F ( l ) -1 .7 8 -1 .7 8 -1 .8 0
A D F (2 ) -1 .5 6 -1 .5 5 -1 .55
A D F (3 ) -2 .1 6 -1 .9 4 -2 .1 6
A D F (4 ) -2 .0 6 -1 .9 0 -2 .05
DF regressions include an intercept and a linear trend
D F -5 .9 4 * * -5 .9 7 * * -5 .9 9 * *
A D F ( l ) -3 .47* -3 .6 2 * -3 .4 9 *
A D F (2 ) -3 .3 8 * -3 .5 0 * -3 .3 6 *
A D F (3 ) -3 .7 6 * -3 .6 5 * -3 .7 4 * *
A D F (4 ) -4 .0 8 * * -3 .8 2 * * -4 .0 6 * *
N o te :  ** a n d * a re  s ig n i f ic a n t  a t 5 %  a n d  1 0 %  le v e l ,  r e s p e c t iv e ly
Appendix 7.10: Real Import Penetration Rate, 1 992-98
20CI-:
1 5 0 -
1 9 9 2 Q 4  1 9 9 4 Q 1  1 9 9 5 Q 2  1 9 9 6 Q 3  1 9 9 7 Q 4 1 9 9 8 Q 4
Source: SBV authorities. Author's estimate
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Appendix 7.11: Export Structure of 13 Trading Partners of Vietnam 
__________________ (% of total exports), 1992-98__________________
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
1-A U ST R A L IA
TM 0.26 0.35 0.36 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.36
TPC 0.58 0.64 0.61 0.59 0.60 0.61 0.59
2-C A N  A D A
TM 0.64 0.66 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.70
TPC 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.25
3-F R A N C E
TM 0.80 0.79 0.80 0.79 0.81 0.80 0.81
TPC 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.16
4-G E R M A N Y
TM 0.90 0.88 0.89 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.88
TPC 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
5-JA P A N
TM 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.95
TPC 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
6-N E T H E R L A N D S
TM 0.61 0.60 0.62 0.64 0.64 0.72 0.72
TPC 0.35 0.36 0.34 0.32 0.32 0.27 0.28
7-S IN G A P O R E
TM 0.78 0.80 0.83 0.86 0.85 0.86 0.87
TPC 0.21 0.19 0.15 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.12
8-K O R E A , R E P
TM 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.92 0.93
TPC 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.07
9-SW E D E N
TM 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.78 0.82 0.82 0.83
TPC 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.10
10-T H A IL A N D
TM 0.67 0.71 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.75
TPC 0.32 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.24
11-T A IW A N
TM 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.96
TPC
12-U N IT E D
K IN G D O M
0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.03
TM 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.87
TPC
13-U N IT E D
ST A T E S
0.16 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.12
TM 0.78 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.82 0.83
TPC 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.13
Note: TM = Total manufactures = 5+6+7+8, TPC = Total Primary Commodities = 0+1+2+4+3. 
Source: STARS-IEDB, ANU, 2000
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Appendix 8.1: DF and ADF Tests for Residuals of Model (8.11) Regressions
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
R l l R12s R21 R22s R31 R32s R41 R42s
The DF regressions include an intercept but not a trend
DF -2.68* -4.32** -2.96* -3.09** -3.46** -4.40** -3.31** -3.26**
A D F(l) -1.55 -2.60 -2.59 -2.67** -2.47 -3.41** -2.70* -2.57
ADF(2) -1.71 -2.78* -2.52 -2.57 -2.41 -3.35** -2.42 -2.37
The DF regressions include an intercept and a linear trend
DF -2.94 -4.32** -2.94 -3.17 -3.88** -4.30** -3.20 -3.33*
A D F(l) -1.90 -2.61 -2.60 -2.79 -2.89 -3.00 -2.59 -2.68
ADF(2) -2.05 -2.69 -2.52 -2.75 -2.76 -2.86 -2.35 -2.50
Note: ** and * are significant at the 5% and 10% level.
Rij (i=l ...4, j= l ,2) means the residual from each cointegrating vector which obtained in (8.11) 
S indicates the selecting residual for the short run VECMs
Appendix 8.2: Single equation regression results of Model 1
20 observations used from 1993Q4 to 1998Q3
Regressor DLnCPI DLnVCBE DLnMl
DLnCPI(-l) 0.491** 1.008** -1.469**
(2.30) (2.12) (-2.78)
DLnVCBE(-l) 0.005 -0.335 0.014
(0.05) (-1.37) (0.05)
D LnM l(-l) 0.273*** 0.106 -0.240
(2.93) (0.51) (-1.04)
CONST -0.40 IE-3 -0.012 0.036***
(-0.10) (-1.48) (3.95)
E C T l(-l) -0.006 0.045** 0.013
(-0.75) (2.36) (0.61)
R square 0.47 0.42 0.40
Serial Correlation 5.098 [.277] 7.401 [.116] 0.696 [.952]
Function Form 2.696 [.101] 1.465 [.226] 1.662 [.197]
Normality 0.384 [.825] 2.867 [.238] 0.653 [.721]
Heteroscedasticity 1.235 [.266] 0.12E-3 [.991] 0.094 [.760]
Note: ***, ** and * are significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Values in brackets are T-ratios and in square brackets are probabilities.
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A p p en d ix  8.3: S ingle  eq u ation  regression  resu lts o f  M od el 2
20 observations used from 1993Q4 to 1998Q3
R e g r e s s o r D L n C P I D L n V C B E D L n M 2
D L n C P I ( - l ) 0 .0 4 5 0 .5 3 8 -0 .4 6 8 *
(0 .1 8 ) ( 1 .1 4 ) ( -1 .7 6 )
D L n V C B E ( - l ) 0 .1 3 2 0 .0 0 8 0 .0 1 3
( 0 .7 1 ) (0 .0 2 ) (0 .0 7 )
D L n M 2 ( - l ) 0 .4 6 9 * 0 .4 4 7 -0 .0 1 3
(1 .8 1 ) ( 0 .9 3 ) ( -0 .0 5 )
C O N S T - 0 .0 0 2 -0 .0 1 5 0 .0 2 9 * * *
( -0 .3 8 ) ( -1 .4 0 ) (4 .6 2 )
E C T 2 ( - 1 ) 0 .0 0 3 0 .0 6 6 * * - 0 .0 0 6
( 0 .2 0 ) ( 2 .3 9 ) ( -0 .4 1 )
R  s q u a r e 0 .2 7 0 .4 6 0 .2 3
S e r ia l  C o r r e l a t i o n 5 .5 4 3  [ .2 3 6 ] 6 .8 2 9  [ .1 4 5 ] 5 .2 6 9  [ .2 6 1 ]
F u n c t i o n  F o r m 7 .9 7 2  [ .0 0 5 ] 1 .5 5 6  [ .2 1 2 ] 0 .3 1 4  [ .5 7 5 ]
N o r m a l i t y 1 .198  [ .5 4 9 ] 0 .2 7 0  [ .8 7 4 ] 0 .8 4 4  [ .6 5 6 ]
H e te r o s c e d a s t i c i t y 1 .5 5 4  [ .2 1 3 ] 0 .0 2 2  [ .8 8 3 ] 0 .1 5 6  [ .6 9 3 ]
N ote: ***, ** and * are significant at 1%, 5%  and 10%, respectively.
Values in brackets are T-ratios and in sauare brackets are probabilities.
A p p en d ix  8.4: S in g le  eq u ation  regression  resu lts o f  M od el 3
20 observations used from 1993Q4 to 1998Q3
R e g r e s s o r D L n C P I D L n H N E D L n M l
D L n C P I ( - l ) 0 .4 7 6 * 1 .0 1 4 * * -1 .4 8 3 * *
(2 .1 6 ) ( 2 .2 1 ) ( -2 .7 4 )
D L n H N E ( - l ) 0 .0 0 2 - 0 .4 4 4 0 .1 7 3
(0 .0 1 ) ( -1 .3 4 ) ( 0 .4 4 )
D L n M l ( - l ) 0 .2 6 3 * * 0 .1 4 4 -0 .221
( 2 .7 6 ) ( 0 .7 3 ) ( -0 .9 4 )
C O N S T 0 .1 2 2 E - 3 -0 .0 1 4 0 .0 3 5 * * *
( 0 .0 3 1 ) ( -1 .6 5 ) (3 .6 4 )
E C T 3 ( - 1 ) 0 .0 0 7 -0 .0 4 9 * * - 0 .0 1 8
( 0 .7 9 ) ( -2 .4 6 ) ( -0 .7 8 )
R  s q u a r e 0 .4 7 0 .4 6 0.41
S e r ia l  C o r r e l a t i o n 5 .0 7 8  [ .2 7 9 ] 5 .2 0 5  [ .2 6 7 ] 0 .6 5 7  [ .957]
F u n c t io n  F o r m 4 .0 9 7  [ .0 4 3 ] 4 .8 9 0  [ .0 2 7 ] 1 .385  [ .2 3 9 ]
N o r m a l i t y 0 .1 8 9  [ .9 1 0 ] 0 .1 6 9  [ .9 1 9 ] 0 .8 1 5  [ .6 6 5 ]
H e te r o s c e d a s t i c i t y 1 .318  [ .2 5 1 ] 9 .4 0 8  [ .0 0 2 ] 0 .0 7 8  [ .7 8 0 ]
Note: ***, ** and * are significant at 1%, 5%  and 10%, respectively.
V alues in brackets  are T-ratios and in square brackets are probabilities.
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Appendix 8.5: Single equation regression results of Model 4
20 observations used from 1993Q4 to 1998Q3
Regressor DLnCPI DLnHNE DLnM2
D LnC PI(-l) 0.066 0.478 -0.512*
(0.26) (1.09) (-1.92)
D L nH N E (-l) 0.143 0.036 0.120
(0.55) (0.08) (0.43)
D L nM 2(-l) 0.397a 0.567 0.052
(1.52) (1.24) (0.19)
CONST -0.64E-3 -0.018 0.027***
(-0.10) (-1.66) (4.15)
ECT4(-1) 0.001 -0.070** -0.003
(0.07) (-2.49) (-0.18)
R square 0.27 0.49 0.22
Serial Correlation 5.902 [.207] 2.784 [.595] 4.478 [.345]
Function Form 7.048 [.008] 5.524 [.019] 0.103 [.748]
Norm ality 1.191 [.551] 0.591 [.744] 0.891 [.641]
Heteroscedasticity 1.518 [.218] 10.075 [.002] 0.344 [.557]
Note: ***, ** and * are significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively, a is significant at the 15%
level. Values in brackets are T-ratios and in square brackets are probabilities.
Appendix 8.6: Estimated System Covariance Matrix of Errors
Model 1 Model 2
DLnCPI DLnVCBE DLnM DLnCPI DLnVCBE DLnMl
DLnCPI .535C-4 .597E-4 -2 3 5 E -4 DLnCPI .760E-4 .523E-4 ,321£-4
DLnVCBE .597E-4 .265E-3 -1 2 1 E -5 DLnVCBE ,523£-4 .26LE-3 .223£-4
DLnM -2 3 5 E -4 -1 2 1 E -5 .326E-3 DLnMl .32LE-4 .223E-4 .833C-4
Model 3 Model 4
DLnCPI DLnHNE DLnM DLnCPI DLnHNE DLnMl
DLnCPI .532E-4 .570C-4 -2 3 0 £ -4 DLnCPI .756£-4 .532£-4 .317E-4
DLnHNE .570£-4 230E-3 .461E-4 DLnHNE .532E-4 ,231£-3 .331E-4
DLnM -.230E -4 .461E-4 .321E-3 DLnMl .317E-4 .331£-4 .8 f3 £ -4
Source: Author’s estimates
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Appendix 8.7: The Variance Decompositions of Depreciation (DLnE) and 
Money Supply Growth (DLnMs) Rates
20 observations from 1993Q4 to 1998Q3 
Proportion of forecast variance explained by changes in:
DLnE DLnMs
Time
horizon DLnCPI DLnE DLnMs DLnCPI DLnE DLnM
(Quarter)
Model 1
1 27.65 71.21 1.14 24.38 0.73 74.89
3 26.60 67.86 5.54 23.77 0.80 75.43
6 26.59 67.65 5.76 23.83 0.81 75.36
9 26.59 67.65 5.76 23.83 0.81 75.36
12 26.59 67.65 5.76 23.83 0.81 75.36
Model 2
1 24.28 71.31 4.41 29.96 0.04 70.00
3 24.09 70.19 5.72 29.92 0.87 69.21
6 24.09 70.14 5.77 29.95 0.88 69.17
9 24.09 70.14 5.77 29.95 0.88 69.17
12 24.09 70.14 5.77 29.95 0.88 69.17
Model 3
1 26.77 71.09 2.14 21.01 7.42 71.57
3 24.87 70.17 4.96 20.14 9.03 70.83
6 24.86 70.11 5.03 20.17 9.03 70.80
9 24.86 70.11 5.03 20.17 9.03 70.80
12 24.86 70.11 5.03 20.17 9.03 70.80
1 26.65 65.72
Model 4
7.63 25.79 3.51 70.70
3 26.05 65.22 8.73 25.76 4.41 69.83
6 26.05 65.20 8.75 25.78 4.41 69.81
9 26.05 65.20 8.75 25.78 4.41 69.81
12 26.05 65.20 8.75 25.78 4.41 69.81
s
Source: Author’s estimates
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Appendix 8.8: Results of DF and ADF tests
Sample period from 1994Q1 to 1998Q3 
The Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept but not a trend
L nM l LnM 2 LnC PI
DF -0.49 -0.91 -2.29
A D F (l) -0.49 -1.05 -2 .10
A D F (2) -0.59 -1 .56 -2.22
A D F (3) -0.55 -1 .67 -1.96
A D F (4) -0.58 -1.61 -1 .89
D L n M l D L nM 2 D L nC PI
D F -4.18** -5.14** -3.20**
A D F (l) -4.89** -7.28** -2.82
A D F (2) -2.83* -2.92* -1.72
A D F (3) -1.67 -1 .14 -1.23
A D F (4) -1.89 -1.71 -1.98
Note: ** and * is significant at the 5% and 10% level.
Appendix 8.9: Share of the Private Sector in the total Economy (Per cent),
1991-99
1991 1993 1995 1997 1999
T ota l G D P 100 100 100 100 100
Sectors
Priva te 27.4 31.8 39.14 37.70 36.53
State 33.3 39.2 40.18 40.48 39.48
C o llec tiv e 39.3 29.0 10.06 8.91 8.6
M ixed n.a n.a 4 .32 3.84 3.64
F ore ign  Investm en t n.a n.a 6 .30 9.07 11.75
Note: For comparison with the 1991-93 period, data of the private sector in the 1995-99 period 
include share of private economy plus share of household economy in the total GDP.
Source: GSO (1994-99) and Dao (1995).
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Appendix: 8.10. Total Value of World and Vietnam's Exports (US$ billion), 1992-99
World's Exports (1) 
Vietnam's Exports (2)
Proportion of (2) to (1), (%)
92 93 94 95
3755 3742 4241 5073
2.48 2.99 4.05 5.2
0.07 0.08 0.10 0.10
96 97 98 99
5345 5529 5422 5587.5
7.33 9.15 9.37 11.54
0.14 0.17 0.17 0.21
Source: WTO, 1999. Table A3, p 144, and Table 1.2 (chapter 1)
Appendix: 8.11.
The lower bound on 3.\ for (5.2) and (5.3) is exactly as -2<  ai<0 for confirming that the 
residual sequence is stationary. We can prove it simply:
Before getting (5.2) we have:
et = aoSt-i + Tt (5.2a)
Be aware that stationarity necessitates that for (5.2a): -1< ao< l. If the estimated value of 
ao is close to -1 , we should also be concerned about nonstationarity.
By adding -8t-i in both sides of (5.2a), we have:
St - St-i = a 0St-i - St-i + Tt 
Ast = (a0-  l)8t-i + T t (5.2b)
So if we define: ai = ao -  1, then (5.2b) becomes: Ast = aiSt-i + Tt (5.2)
The condition -1< ao<l above is equivalent to -2< ao - 1<0 
Or -2< ai <0 (see Enders 1995, pp215, 374-75).
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